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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three essays on the impacts of demographic changes on
labor markets and consumption goods markets. More specifically, the first two
essays examine the role of demographic changes on labor market dynamics with
empirical evidence and a theoretical framework, respectively. The third essay
investigates the differential impacts of demographic changes on the consumption
of retirees and workers.
The impacts on labor market dynamics come from the substantial changes
in the demographic composition of labor markets, which happen among the vast
majority of developed economies. In the U.S., for instance, the share of young
workers (aged 15–24 years) in the labor force, let us name it the youth share
afterward, has increased from 19% since 1960s to 25% by the late 1970s due to
the postwar baby boom. Recently, this value decreased to less than 15% as the
inflow of young workers dwindled. In Japan, this value declined from 23% in
the late 1960s to less than 10% currently. If workers at different age levels are
disproportionately affected by the business cycle, then changes in the youth share
will have a direct composition effect on aggregate labor market dynamics, even
if age-specific labor market dynamics remain unchanged during demographic
changes.
It is often thought that young workers would be more easily affected by the
business cycle, as they lose jobs more often and their (un)employment rate is
generally more cyclically sensitive. In the first essay, I first show that this guess is
supported by data. In particular, the labor market volatility of young workers, in
terms of unemployment volatility, is significantly higher than those of other age
1
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groups, and the corresponding values of prime-age and old workers are relatively
close. This age-specific difference points out the importance of demographic
changes in accounting for aggregate business cycle volatility. Besides, I observe
that there is a hump-shaped pattern in the youth share in the U.S. from 1960
to 2007, at the same time, aggregate unemployment volatility comoves with this
youth share over time. More importantly, I find an even closer comovement
between the unemployment volatility of young workers and this youth share.
This suggests a new channel: Unemployment volatility within the group of young
workers increases with their share in the labor force.
I then test empirically this new channel. Using an unbalanced panel of
20 OECD countries from 1960 to 2007, I find that the variation in the youth
share has a quantitatively large and statistically significant, positive effect on
the unemployment volatility of young workers. The causality of this relationship
is identified by the exogeneity of the youth share, as it is predetermined at least
15 years prior. I refer to this novel fact as a spillover effect.
To quantify the relative importance of this spillover effect with respect to
the composition effect as mentioned before, which is proposed as the only demo-
graphic explanation for business cycle volatility by Jaimovich and Siu (2009), I
decompose the overall effect of demographic changes on aggregate unemployment
volatility. In contrast to Jaimovich and Siu (2009), I find that the spillover effect
accounts for most of the effect of demographic changes. In accounting for “The
Great Moderation”—the substantial decline in cyclical volatility experienced in
the U.S. since the mid-1980s, I find that demographic changes can explain one
quarter of the decline in unemployment volatility. Of this, the spillover effect ac-
counts for two-thirds of the overall effect, while the composition effect accounts
for only a third.
In the second essay, I explore a potential explanation of this novel fact. I
argue that an increase in the youth share depresses the price of goods produced
by young workers. This generates a congestion in their labor market dynam-
ics and raise their cyclical unemployment volatility. To be specific, I build on
Jaimovich, Pruitt, and Siu (2013) by incorporating a job matching model with
endogenous job separation into the real business cycle model, to connect labor
demand with the dynamics of labor market transition rates.
3I start by distincting goods produced by young and old workers. Then, these
two distinct goods are combined with capital for the production of final goods.
Therefore, this distinction generates a labor demand structure that differentiates
between young and old workers. With this labor demand structure, a greater
share of young workers is associated with a lower relative price of goods produced
by them, lowering firms’ profits. This induces spillover effects in labor market
dynamics, both in the job separation and finding rates. For the former, the
volatility of the job separation rate increases with the youth share, because
young workers become more vulnerable to productivity shocks. For the latter,
the volatility of job finding rate also increases with the youth share, since firms’
vacancy posting also becomes more sensitive to productivity shocks, which works
the same way as Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Therefore, both aspects imply
that the unemployment volatility of young workers increases with the youth
share.
As corroborating evidence for this mechanism, I find that the decline in the
relative price of goods produced by young workers due to a greater share of
young workers is supported by empirical data. Further evidence comes from the
empirical dynamics of transition rates: The second moments of the transition
rates of young workers are higher if the share of young workers is higher, and
vice versa. This empirical pattern is exactly the same as my model predicts.
The dependence of the labor market dynamics of young workers on demo-
graphic structure have important policy implications. First, it points out the
necessity for policy-makers to pay attention to the current state of demographic
structure and its projected path, if they need information about the labor market
response to potential shocks, especially for young workers. Second, the positive
correlation between business cycle volatility and demographic changes also sug-
gests that the Great Moderation was more likely driven by structural factors
other than good policies.
The third essay focuses on consumption goods markets, by assessing the dif-
ferential impacts of demographic changes on the consumption of retirees and
workers. The research topic is of particular interest, not only because of the
increasing income and wealth inequality in industrialized countries in the past
few decades (Piketty, 2015), but also because these countries will experience
considerable growths in their older population while significant declines in their
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
working population. In the U.S., the dependency ratio—the number of popula-
tion over 65 years to working age population, is expected to grow from 0.22 in
2015 to 0.40 in 2060. Some other countries have already stepped into the society
of aging. In Japan, the dependency ratio is already up to 0.47 in 2017, almost
three times as much as that in 1990. The current ratios for Italy, Germany, and
France are all over 0.3.
Using a New Keynesian model featuring the life-cycle behavior of Gertler
(1999), I predict an increase in consumption inequality between retirees and
workers in the U.S., measured by the ratio of consumption per retiree to con-
sumption per worker, using its projected demographic evolution. In my cali-
brated model, this ratio is predicted to decline by 40% for the U.S., from 0.68 to
0.41, between 1990 and 2060, due to population aging. As the zero lower bound
will bind more frequently with an older population, in addition, I also investi-
gate the distributional effects of the zero lower bound during cyclical downturns.
I find that the presence of the zero lower bound can mitigate the asymmetric
effects of shocks on workers and retirees in dynamics, because there is a lower
decline in the real return on assets, which particularly benefits retirees.
Chapter 2
Demographic Changes and Unemployment
Volatility
2.1 Introduction
The demographic composition of the labor market has changed substantially
among developed economies. In the U.S., the persistent inflow of young workers
(aged 15–24 years) into the labor market since 1960s has pushed the youth share,
the share of young workers in the labor force, to be more than one quarter by
the late 1970s, and then as the inflow dwindled, this value decreased to less
than 15% recently. In Japan, the share of old workers (aged 55–64 years) in
the labor force increased from 10% in the 1960s to more than 20% currently1.
The implications of demographic changes in the labor market are far reaching.
In this paper, I focus on the effect of demographic changes on unemployment
volatility.
It is often thought that young workers would be more easily affected by the
business cycle, while the opposite is considered true for prime-age workers. My
first contribution consists in showing that this guess is supported by data. There
are sharp age-specific differences. In particular, the unemployment volatility of
young workers is significantly higher than those of other age groups, and the
corresponding values of prime-age and old workers are relatively close.
Given the size of the unemployment volatility of young workers, changes in
the youth share have a direct composition effect on aggregate unemployment
1If the labor force is evenly distributed across age groups, the youth share will be 20%
and so will the share of old workers.
5
6 CHAPTER 2. DEMOGRAPHY AND UNEMPLOYMENT VOLATILITY
volatility. Ceteris paribus, more young workers in the labor force naturally
mean higher aggregate unemployment volatility even if age-specific unemploy-
ment volatility remains unchanged. The prediction of the impact of demographic
changes would be a simple task if it was only due to the composition effect. But,
if age-specific unemployment volatility is also affected by demographic changes,
estimating the effect on each age group is of vital importance for precise pre-
diction. Besides, the estimation results could have important implications for
policy makers when it comes to coping with age-specific labor market policies.
My second contribution lies in showing that there is also a spillover effect
among young workers. The variation in the youth share has a quantitatively large
and statistically significantly positive effect on the unemployment volatility of
young workers. This further contributes to the variation in aggregate unemploy-
ment volatility. After decomposing the overall effect of demographic changes on
aggregate unemployment volatility into composition and spillover effects, I find
that the spillover effect accounts for most of the effect of demographic changes.
In accounting for “The Great Moderation”—the substantial decline in cyclical
volatility experienced in the U.S. since the mid-1980s, I show that demographic
changes can explain 24.2% of the decline in unemployment volatility. Of this,
the spillover effect accounts for 16.6%, while the composition effect only 7.6%.
To measure unemployment volatility, I use time-varying volatility based on
a stochastic volatility process with an autoregression (SV with AR) used in re-
cent studies (see e.g. Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2011; Born and Pfeifer, 2014).
Compared with the rolling-window standard deviation, a conventional measure
used in the literature (see e.g. Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Jaimovich and Siu,
2009; and Carvalho and Gabaix, 2013), it has two advantages: First, as a depen-
dent variable, it does not suffer from serial correlation in the residuals, which is
inevitable for the conventional measure that uses overlapping data for the con-
struction of consecutive values. Second, it does not have any loss in the amount
of observations, while for the other, a 10-year window period means a loss of
nine observations for each country. Furthermore, in comparison with the instan-
taneous standard deviation based on Stock and Watson (2003) (Stock/Watson)
used in Jaimovich and Siu (2009), it is still preferred. For the measure based on
Stock/Watson, the unit root assumption used for the variance equation is not
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empirically supported2. Besides, it uses a mixture of different normal distribu-
tions for the shock in the variance equation to ensure a better fit with the data,
but this practice makes it suffer from subjectivity in the selection of weights for
this shock.
In addition to the demographic variable, which is used as the sole explana-
tory variable in Jaimovich and Siu (2009), Lugauer and Redmond (2012), and
Lugauer (2012b), I include labor market institutions to explain unemployment
volatility. Union density and the centralization of wage bargaining reflect real
wage rigidities, which play an important role in the amplification of unemploy-
ment fluctuation (Hall, 2005). In addition, according to Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008), high unemployment benefit suggests a low value for firms’ profit, and
therefore a high cyclical unemployment fluctuation. Neglecting the effects of la-
bor market institutions might lead to biased estimation or even spurious regres-
sion. Although changes in labor market institutions could also partially reflect
demographic pressures, this does not affect the consistency of the estimation.
As pointed out by Everaert and Vierke (2016), the negligence of the time
series property of panel data might lead to spurious inferences. In view of this, I
also carry out extensive stationarity analyses on relevant series. Another reason
is the relatively monotoneous variation in the demographics and unemployment
volatility over the sample period. Hypothetically, the two could merely share a
similar trend in coincidence. The results show that this possibility is excluded
as stationarity tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in any of them.
But I detect cross-sectional dependence in both series. This could lead to biased
upward stationarity statistics and falsely reject the null hypothesis. Thus, I also
run panel cointegration tests to ensure the validity of regression results in case of
non-stationarity. Besides, I use the common correlated effects (CCE) estimators
proposed by Pesaran (2006) to take care of cross-sectional dependence.
2The estimates of the coefficient of the AR(1) process of the variance equation are
smaller than unity for all countries in my sample. Therefore, the unit root assumption is
not supported. Results are available upon request.
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2.1.1 Related literature
This paper contributes to four strands of literature. First, this paper is closely
related to the studies initiated by Jaimovich and Siu (2009) on the role of demo-
graphic changes in aggregate business cycle volatility. By linking demographic
changes to the aggregate cyclical volatility of real GDP after World War II in
G7 countries, they claim that the change in the age composition of the labor
force over time is the main demographic reason for the variation in aggregate
cyclical volatility. As follow-ups, Lugauer and Redmond (2012) and Lugauer
(2012b) also found similar results with, respectively, a balanced panel dataset
for 51 countries and state-level data of the U.S. But the replication by Everaert
and Vierke (2016) indicates that these regression results may be spurious, as
the series used in these papers for demographic change and cyclical volatility
are found to be non-stationary. Besides, no co-integrating relation is detected
between these two series.
Building on these studies, this paper confirms the positive impact of demo-
graphic changes on aggregate unemployment volatility. To obtain this result,
I deviate from the literature in three aspects. First, I use the youth share as
a measure for demographics instead of the compact index, which is the share
of young and old workers in the labor force, used in Jaimovich and Siu (2009).
Although their analysis shows that the volatilities of hours worked and employ-
ment for young and old workers are obviously higher than that of prime-age
workers, it is too restrictive to assume the regression coefficients for the young
and the old as being the same. This is because the underlying reasons are dif-
ferent: The fact that the cyclical volatility of young workers is high is related
to their low work experience, which is a persistent feature for young workers in
most countries; for old workers, on the other hand, it depends on labor market
reforms such as changes in the generosity of unemployment benefits and firing
cost, which are heterogeneous in terms of timing and scale among different coun-
tries. Second, I use the time-varying volatility based on SV with AR to measure
unemployment volatility instead of a rolling-window standard deviation3 or the
3Besides, the rolling-window standard deviation in Jaimovich and Siu (2009) is filtered
by Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Since HP filter itself already has several flaws (see Hamil-
ton, 2017), a volatility measure which further uses a rolling-window standard deviation is
at a disadvantage.
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measure based on Stock/Watson used in Jaimovich and Siu (2009) with its ad-
vantages mentioned before. In fact, with this measure, I find that the difference
in unemployment volatility between old and prime-age workers is not a general
worldwide phenomenon; this corroborates my first deviation. Finally, I also con-
trol the effect of labor market institutions, which is overlooked in the literature
and is likely to be the reason for the non-stationarity detected by Everaert and
Vierke (2016) in the series used by Jaimovich and Siu (2009) and their follow-ups.
Despite there being rich literature on the impact of demographic changes
on aggregate business cycle volatility, there are few studies that examine the
impact on the age-specific unemployment volatility. Han (2018b) happens to be
the only one to offer a theoretical explanation of this spillover effect. In that
paper, I show that the explanation lies in the price changes of goods typically
produced by young workers. An increase in the youth share depresses this price.
Since the decline in price can shrink profits, firms raise their selection criteria
of young workers, thus pushing the cutoff of the productivity of young workers
close to the center of its distribution. This implies that more young workers
will be affected when aggregate productivity changes. Furthermore, firms’ profit
and thereby their vacancy postings also become more sensitive to aggregate
productivity since their profit shrinks. Therefore, the unemployment volatility
of young workers increases with the youth share. This paper ties in with this
study by providing empirical evidence to Han (2018b).
Third, this paper is related to the literature which studies the demographic
differences in labor market fluctuations. Clark and Summers (1981) document
the demographic differences in unemployment variation in the U.S. from 1950
to 1976. They conclude that the cyclical variation of the unemployment rate
of young workers is higher and thereby accounts more of aggregate unemploy-
ment variation4. Jaimovich, Pruitt, and Siu (2013) extend this results to hours
worked and wage in the U.S. They find the volatilities of both hours and wages
for young workers to be higher than those of the prime-age. This paper enriches
the literature by generalizing the pattern of the demographic differences in un-
employment volatility to 20 OECD countries. In addition, this paper shows that
4In Clark and Summers (1981), the cyclical variation of the young is measured by the
sensitivity of the change rate of the unemployment rate of young workers with respect to
aggregate demand.
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this pattern exists not only in summary statistics, which is the measure used in
the literature, but also in the time-varying measure.
As already mentioned, this paper is also related to the literature that in-
vestigates the impact of labor market institutions on unemployment dynamics.
The conventional explanation for cross-country differences in the unemployment
rate and unemployment volatility considers the variation in labor market insti-
tutions. Studies by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Krause and Uhlig (2012)
focus on the long-run effect of labor market institutions on the unemployment
rate, while studies by Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2007) and Abbritti and Weber
(2010) explore the impact of labor market institutions on cyclical unemployment
dynamics. Their findings suggest that it is hard to detect the true relationship
between demographic changes and business cycle volatility without controlling
the effects of labor market institutions on the latter. Therefore, in this paper,
I include the effects of labor market institutions while focusing on the role of
demographic changes.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section is about the measure of
unemployment volatility and provides a description of the data. Section 2.3
documents the differences in age-specific unemployment volatility. Section 2.4
lays out the empirical evidence of the existence of the spillover effect. Section
2.5 presents a decomposition of the overall effect of demographic changes in the
Great Moderation. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Measure of unemployment volatility
A time-varying volatility measure, with which one can easily disentangle the
influence of temporary shocks, is crucial to identify persistent demographic fea-
tures in unemployment volatility. I use a measure based on SV with AR for
unemployment volatility.
The unemployment rate is assumed to follow an AR(1) process5:
ut = ρut−1 +eσtvt, (2.1)
5I omit the country specific subscript for simplicity.
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and the volatility equation follows an AR(1) stochastic volatility process (see
e.g. Fernández-Villaverde et al. 2011; Born and Pfeifer, 2014):
σt = (1−ρσ)σ¯+ρσσt−1 +ηεt, (2.2)
where vt and εt
iid∼ N(0,1), ρ and ρσ are respectively the coefficients of the level
and volatility equations, Equations (2.1) and (2.2), σ¯ is an unconditional mean,
and η is a scale factor.6
The error term of the level equation is a product of the instantaneous in-
novation variance and an i.i.d. random process with unity variance. I use the
unemployment rate itself instead of the log unemployment rate in the level equa-
tion. This is because the unemployment rate is already in percentage and usu-
ally considered as stationary, more importantly, according to Andreasen (2010),
log-transformation of the level equation leads to an infinite expectation of the
unemployment rate7.
The time-varying volatility of the unemployment rate is eσt and what one
needs is the estimation of the stochastic volatility σt. With the non-linear setup
of the shocks, the Sequential Importance Resampling particle filter (with 10,000
particles) is used to evaluate the likelihood. Thereafter, a standard Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm is used to maximize the posterior, followed by a backward-
smoothing routine to get the fitted value for σt. The detailed procedure can be
found in Born and Pfeifer (2014).8
6As priors for the stochastic volatility processes in the sample, I assume the coefficient
of the level equation follows uniform distribution: ρ ∼ U(−0.9999,0.9999), the uncon-
ditional mean in the volatility equation follows uniform distribution: σ¯ ∼ U(−11,−3),
the coefficient of the volatility equation follows beta distribution: ρσ ∼ Beta(0.9,0.01),
and the scale factor of the shock in the volatility equation follows gamma distribution:
η ∼Gamma(0.5,0.01).
7See Appendix A.1 for proof.
8The code for generating the time-varying volatility based on SV with AR is publicly
available on Pfeifer’s personal website.
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2.2.1 Data
I use an unbalanced panel of data consisting of annual9 observations of 20 OECD
countries10 from 1960 to 2007. The cross-sectional coverage is limited to 20
countries because the data for labor market institutions are derived from the
ICTWSS database (Visser, 2016) and the database of CEP-OECD institutions
(Nickell, 2006), which only cover these countries11. The data are up to 2007,
because unemployment behavior afterward contains noisy signals of the recent
financial crisis. Besides, it is technically difficult to disentangle the effect of the
financial crisis from the effect of demographic changes.
The dependent variables in regressions are the age-specific unemployment
volatility and aggregate unemployment volatility, respectively. Aggregate mea-
sure covers people aged 15-64 years. The main explanatory variable is the share
of the corresponding age group in the labor force, while the youth share for aggre-
gate unemployment volatility. In addition, I also use the population share as well
as the native population share to deal with potential endogeneity problems.12
To characterize labor market institutions, I use five indicators. These are: (i)
union density, which is the percentage of wage and salary earners who are union
members; (ii) the union centralization of wage bargaining, which is related to real
wage rigidities; (iii) the strictness of employment protection legislation, which is
associated with firing cost; (iv) tax wedge, which is a measure of the deviation
of the actual wage from the labor cost to employer due to taxation; (v) gross
replacement rate, which is the ratio of unemployment benefits received when
not working over wages earned when employed, as a measure of the generosity
of unemployment benefit.
Additionally, I include a measure for the world demand shock, which is prox-
ied by the log-difference of the sum of real GDP of other 19 countries.
9The quarterly data for the age-specific unemployment rate are only available for lim-
ited countries, besides, the data for the labor force share of each age group and labor
market institutions are only available annually.
10Table 2.1 includes a list of these 20 countries.
11See Appendix A.2 for detailed information on data sources.
12See Appendix A.3 for the summary statistics of key variables.
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2.3 Unemployment volatility by age
I start with the analysis of differences in unemployment volatility across age
groups. Young workers form the age group of 15-24 years, while the old comprise
the age group of 55-64 years. I find that the unemployment volatility of young
workers is far higher than those of the other age groups, and the corresponding
values of old workers are quite close to those of prime-age workers in general.
To be consistent with the literature started by Jaimovich and Siu (2009), in
addition to the main measure for unemployment volatility as mentioned, I also
use the standard deviation of the cyclical component of the unemployment rate
as an extra measure. For this I apply the one-sided HP filter with a smoothing
parameter of 100 on the unemployment rate 13. If one filters the log unemploy-
ment rate and uses the percentage standard deviation to measure unemployment
volatility, the volatility will be over-sensitive to real shocks when the unemploy-
ment rate is at a low level14.
Table 2.1 reports the cyclical volatility of the unemployment rate by age
group for 20 OECD countries15. For easy comparison, I normalize the value for
the age group of 25-54 years to unity. From Table 2.1 we can see an almost
strictly declining16 trend in the age-specific unemployment volatility before age
55. For the age group of 15-19 years, the unemployment rate is about three times
volatile than that of prime-age workers, and more than four times in Austria,
Belgium, France, and Italy; for the age group of 20-24 years, the unemployment
rate is still about twice as volatile as that of prime-age workers. However, this
13A parameter of 100 is commonly used in the literature for annual data, see e.g.
Cooley and Ohanian (1991) and Rogerson and Shimer (2011). It is also the value used
throughout this paper. Besides, I have also repeated the analyses with a parameter of
6.25, as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002), and got similar results.
14An extreme case is Germany. From the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, the unemploy-
ment rate remains less than 1 percent in Germany. This makes it highly sensitive to any
real shock. The percentage standard deviation of the unemployment rate stays at a quite
high level before the mid-1970s.
15In fact, the unemployment rate data of the age groups of 15-19 years and 20-24 years
are only available for Netherlands from 1987 and the data of the age group of 55-64 years
are only available for Portugal from 1975. For Ireland, the age-specific unemployment
rate has several missing values before 1983. I use the average of the neighboring values
to replace the missing if both are available; otherwise, it is left as missing. In this way,
missing values are filled back to 1975.
16One exception is Switzerland, for whom the unemployment volatility of the age group
of 15-19 years is slightly lower than that of the age group of 20-24 years, but still the value
is much higher for the young than that of the prime-age.
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Table 2.1: Cyclical volatility of unemployment by age group, 20 OECD countries
Country Period 15-19 20-24 25-54 55-64 15-64
Australia 1966-2007 2.88 1.97 1.00 1.18 1.29
Austria 1994-2007 4.86 2.08 1.00 0.78 1.15
Belgium 1983-2007 4.27 2.76 1.00 1.10 1.13
Canada 1976-2007 1.95 1.83 1.00 0.97 1.15
Denmark 1983-2007 2.17 2.27 1.00 0.96 1.03
Finland 1963-2007 2.15 1.95 1.00 1.40 1.11
France 1968-2007 4.72 3.51 1.00 1.11 1.21
Germany 1970-2007 1.82 1.77 1.00 1.34 1.10
Ireland 1975-2007 3.02 1.99 1.00 0.77 1.18
Italy 1970-2007 5.24 3.53 1.00 1.26 1.47
Japan 1968-2007 3.16 1.75 1.00 1.67 1.15
Netherlands 1971-2007 3.26 1.75 1.00 0.62 1.11
New Zealand 1986-2007 2.12 2.10 1.00 0.86 1.19
Norway 1972-2007 3.42 2.30 1.00 0.68 1.11
Portugal 1974-2007 3.46 2.85 1.00 0.70 1.22
Spain 1972-2007 3.00 2.21 1.00 0.70 1.22
Sweden 1963-2007 3.32 2.85 1.00 0.92 1.16
Switzerland 1991-2007 2.28 2.55 1.00 1.02 0.99
U.K. 1984-2007 2.32 1.97 1.00 0.92 1.14
U.S. 1960-2007 2.02 1.64 1.00 0.83 1.12
Notes: Cyclical volatility of the unemployment rate is filtered by a one-sided HP
filter with a smoothing parameter of 100. It is expressed relative to the prime-age
(25-54).
trend reverses in several countries17 when it comes to old workers. Among these,
the unemployment volatility of old workers is relatively high for Japan, Germany,
and Finland, which are currently facing serious aging of the labor force18. I also
report aggregate unemployment volatility (15-64) in the last column, which is
higher than that of prime-age workers for almost all 20 countries19 because of the
17Which include Australia, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and
Switzerland.
18The labor force share of the old (55-64) for these three countries in 2015 are, respec-
tively, 19.91%, 18.71%, and 18.37%, ranking top 3 among the 20 OECD countries.
19Again, the exception is Switzerland. The aggregate unemployment volatility is lower
than all age-specific volatilities. The reason for this puzzling observation could be due to
the negative relation between age-specific unemployment rates. As the aggregate unem-
ployment rate can be expressed as the average of age-specific unemployment rates weighted
by the corresponding labor force share. Therefore, the aggregate unemployment volatility
is composed of the volatility of uitsit and the covariance of uitsit and u
j
ts
j
t , where i and j
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volatile behavior of young workers. In summary, the unemployment volatility of
young workers is significantly higher than that of other age groups.
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Figure 2.1: Time-varying unemployment volatility by age group
Notes: Solid line is for young workers (15-24); dotted, triangle-hatched line is for
prime-age workers (25-54); and solid, square-hatched line is for old workers
(55-64).
The aforementioned measure is straightforward and easy to compare across
age groups, but as summary statistics, it could lead to misleading interpretation.
One might wonder whether the observed pattern is a persistent demographic
feature or is simply due to temporary shocks. For example, right before the
are the indexes for different age groups. If the unemployment rates of young workers and
the prime-age move in opposite direction, suppose that it is due to certain labor market
institutions which only favor the job finding probability of young workers, we will see a
negative covariance of uYt sYt and uPt sPt . And summation of these terms gives a lower
value for aggregate unemployment volatility. This is also one of the reasons that I add
labor market institutions into the analysis.
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beginning of 2005, there was a big spike in the unemployment rate of the age
group of 60-64 years in Germany. The reason is that January 1, 2005 marked the
effective date of the Hartz IV reform, which shortened the duration and lowered
the level of unemployment benefits. This creates an incentive for old workers to
enter the unemployment pool and grab the last chance for high unemployment
benefit without having much to lose. Potentially, this could be the reason for
the higher unemployment volatility of old workers compared to that of prime-age
workers for Germany as shown in Table 2.1, rather than any essential difference
among workers of different ages. A similar logic also applies to the high values
for young workers, which might be the result of changes in certain labor market
institutions that only impact young workers. Therefore, it is also necessary to
ascertain the time-varying measure of unemployment volatility.
Figure 2.1 shows the volatility measure based on SV with AR by age group
for four countries. It displays distinctive features. For the U.S. and Canada,
the unemployment volatility of young workers (solid line) is obviously above the
values for prime-age (dotted and triangle-hatched line) and old workers (solid
and square-hatched line). The value for prime-age workers is slightly higher than
that for old workers over most of the time for the U.S., while the two almost
coincide for Canada. For the U.K. and Germany, the value for old workers even
overtakes that for young workers. For the U.K., this happens only once; while
for Germany, though, this lasts for about two decades. Besides, we see there is
indeed a sudden spike around 2005 in the unemployment volatility of old workers
in Germany, but its long-lasting high value does not seem to be driven by the
labor market reform in 2005.
Based on the examination of the time-varying unemployment volatilities by
age group also for the other 16 countries20, I conclude that the unemployment
volatility of young workers is the highest in general, and this is more likely to be
a persistent demographic feature over time. The value for old workers frequently
overtakes that for prime-age workers for a few countries (Japan, Germany, and
Finland), but overall these two are quite close.
20See Appendix A.4 for the measures of other sixteen countries.
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2.4 Empirical identification of the role of demographic
changes
In this section, I employ the panel data model to study the relationship between
unemployment volatility and demographic changes in the 20 OECD countries.
For age-specific unemployment volatility, I find the following: (1) the variation in
the youth share has a quantitatively large and statistically significantly positive
effect on the unemployment volatility of young workers, and (2) no statistically
significant relationship is detected among prime-age and old workers. After
the spillover effect is identified, I go on to check for aggregate unemployment
volatility and find that the variation in the youth share also has a statistically
significant effect on aggregate unemployment volatility.
2.4.1 Unemployment volatility of young workers
In this subsection, I first present a brief look at the comovement between the
unemployment volatility of young workers and the youth share. I then check
the time series properties of these two series, and finally report the regression
results.
Figure 2.2 presents the time series of the time-varying unemployment volatil-
ity of young workers and the youth share for the U.S., U.K., Canada, and Ger-
many. In the U.S., the cyclical behavior can be divided into two distinct periods,
one with a persistent rise from 1960s to the mid-1970s, and the other with a de-
cline from the mid-1970s. Coincidentally, the evolution of the youth share can
also be characterized by a similar pattern—a rise with the entry of baby boomers
into the workforce in the 1960s and the 1970s, and then a decline from the late
1970s. In Canada and the U.K., both series share a monotonically decreasing
trend over time. For Germany, both series share a common decline from the
mid-1980s to the early 2000s.
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Figure 2.2: Youth share and unemployment volatility of young workers
Notes: Solid line is the youth share; dotted, circle-hatched line is the
time-varying unemployment volatility of young workers; solid, square-hatched
line is the trend of unemployment volatility which is filtered using a one-sided
HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 100.
2.4.1.1 Time series properties
Before moving to regression analysis, it is necessary to check whether unemploy-
ment volatility is intrinsically driven by demographic changes or only coinciden-
tally shares a similar trend. This concern comes from the insufficient variation
in both series21. The rather monotonous variation could arouse the suspicion of
spurious regression.
21Due to the long-term decline in birth rate and increase in life expectancy, the youth
share decreases persistently from the 1980s, at the same time, there is also a decline in
the unemployment volatility of the young in most OECD countries.
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To take care of this, I first check the stationarity of the relevant series. The
upper part of Table 2.2 reports the results of panel unit root tests of the youth
share and the unemployment volatility of young workers. For the youth share,
after projecting out fixed effects (FE), I show that the null hypothesis of a unit
root is rejected as a panel by the Maddala and Wu (1999) test (MW)22, and it is
rejected at 5 percent level of significance in six countries (out of 20) by country-
specific augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) tests (ADF). For unemployment
volatility of young workers, after projecting out fixed effects and time effects
(FETE), along with the effects of labor market institutions (LMIs) and external
shock23, the null hypothesis is rejected at 1 percent level of significance by the
MW test as a panel. Besides, it is rejected in six countries by country-specific
tests. These suggest the two series are more likely to be stationary.
However, I also detect cross-sectional dependence in the data. Columns 1 and
2 in the middle part show that, although the values for the average cross-sectional
correlation ρ¯ are low, the Pesaran (2004) cross-sectional dependence (CD) tests
are significant. This strongly suggests the existence of cross-sectional dependence
in both series. As the panel unit root tests are biased toward stationarity when
cross-sectional dependence is neglected according to O’Connell (1998), we cannot
fully rule out non-stationarity. In Column 3, I also carry out the same test for
unemployment volatility by projecting out only fixed effects and time effects.
The results are similar. The reason for this exercise is to show that, with a
model setup similar to Jaimovich and Siu (2009), cross-sectional dependence is
likely to be a potential reason for biased estimates.
Therefore, I also carry out cointegration tests as shown in the lower part of
Table 2.2. Even if these two series were non-stationary, panel regression is still
capable of detecting the true relationship if they are cointegrated24. Technically,
if panel cointegration tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the error
terms of the regressions, the panel regressions still offer meaningful results even
with the presence of cross-sectional dependence. The results show that there
22It combines the p-values of the country-specific ADF tests.
23I use a fixed effect model and regress the unemployment volatility of each country
on time dummies, the corresponding labor market institution indicators, and an external
demand shock. Then, I use the residuals to calculate the country-specific unit root tests.
24Phillips and Moon (1999) show that a consistent estimation can also be obtained with
neither stationarity nor cointegration, but their result relies on cross-sectional indepen-
dence.
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is indeed a cointegrating relationship between the youth share and the unem-
ployment volatility of young workers, both shown by the cointegration tests as
a panel and the ADF tests of individual countries.25
Table 2.2: Specification tests
Model FE FETE+LMIs FETE
(1) (2) (3)
Variable youth share unem. vol. unem. vol.
(young) (young)
ADF unit root tests of the series
Panel unit root
test
73.74 83.81 91.74
P-value [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
# pi 6 5% 6/20 6/20 7/20
Cross-sectional dependence
Average
correlation
0.04 -0.03 -0.03
CD test 3.24 -2.37 -2.09
P-value [0.00] [0.02] [0.04]
Panel cointegration test
Panel unit root
test
- 87.47 93.02
P-value - [0.00] [0.00]
# pi 6 5% - 7/20 7/20
Notes: Sample period: 1960-2007, unbalanced panel of 20 OECD countries.
FE refers to a model which projects out fixed effects; FETE refers to a model
which projects out both fixed effects and time effects; FETE + LMIs refers to a
model which not only projects out fixed effects and time effects but also excludes
the effects from labor market institutions and external demand shock.
CD test refers to cross-sectional dependence test. Details for the calculation of
test statistics can be found in Appendix A.5.
25I regress σYit − σ¯Yit on the regressors, which includes sYit − s¯Yit , time dummies, labor
market indicators, an external demand shock, and a constant term for each country. Then,
I carry out the country-specific ADF tests on the error terms and count the number of
countries with a p-value lower than 5%. The panel cointegration tests are constructed
similarly as the panel unit root tests in the top left of Table 2.2, by combining the p-values
from the country-specific ADF tests.
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2.4.1.2 Regression results
The regression setup is a panel data model with fixed effects and time effects
(FETE):
σit = αi+βt+γsit+λXit+εit, (2.3)
where σit is the volatility measure based on SV with AR for country i at time t;
sit is the share of the corresponding age group in the labor force; Xit includes
the five indicators of the labor market institutions and the external shock as
mentioned; αi is a country fixed effect; and βt denotes a full set of time dummies
to control for time effects.
Table 2.3: Unemployment volatility and the share of labor force: young workers
Model FETE
(1)
MG
(2)
CCEP
(3)
CCEMG
(4)
Coef. of the share 2.24
(2.64)
3.28
(5.81)
8.97***
(3.43)
8.80*
(4.82)
LMIs & shock Yes Yes Yes Yes
FETE Yes Yes
Nobs 644 644 644 644
R2 0.31 0.96 0.77 0.62
CD test -2.45
[0.02]
2.31
[0.02]
0.60
[0.55]
-0.76
[0.45]
Notes: Sample period: 1960-2007, unbalanced panel of 20 OECD countries. The
dependent variable is the unemployment volatility of young workers.
All models exclude the effects of labor market institutions and external demand
shock. FETE refers to a model which also projects out fixed effect and time
effects; MG refers to mean group estimator with trends; CCEP refers to a model
that projects out fixed effects and excludes the effects of the unobserved common
factors; and CCEMG refers to the mean group model, which also excludes the
effects of the unobserved common factors.
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors for Columns 1 and 2 and Newey-West standard
errors for Columns 3 and 4 are in parentheses. p values are in square brackets.
*** and * stand for significance levels of 1% and 10%, respectively.
Table 2.3 presents the regression results for young workers. Columns 1 and
2 give the results of fixed effects and time effects (FETE) and the mean group
(MG) estimations. With both estimators reported, we can reduce the risk of
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model misspecification26. I also include a trend component in the MG estimator,
as there appears to be a trend in the unemployment volatility of young workers
for some countries. Besides, I report the Driscoll and Kraay (1998)27 standard
error for both, which is robust to the missing of unobserved common factors
unrelated to regressors. The results in the first row show that the coefficients
are both positive but insignificant. It seems that the youth share does not
have any statistically significant impact on the unemployment volatility of young
workers. At the same time, though, I detect cross-sectional dependence, which
suggests that the unobserved common factors in the error term is correlated with
regressors. In this case, both FETE and MG estimators are biased. Still the
former is used as the main estimator in Jaimovich and Siu (2009).
To deal with this problem, I follow the approach proposed by Pesaran (2006)
with common correlated effects (CCE) estimators28. Here, the unobserved com-
mon factors are proxied by the cross-sectional averages of all observed variables,
including both the dependent variable and the regressors. As a result, the unob-
served common factors are eliminated and the consistency of panel estimator is
ensured. Column 3 reports the pooled common correlated effect (CCEP) estima-
tor, the fixed-effect version of the CCE estimator. Now, the coefficient becomes
significant at the 1 percent level, meaning the youth share has a positive im-
pact on the unemployment volatility of young workers29. The magnitude of the
26The FETE estimator pools the data together and assumes that the slope coefficients,
the intercepts, and error variances of different age groups are all identical. Thus it may
produce inconsistent estimates in case of heterogeneity among age groups. While the MG
estimator by Pesaran and Smith (1995) fits the model separately for each group, therefore
the estimated parameters are allowed to be heterogeneous across groups.
27Driscoll and Kraay (1998) propose a non-parametric covariance matrix estimator for
the consistent standard errors. They use the cross-sectional average of the orthogonality
moments of the product of the regressors and the residual to act as a Newey-West type
weight in the estimation.
28Other approaches include the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) approach and
the principal components approach. Among all, the CCE estimator is the most attractive
because of its simplicity. One only needs to add the cross-sectional averages of observed
variables in the fixed effects panel estimation and corrects the standard errors accordingly.
29Meanwhile, I also report the CCEP estimators of the coefficients of labor market
institutions in Appendix A.6. Of which, the coefficients of union density and employment
protection legislation are sizable and statistically significant. The effect of union density
on unemployment volatility is positive, because union density is positively related to real
wage rigidities and firms have to cut employees in case of recession; while the effect
of employment protection legislation is negative, which is consistent with the finding of
Blanchard and Portugal (2001).
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coefficient suggests that a 10% increase in the youth share would increase the un-
employment volatility of young workers by almost 0.90. Since the time-varying
measure of the unemployment volatility of young workers for the U.S. is 2.57 in
1975 and 0.46 in 1995, the regression result suggests that: If there were a decline
of 23.5% less young workers in the labor force over these 12 years, and all other
conditions unchanged, then we would have the same decline in unemployment
volatility of young workers. In other words, the actual decline in the youth share
is 8.2%, meaning demographic changes account for approximately a third of the
variation of the unemployment volatility of young workers.
To further check the robustness of the results and allow for more flexibility
in the model setup, I also report the results of the common correlated effects
mean group (CCEMG) estimator in Column 4, the mean group version of the
CCE estimator. It allows for heterogeneous slope coefficients and also controls
for cross-sectional dependence. The results confirm the positive impact of the
youth share on unemployment volatility as implied by the CCEP estimator. The
magnitude of the coefficient is slightly lower and less significant. Considering
that the country-specific coefficients are relaxed to be heterogeneous, one should
expect a lower significance level. The null assumption of cross-sectional inde-
pendence cannot be rejected either, which ensures the validity of the estimation
result.
As the youth share also depends on the participation rate of young workers,
its validity as a measure of demographics lies in the exogeneity condition that
the participation rate of young workers plays a minor role in the unemployment
dynamics of young workers. To verify this, I use the share of young population
as a proxy for the youth share. As the share of young population is independent
of their labor force participation decision, the endogeneity bias is likely to be
excluded. Column 1 of Table 2.4 reports the results of CCEP estimation result.
The coefficient is positive and significant at the 10% level. Moreover, the level
of the coefficient is similar to that in Table 2.3. The CD test also suggests that
cross-sectional dependence is well taken care of by the CCEP estimator.
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Table 2.4: Labor force participation and international migration: further robust
check
Proxy for youth
share
population share native population
share
(young) (young)
Coef. of the proxy 6.53*
(3.47)
9.41**
(4.45)
LMIs & shock Yes Yes
FETE Yes Yes
Nobs 659 627
R2 0.77 0.78
CD test -0.05
[0.96]
-0.67
[0.50]
Notes: Unbalanced panel of 20 OECD countries, sample period: 1960-2007 for
Column 1 and 1970-2007 for Column 2. The dependent variable is the
unemployment volatility of young workers.
Model used in this table is the pooled common correlated effect (CCEP)
estimator. Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses. p values are in square
brackets. ** and * stand for significance levels of 1% and 5%, respectively.
However, if the response of the labor market activity of a foreign young
worker to shocks differs from the response of that of a native young worker, the
young population share is still likely to be endogenous as international migration
decision is unaccounted for. To take care of this, Jaimovich and Siu (2009)
suggest using the share of the native population30. As the historical data of this
distribution are directly unavailable, they proxy it by the projection of the labor
force share on the lagged birth rates. Instead, I use directly the age distribution
of native population calculated from data on lagged birth rates and population
size. With historical data on birth rates and population from Mitchell (2008)
and Maddison (2003), I first get the historical series of the size of newborns.
Since the population size of the young native population today is just the sum
of newborns 15 to 24 years ago, I calculate the share of native young population
as
bYit =
∑j=24
j=15 bi,t−jpi,t−j∑j=64
j=15 bi,t−jpi,t−j
, (2.4)
30Since the past fertility decision is made long before the realization of shocks affecting
the current unemployment volatility, the distribution of native young population is not
likely to be influenced by international migration.
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where bi,t , pi,t are, respectively, the birth rate and population size at time t for
country i.
Still, this measure does not account for the dynamics of the mortality rate
for people below 64, and assumes that all newborns can live up to the age
of 64. Therefore, I start this series from 1970 to mitigate the effects of the
variation in the mortality rate and longevity. Column 2 in Table 2.4 reports the
corresponding results of the CCEP estimation when the youth share is replaced
by the share of young native population. The coefficient is significant at the 1%
level and the magnitude of the coefficients is also similar to the other two cases.
Taken together, I interpret the results of this subsection as convincing evidence
of the existence of the spillover effect.
2.4.2 Unemployment volatilities of prime-age and old
workers
In this section, I verify whether a similar relationship is also present among
workers in other age levels.
Table 2.5 reports the results of CCEP estimations. Column 1 presents the es-
timation results when I regress the unemployment volatility of prime-age workers
on their labor force share and other regressors. The share of the prime-age group
in the labor force has a negative but insignificant impact on the unemployment
volatility of prime-age workers. When I use the share of prime-age population as
a proxy in Column 2, the impact becomes weaker and the coefficient is even less
significant. Furthermore, when I use the share of native prime-age population as
a proxy in Column 3, the results are similar: The coefficient is insignificant and
the impact becomes even weaker. These, in turn, confirm the non-existence of
any statistically significant relationship among prime-age workers. The validity
of these results is ensured as cross-sectional dependence is rejected in all three
cases.
In the last three columns, I redo the same exercises for old workers. For the
share of old workers and the share of old population, the coefficients are positive
but insignificant. For the share of the native old population, the coefficient
becomes significant at the 5% level, but CD test is rejected at the 10% level.
Thus, in Appendix A.7, I also report the corresponding CCEMG estimator,
which becomes insignificant and whose coefficient also changes direction. This
26 CHAPTER 2. DEMOGRAPHY AND UNEMPLOYMENT VOLATILITY
Table 2.5: Unemployment volatility and the share of labor force: prime-age and
old workers
Age-specific
share
sPit
(1)
pPit
(2)
bPit
(3)
sOit
(4)
pOit
(5)
bOit
(6)
Coef. of the
share
-3.54
(2.25)
-1.30
(2.17)
-0.64
(2.37)
3.26
(3.73)
3.57
(3.04)
4.50**
(2.14)
Nobs 658 658 627 658 658 627
CD test -0.07
[0.95]
0.23
[0.81]
-1.00
[0.32]
-1.17
[0.24]
-1.20
[0.23]
-1.89
[0.06]
Notes: Unbalanced panel of 20 OECD countries, sample period: 1970-2007 for
Columns 3 and 6 and 1960-2007 for other columns. The dependent variable for
Columns 1-3 is the unemployment volatility of prime-age workers, and for
Columns 4-6, it is the unemployment volatility of old workers.
The model used in this table is the pooled common correlated effect (CCEP)
estimator. sPit , pPit , and bPit refer, respectively, to the share of prime-age workers,
the share of prime-age population, and the share of native prime-age population.
sOit , pOit , and bOit are the corresponding measures for old workers.
See Tables 3 and 4 for further notes.
indicates that the variation in the unemployment volatility of old workers is
unlikely to be due to any persistent demographic phenomenon. Another reason
could be the lack of enough variation in the unemployment volatility of prime-age
and old workers, which makes it hard to detect any statistical relationship.
2.4.3 Aggregate unemployment volatility
In this section, I regress aggregate unemployment volatility on the youth share31.
Concerning the potential endogeneity problems as mentioned already, I also use
the share of young population and that of young native population as proxies
for the youth share.
Table 2.6 reports the regression results by using the CCEP estimator. The
coefficient of the youth share is significant at the 1% level. When I use the share
of young population, the magnitude of the coefficient decreases slightly but is
still significant at the 5% level. Even with the share of young native population,
31 I do not consider the shares of other age groups as part of the regressors. This
is because the effect of demographic changes on aggregate unemployment volatility is
mainly due to the spillover effect, rather than the composition effect, as shown in the
decomposition analysis in Section 2.5.
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the coefficient is still significant and has similar magnitude. The CD test results
also suggest the absence of cross-sectional dependence.
Table 2.6: Aggregate unemployment volatility and the share of labor force
Age-specific
share
youth share population share
(young)
native population
share
(young)
Coef. of the
share
6.52***
(1.86)
4.88**
(1.79)
5.08*
(2.63)
LMIs & shock Yes Yes Yes
FETE Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 658 658 627
R2 0.77 0.77 0.78
CD test 0.48
[0.63]
-0.09
[0.93]
-0.18
[0.86]
Notes: Sample period: 1960-2007, unbalanced panel of 20 OECD countries. The
dependent variable is aggregate unemployment volatility.
The model used in this table is the pooled common correlated effect (CCEP)
estimator.
See Tables 3 and 4 for further notes.
2.4.3.1 Changes in composition of the sample and redefinition of the
age group
As one of the main counterarguments of Everaert and Vierke (2016) is that the
results of Jaimovich and Siu (2009), Lugauer and Redmond (2012) and Lugauer
(2012b) are sensitive to the changes in the composition of the sample, I carry out
20 exercises which drop one country from the sample each time when I regress
aggregate unemployment volatility on the youth share.
We see that the estimation results remain unchanged, as shown in Figure 2.3,
which gives the distributions of four key parameters of the CCEP estimations.
The coefficients are concentrated around 6, which is very close to 6.52, the corre-
sponding coefficient of the youth share in Table 2.6. Although its value deviates
when I exclude Ireland, Japan, or Sweden from the sample, the deviation is still
acceptable, considering that the consistency of the CCEP estimator potentially
relies on the assumption of infinite cross-sectional observations. Moreover, the
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distribution of the standard errors is quite narrow. The distribution of the P-
values of the coefficients shows that the coefficients are basically significant at the
1% level, only with slightly lower significance level for two cases, when Germany
or Ireland is excluded. In addition, the lowest p-value of the CD test is 0.15
when New Zealand is excluded from the sample, suggesting that cross-sectional
dependence is well taken care of in all 20 exercises.
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Figure 2.3: Robustness: distribution of key parameters after dropping one coun-
try at a time
Notes: The dependent variable is aggregate unemployment volatility. Graphs are
drawn using Stata v11.2. Distribution is approximated using the nonparametric
method with a Epanechnikov kernel function.
Except for the definition of the age groups used earlier, which categorizes
the age group of 15-24 years as the young, 25-54 as the prime-age, and 55-64 as
the old, I also take the specification used in Jaimovich and Siu (2009) and define
the age group of 15-29 years as the young and the age group of 60-64 years as
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the old. The estimation results suggest that the changes in the youth share still
have a statistically significantly positive effect on the unemployment volatility
of young workers and aggregate unemployment volatility, only with a slightly
smaller magnitude32.
To summarize, I find convincing evidence that the age composition of the
labor force not only has an effect on aggregate unemployment volatility but also
makes a spillover effect on that of the young.
2.5 Decomposition of the effect of demographic changes
in the Great Moderation
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a substantial decline in unemployment
volatility in the U.S. It can be partially accounted for by demographic changes
as shown in the earlier analysis. In this section, I decompose the overall effect
of demographic changes in the Great Moderation into composition and spillover
effects.
To this end, I first calculate the counterfactual aggregate unemployment
volatility for the U.S. during the Great Moderation (1985-2007) if the labor force
composition were kept at an average preceding the Great Moderation (1970-
1984)33. As the aggregate unemployment rate can be expressed as a weighted
average of the age-specific unemployment rates34:
ut =
∑
i=Y,P,O
situ
i
t, (2.5)
where uit is the unemployment rate of group i; and the weight, sit, is the labor
force share of i. This counterfactual aggregate unemployment volatility can be
constructed as
σˆ2t =
∑
i=Y,P,O
(sipreσit)2 +ρ
i,−i
t (sipreσit)(s−ipreσ
−i
t ), (2.6)
32See Appendix A.8 for details.
33The youth share remains at a high level from 1970 to 1984 and only slightly varies.
34The aggregate unemployment rate can be written as: ut = (UYt +UPt +UOt )/Lt =
uYt s
Y
t +uPt sPt +uOt sOt .
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where sipre is the pre-great-moderation average of the labor force share of group i
and ρt is the correlation coefficient between different age-specific unemployment
rates measured by a five-year moving correlation coefficient.
Thereafter, the composition effect can be defined as
Composition effect≡
¯ˆσt− ¯σpost
¯σpre− ¯σpost , (2.7)
where ¯σpre and ¯σpost are, respectively, the average of aggregate unemployment
volatility before and after 1985; and ¯ˆσt stands for the average of counterfactual
aggregate unemployment volatility σˆt. Hence the denominator, ¯σpre − ¯σpost,
is the actual decline during the Great Moderation, and the numerator, ¯ˆσt −
¯σpost, is the reduction if the labor force composition were kept at an average
preceding the Great Moderation and the age-specific unemployment volatility
were independent of demographic changes.
To get the spillover effect, I first adjust the age-specific unemployment volatil-
ity to match the demographic structure at the pre-great-moderation average. As
the regression analyses suggest the existence of the spillover effect among young
workers, the adjusted value for the unemployment volatility of young workers is
σY Adjt = σYt + 8.97(sYpre−sYt ). (2.8)
Here, 8.97 is the CCEP estimator for the coefficient of the youth share in Ta-
ble 2.3. If we use this adjusted value for the calculation of the counterfactual
aggregate unemployment volatility, the spillover effect can be written as
Spillover effect≡
¯ˆσadjt − ¯ˆσt
¯σpre− ¯σpost , (2.9)
where ¯ˆσadjt is the average of the adjusted counterfactual aggregate unemployment
volatility and ¯ˆσadjt − ¯ˆσt stands for the reduction in the average of aggregate
unemployment volatility due to the effect of actual changes in age structure on
the unemployment volatility of young workers.
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Figure 2.4: Decomposition of the effect of demographic changes in the Great
Moderation
Figure 2.4 shows the decomposition of the overall effect of demographic
changes in the Great Moderation. Comparing the value for the actual aggre-
gate unemployment volatility (solid line) across 1970-84 with the one across
1985-2007, we see that it has dropped significantly since 1985, with a decrease
of 0.66. The counterfactual series without adjusting the unemployment volatil-
ity of young workers (dotted, triangle-hatched line) lies in the middle of the
actual series and the counterfactual series with the unemployment volatility of
young workers adjusted (solid, circle-hatched line). It states that, if the age
composition remained constant after 1985 and the age-specific unemployment
volatility were unaffected, aggregate unemployment volatility would have fallen
comparatively less and the average would have fallen by 0.61, suggesting that
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the composition effect can explain 7.6%35 of the moderation. For the second
counterfactual series, had only the age composition remained constant, aggre-
gate unemployment volatility would have fallen by 0.50. Thus, the overall effect
of demographic changes explains 24.2%36 of the moderation, leaving 16.6% to
be attributed to the spillover effect.37
My result for the overall effect of demographic changes is close to that of
Jaimovich and Siu (2009), who claim that 24% of the moderation is due to
demographic changes, but the underlying mechanism is different. They attribute
it exclusively to the composition effect, while I conclude that the spillover effect
is the main demographic contributor.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I address the question of how demographic changes affect un-
employment volatility. First, I document the sharp differences in age-specific
unemployment volatility: The unemployment volatility of young workers is sig-
nificantly higher than those of other age groups, while the corresponding val-
ues of prime-age and old workers are quite close38. Based on this persistent
age-specific difference, aggregate unemployment volatility can increase with the
share of young workers in the workforce through a direct composition effect.
Second, I document a new stylized fact: Unemployment volatility with the
group of young workers increases with their share in the labor force. This
spillover effect further contributes to the variation in aggregate unemployment
volatility due to demographic changes. My estimation controls for the effects
of labor market institutions and is robust to changes in the composition of the
35Which is calculated by (0.66-0.61)/0.66.
36It is calculated in the same way as the former case: (0.66-0.50)/0.66.
37The above analysis is based on the assumption that changes in age structure do not
have any effect on the correlation coefficients ρt between different age-specific unemploy-
ment rates. To check if this is true, I regress the three correlation coefficients, ρY Pt , ρY Ot ,
and ρPOt , respectively, on the corresponding share of the labor force and other regressors.
I do not find any statistically significant relationship between the correlation coefficients
and the youth share, neither with fixed effects and time effects (FETE) estimator nor
with common correlated effects (CCE) estimators.
38Exceptions include countries which are currently facing serious aging of the labor force
(Germany, Japan, and Finland). For these three countries, the values for old workers are
clearly higher than that of prime-age workers.
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sample. Furthermore, it takes care of the cross-sectional dependence detected in
the data by using common correlated effects (CCE) estimators.
Finally, taking the Great Moderation in the U.S. as an example, I decompose
the overall effect of demographic changes on aggregate unemployment volatility
into composition and spillover effects. I find that the spillover effect accounts
for about two-thirds of the effect of demographic changes.

Chapter 3
Demographic Structure and the (Un)employment
Volatility of Young Workers
3.1 Introduction
Unemployment volatility increases with a greater share of young workers in the
labor force, as young workers lose jobs more often and their unemployment (rate)
is generally more cyclically sensitive. This age-specific difference in the cyclical
labor market volatility has been well documented and explanations have been
offered by several authors1. With the existence of this difference, change in the
relative share of young workers naturally has a direct composition effect, even if
age-specific labor market volatility remains unchanged.
In this paper, I focus on a new fact: Unemployment volatility within a group
of young workers also increases with their share in the labor force, which I refer
to as a spillover effect in Chapter 2. Empirically, this phenomenon does not
exist in other age groups as I show in Han (2018a). The reason, as argued in
this paper, lies in a capital-experience complementarity, which is observed in the
data I use.
Figure 3.1 shows the time series for unemployment volatility (along with its
trend, filtered using a one-sided HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 100)2
1The empirical evidence is available both in intensive (see e.g. Gomme et al., 2004;
Jaimovich and Siu, 2009) and extensive margin (see Han, 2018). Theoretical explanations
include the capital-experience complementarity by Jaimovich, Pruitt, and Siu (2013), the
higher initial training sunk cost for more educated workers by Cajner and Cairo (2013),
and the difference in time spent for a good match by Lugauer (2012a) and Engbom (2018).
2Unemployment volatility is calculated by the author and measured by a stochastic
volatility process which assumes that the unemployment rate follows an AR(1) process and
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and the share of young workers3 in the labor force (hereafter referred to as the
youth share) for the U.S. from 1960 to 2007. We see that aggregate unemploy-
ment volatility comoves with the youth share over time (left panel). Moreover,
an even closer comovement exists between this share and the unemployment
volatility of the young (right panel). By contrast, the common underlying as-
sumption used in the literature is that changes in the labor force composition do
not have any impact on the labor market outcomes of a specific group4. Ignoring
this spillover effect automatically leads to an overestimation of the composition
effect. In addition, it could lead one to overlook the necessity of age-specific
labor market policies in maintaining macroeconomic stability. Therefore, an in-
vestigation into this spillover effect and a possible explanation of this effect have
significance for both empirical estimation and policy evaluation.
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Figure 3.1: Unemployment volatility and the youth share (U.S.)
Notes: Dotted, circle-hatched line is the time-varying unemployment volatility
(left axis), solid, square-hatched line is the trend of this measure (left axis), and
the solid line is the youth share (right axis).
the volatility equation follows an AR(1) stochastic volatility process. The unemployment
rate and volatility are at an annual frequency. Throughout this paper, I use a one-sided
HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 100 for annual data, which is commonly used
in the literature, see e.g. Cooley and Ohanian (1991) and Rogerson and Shimer (2011).
Besides, I have also repeated the analysis with a smoothing parameter of 6.25, as suggested
by Ravn and Uhlig (2002), and got similar results.
3Young workers refer to those aged 15-24 years and aggregate measure covers people
aged 15-64 years.
4See e.g. Jaimovich and Siu (2009) and Cajner and Cairo (2013).
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To explain this new finding, I incorporate the Mortensen–Pissarides (MP)
job matching model with endogenous job separation into the real business cycle
(RBC) model. Workers search for jobs in labor markets, which are segmented
by experience levels, and produce distinct intermediate goods with labor as the
only input. This distinction is motivated by two empirical facts: First, there is
an experience premium, which exists among workers of different age levels if we
equate age with experience. Second, the spillover effect only exists among young
workers5. Different intermediate goods are then combined with capital for the
production of final goods, thereby giving rise to age-specific difference in labor
demand, when age is equated with experience.
A greater share of young workers is associated with a bigger supply and thus
a lower relative price of goods produced by them. This price change triggered by
demographic change is the key to understanding the spillover effect. First, since
the decline in price can lower profits, firms raise their selection criteria of young
workers, thus pushing the productivity cutoff of young workers to the mode of
its distribution. This implies a greater number of young workers will be affected
when aggregate productivity changes. Furthermore, as Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) have shown, firms’ profits and thereby their vacancy posting also become
more sensitive to aggregate productivity since profitability shrinks. Therefore,
both aspects imply that the unemployment volatility of young workers increases
with the youth share.
One contribution of this paper lies in bridging the theoretical gap between
demographic changes and the response of age-specific labor market to produc-
tivity shocks. Filling this gap is not only important for our understanding of
the uniqueness of the labor market dynamics of young workers but also helpful
in explaining the falling macroeconomic volatility in the U.S. existing since the
mid-1980s, referred to as “The Great Moderation.” I demonstrate that when
the youth share increases, the unemployment rate of young workers responds
more strongly to productivity shocks. This is important as it establishes a new
channel for the explanation of the Great Moderation. In contrast to Jaimovich
and Siu (2009), who proposed a composition effect as its main demographic ex-
planation, I show theoretically that the changes in the unemployment volatility
of the young due to demographic changes can also be an important contributor.
5Intuitively, inexperienced workers are more suitable for less sophisticated products
and vice versa.
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In my simulations, I find that demographic changes can account for at least 23%
of this moderation. Of this, the spillover effect accounts for three-quarters of the
overall effect6, while the composition effect accounts for only a quarter.
As already mentioned, Jaimovich and Siu (2009) started the recent litera-
ture on the role of demographic changes in labor market dynamics. They provide
empirical evidence for the age-specific difference in labor market volatility and
claim that a direct composition effect among different age groups can account
for a sizable fraction of the Great Moderation. Lugauer and Redmond (2012)
and Lugauer (2012b) confirm that changes in the age composition of the labor
force have a large and significant effect on cyclical volatility7. Jaimovich, Pruitt,
and Siu (2013) offer an explanation for this age-specific difference. They de-
tect a capital-experience complementarity in the data. As capital is in inelastic
supply in the short-run, the employment of old workers, who are rich in experi-
ence, features rigidity in the short-run. But their model fails in generating any
spillover effect. Because productivity shock is fully transmitted to labor mar-
ket, thus age-specific labor market dynamics are independent of demographic
composition. This paper solves this by introducing labor market frictions into
a RBC model with age-specific difference in labor demand. It shows that both
the unemployment volatility of young workers and the dynamics of their labor
market transition rates increase as the youth share increases.
Meanwhile, this paper is related to the growing number of studies on the
state dependence of labor market fluctuations over the business cycle. Michaillat
(2014) and Cacciatore et al. (2016) show that labor market reforms have different
effects on labor market fluctuations across phases of business cycles. Pizzinelli,
Theodoridis, and Zanetti (2018) develop a search model with endogenous job
separation and on-the-job search, replicating the asymmetries in the fluctuations
of labor market variables across different states of aggregate productivity. As an
6Compared with the empirical value for the contribution from the spillover effect, which
is two-thirds as shown in Chapter 2, my simulation result is in general consistent with
this empirical finding, only slightly overestimates the relative importance of the spillover
effect.
7Although the replication of these results by Everaert and Vierke (2016) suggests that
the relationship identified in these papers between variation in the age composition of
the labor force and cyclical volatility may well be spurious, Han (2018a) reconfirms the
validity of this relationship with a broader dataset by measuring unemployment volatility
with a stochastic volatility process proposed by Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) and
accounting for the effects of labor market institutions.
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extension, I show that the fluctuations of labor market variables also depend on
the state of demographics.
Finally, this paper is also related to the study conducted by Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008), who provide a different calibration method8 to remedy the
failure of basic search and matching model in generating sufficient volatility
to match empirical data, a puzzle raised by Shimer (2005). As an alternative
solution, Hall (2005) proposes introducing wage stickiness9. This paper starts
from a different angle and explores whether the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
job matching model can generate unemployment volatility after accounting for
the variation in the youth share.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section gives further evidence for the
existence of the spillover effect. Section 3.3 lays out the model. Section 3.4 shows
the calibration strategy. Section 3.5 discusses the model’s performance. Section
3.6 shows the robustness of the results when jobs are exogenously separated.
Section 3.7 provides supporting evidence for the mechanism. The final section
summarizes.
3.2 Empirical evidence
The right panel of Figure 3.1 shows a hump-shaped demographic trend for the
youth share. It climbs up to its maximum in the mid-1970s as baby boomers
start entering the labor force from the 1960s. The trend falls persistently from
1980 with a decreasing inflow of young workers. Meanwhile, this hump-shaped
trend is closely accompanied by the unemployment volatility of the young over
the whole period. This comovement serves as a preliminary evidence for the
relationship between the youth share and the unemployment volatility of the
young.
To identify the causality, further evidence is provided in this part. First, I
show that the cyclicality of labor force participation is not of primary concern
8Their calibration method relies on the strict specification of unemployment benefit
and worker’s bargaining power. The result is an unrealistically high opportunity cost of
unemployment, suggesting that workers are motivated only by a small share of profit, as
pointed out by Mortensen and Nagypal (2007).
9However, Haefke, Sonntag, and Van Rens (2013) find little evidence of the existence
of wage rigidity in empirical data.
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for the cyclical unemployment volatility of the young. With this potential en-
dogeneity concern taken care of, I go on to show the empirical evidence that
I find in Chapter 2, that is, there is a statistically significant relationship ex-
isting between the unemployment volatility of the young and the youth share,
using data from 20 OECD countries. As the timing and extent of demographic
changes are different among these countries, together with the exogeneity of the
youth share, which is predetermined at least 15 years prior, the validity of the
empirical identification is ensured.
3.2.1 The role of labor force participation
It is generally acknowledged that labor market dynamics are affected dispro-
portionately across sex and age groups by the labor force participation decision
(see e.g. Clark and Summers, 1982). An increase in the participation rate,
mostly during booms, will push up the unemployment rate, while a fall in the
participation rate during recession will drag down the unemployment rate. As
young workers have more options in case of job separation, their unemployment
rate might display greater cyclicality than those of other age groups. For in-
stance, with worsening labor market conditions, unemployed young workers are
more likely to reconsider a trade-off between job searching and further educa-
tion. This cyclicality of participation might be more pronounced for females,
given that the participation rate of females is more sensitive to labor market
conditions. Therefore, in the following, I examine the role of the cyclicality of
participation in the unemployment dynamics of the young.
Note that the unemployment rate of a specific group can be expressed as a
ratio between the unemployment-to-population ratio and the labor force partic-
ipation rate of this group,
ui ≡ Ui
Li
= Ui
Pi
/
Li
Pi
= upi
lpi
, (3.1)
where Ui is the size of unemployment of group i, Li is the size of its labor force,
Pi is the size of its population, upi is the unemployment-to-population ratio and
lpi stands for the labor force participation rate. Thus, unemployment volatility
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can be decomposed as
Var(lnui) = Var(lnupi) +Var(ln lpi)−2Cov(lnupi, ln lpi). (3.2)
If the unemployment volatility from the variation of labor force participation
rate accounts for only a minor share, the cyclicality of participation rate is less
of a concern.
Table 3.1: Decomposition of unemployment volatility: share of participation
Female Male Both
15-24 15-64 15-24 15-64 15-24 15-64
Cov. excl. 2.67 0.39 1.11 0.05 1.53 0.10
Cov. incl. 7.60 1.68 4.01 1.30 4.93 1.19
Notes: “Cov. excl.” means that the covariance terms, Cov (1−ei, lfpri), are
excluded for the calculation of the contribution of participation to unemployment
volatility. “Cov. incl.” means that total variance also includes covariance terms.
Annual U.S. data from the OECD Labour Force Statistics database, 1960–2017.
Cyclical volatility of each series is the percentage standard deviation of each
series filtered by one-sided HP-filter with a smoothing parameter 100.
Table 3.1 reports the share of unemployment volatility, which can be at-
tributed to the participation rate of young workers and the aggregate of both
sex groups in the U.S. I use a one-sided HP filter to keep the time ordering of
the data undisturbed. The decomposition results in the first row do not take
into account the effect of the covariance terms. As expected, the contribution
of the participation decision to unemployment volatility is higher for young and
female workers. But even for young females, who have the highest value, the
contribution is only 2.67%. For young workers of both sex groups, the contribu-
tion of participation only accounts for 1.53%, leaving the rest unexplained to the
unemployment-to-population ratio. When the effect of the covariance between
the unemployment-to-population ratio and the labor force participation rate is
also considered, still about 95% of the unemployment volatility of the young can
be attributed to the unemployment-to-population ratio of young workers.
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Thus, even for young workers, the cyclicality of the participation rate is not
of primary importance for cyclical unemployment volatility10.
3.2.2 Identifying the role of demographic changes
To identify the relationship between the unemployment volatility of the young
and the youth share, I consider the following regression:
σit = αi+βt+γsit+λXit+εit, (3.3)
where σit stands for the unemployment volatility of the young for country i at
time t measured by a stochastic volatility process11; sit is the youth share; and
Xit includes indicators for labor market institutions and an external shock. Of
which, the indicators of labor market institutions include union density, union
centralization of wage bargaining, the strictness of employment protection legis-
lation, tax wedge, and gross replacement rate; and the external shock is a world
demand shock, which is proxied by the log-difference of the sum of real GDP
of other 19 countries. αi is a country fixed effect and βt is a full set of time
dummies to control for time effects.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the data covers up to 2007 because unemploy-
ment dynamics afterward contain too much noisy signal from the very recent
financial crisis. It is technically difficult to disentangle its effect from that of
demographic changes.
10This result is robust to the redefinition of young workers as those aged 15-29 years.
See Appendix B.1 for details.
11The unemployment rate is assumed to follow an AR(1) process and the level equation
for the unemployment rate is
ut = ρut−1 +eσtvt,
and the volatility equation follows an AR(1) stochastic volatility process (see Fernández-
Villaverde et al., 2011; Born and Pfeifer, 2014; and Han, 2018):
σt = (1−ρσ)σ¯+ρσσt−1 +ηεt,
where vt and εt
iid∼ N(0,1), ρ and ρσ are respectively the coefficients of the level and
volatility equations, σ¯ is an unconditional mean and η is a scale factor. The time-varying
volatility of unemployment rate is eσt and what one needs is the estimation of the time-
varying parameter σt. I omit the country specific subscript in the level and volatility
equations for simplicity. See Chapter 2 for details.
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The first column of Table 3.2 reports the pooled common correlated effects
(CCEP) estimator12, which projects out fixed effects and eliminates the effects
of the unobserved common factors. The coefficient of the youth share is positive
and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that changes in the youth share have
a statistically significantly positive impact on the unemployment volatility of
the young. In the second column, I take care of the potential participation
endogeneity by replacing the youth share by the share of young population. The
coefficient is still significant at the 10% level and at a similar level. Besides, in
the last column, I use the share of the native young population13 as a proxy to
deal with the potential endogeneity from migration and get similar result.
Table 3.2: Unemployment volatility of the young and demographic changes
Youth share Young population
share
Native young population
share
Coefficient 8.97***
(3.43)
6.53*
(3.47)
9.41**
(4.45)
Nobs 644 659 627
R2 0.77 0.77 0.78
Notes: Unbalanced panel of 20 OECD countries, sample period: 1970-2007.
Dependent variable is the unemployment volatility of the young. Newey-West
standard errors are in the parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for significance levels
of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Model used in this table is the CCEP
estimator, which projects out fixed effects and eliminates the effects of the
unobserved common factors.
However, there is not any statistically significant relationship detected in
other age groups14, in support of the age-specific difference in labor demand
structure.
12For both the fixed effects and time effects estimator and the mean group estimator,
I detect cross-sectional dependence in the data. Because its existence can induce biased
estimation, I use the CCEP estimator to take care of this.
13The share of young population and the share of native young population are calculated
using data from Maddison (2003) and Mitchell (2008).
14See Appendix B.2 for the regression results of other age groups.
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3.3 The model
In this section, I lay out the details of the model. There are three sectors in the
economy: households, firms producing intermediate goods, and firms produc-
ing final goods. Households provide labor as the only input for the production
of intermediate goods and lease capital to firms producing final goods. House-
hold members search for jobs in segmented labor markets. The setup of job
searching behavior shares similarities with Krause and Lubik (2007) and Trigari
(2009). Distinct intermediate goods and capital are then used as inputs for the
production of final goods.
3.3.1 Households
Time is discrete and households have an infinite time horizon. Household mem-
bers are characterized by age and experience levels. There are two types of
age levels, young and old, and two types of experience levels, inexperienced and
experienced. As the accumulation of experience takes time, for the sake of sim-
plicity, I assume that young members are all inexperienced and old members are
all experienced, deriving only two types of workers. Following Merz (1995), I use
the pooling assumption for the consumption of each type of members. Suppose
the utility function is ui(cit) =
(cit)
1−τ−1
1−τ , where cit stands for the consumption
of i at time t, i ∈ {Y, O} denotes either young or old, and τ is the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Let us denote SYt as the youth share15
and normalize the labor force to one.
Taking labor income and capital holdings at time t as given, a representative
household decides the amount of consumption for each member type and the
amount of capital to hold at time t+ 1. Thus, the problem of a representative
15A special case is that the youth share remains constant, which can be realized if the
birth rate of the young, ρB , the exit rate of the old, ρD, and the transition rate from
young to old, ρY O, satisfy
ρY O = ρ
B
SYt
−SYt ρD.
It is just the solution of
LYt+1
Lt+1
=
ρBLt+ (1−ρY O)LYt
(1 +ρB)Lt−ρDLOt
=
LYt
Lt
.
In my simulations, I abstract from these transition probabilities by focusing on this special
case and compare the results under different demographic structures.
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household can be written as
max
{cYt ,cOt ,Kt+1}∞0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[SYt uY (cYt ) + (1−SYt )uO(cOt )],
subject to16
SYt c
Y
t + (1−SYt )cOt +Kt+1 = rtKt+ (1− δ)Kt+SYt nYt ωYt + (1−SYt )nOt ωOt ,
where β ∈ (0,1) is the household’s discount factor; Kt denotes capital holdings at
time t; rt is the rental rate; δ ∈ (0,1) is the depreciation rate of capital holdings;
nYt and nOt are the employment rates of young and old workers, respectively;
and ωYt and ωOt are wage rates. With these setups, optimality conditions imply
that consumption is the same for both types of family members,
cYt = cOt = ct, (3.4)
and the intertemporal first-order condition is
c−τt = βEt[c
−τ
t+1(rt+1 + 1− δ)], (3.5)
from which we can construct the implied stochastic discount factor, Etβt,t+1 =
βEtc
−τ
t+1/c
−τ
t , to evaluate the activities of firms and workers.
3.3.2 Labor markets
Labor markets are segmented by experience levels. A worker–firm match can pro-
duce an output level of Atat, where At and at are aggregate and match-specific
productivities, respectively. The aggregate productivity follows an AR(1) pro-
cess: lnAt = ψlnAt−1 + et. Match-specific productivities are drawn indepen-
dently from a time-invariant lognormal distribution with cumulative distribu-
tion function F (at) and positive support. At the beginning of each period,
both productivity shocks are realized, then workers face job separation shocks,
an exogenous separation shock at rate ρx in both markets and an endogenous
separation shock in each labor market. Endogenous separation happens if the
16Here I assume that unemployment benefit is financed by the tax income on wage.
These two cancel out each other and thus do not appear in the budget constraint.
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realization of the match-specific productivity is lower than a certain threshold for
workers at age i, a˜it, leading to an overall separation rate ρit = ρx+(1−ρx)F (a˜it).
If separation occurs, production does not take place; if not, production starts.
Labor markets open afterward. Figure 3.2 describes the timing of events.
Beginning
of t
End of t
Realization of aggregate
and idiosyncratic shock
Exogenous and endogenous
job separation shocks
Production and
market clearing
Search and matchingWage bargaining
Figure 3.2: Timing of events
The unmatched firm posts exactly one vacancy at the cost of either ςY or
ςO, depending on where the vacancy is posted. New firms can enter both labor
markets without restrictions until the value of posting an additional vacancy
equals to zero. The matching process is depicted by a constant-returns-to-scale
matching function:
mit = φi(vit)1−µ(uit)µ, (3.6)
where φi stands for matching efficiency of labor market i and µ is the elasticity
of the matching function with respect to unemployment. The probability of a
vacancy being filled equals to qit = mit/vit = φiθit−µ and the probability for an
unemployed worker to be matched equals f it =mit/uit =φiθit1−µ, where θit≡ vit/uit
is the market tightness of labor market i at time t. As the unemployment benefit
is usually proportional to the experience level, I assume that the value for old
workers, zO, is higher than that of young workers, zY .
With the sequence of events, employment rate at each segmented labor mar-
ket evolves according to the following
nit = (1−ρit)(nit−1 +f it−1uit−1). (3.7)
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It shows that employment at t is given by the sum of the existing and re-employed
workers at t−1 contingent on unseparation at t. As the number of unemployed
workers when production starts is the same as that when job searching starts,
this setup ensures that the ratio of workers searching for jobs at t, uit, is equal
to the unemployment rate at t, 1−nit.
3.3.3 Firms
I assume that the goods produced by young and old workers are distinct in-
termediate goods. Both goods use labor as the only input and are subject to
common aggregate productivity shock. As the labor force is normalized to one,
the size of young labor force equals to SYt and the size of young matched workers
is nYt SYt . The total output of intermediate goods produced by young workers is
Y Yt = AtnYt SYt
∫ ∞
a˜Yt
a
dF (a)
1−F (a˜Yt )
. (3.8)
Here, the term with integral is simply the conditional expectation of match-
specific productivity, E(a|a> a˜Yt ), as only matches above the threshold, a˜Yt , can
survive. Similarly, the output of intermediate goods produced by old workers is
Y Ot = AtnOt (1−SYt )
∫ ∞
a˜Ot
a
dF (a)
1−F (a˜Ot )
. (3.9)
Both intermediate goods, together with capital, are used as inputs for the
production of final goods in perfectly competitive firms. To comply with the em-
pirical observation that the unemployment volatility of young workers is higher
than that of old workers, I follow Jaimovich, Pruitt, and Siu (2013)’s strategy
by introducing a nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functional form
for final output:
Yt =
[
λ1(Y Yt )σ + (1−λ1)
(
λ2(Kt)ρ+ (1−λ2)(Y Ot )ρ
)σ/ρ]1/σ
, (3.10)
where ρ,σ ∈ (0,1); (1− ρ)−1 is the elasticity of substitution between interme-
diate goods produced by old workers and capital; (1−σ)−1 is the elasticity of
substitution between intermediate goods produced by young workers and the
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composite of other two inputs; and λ1,λ2 ∈ (0,1) are the factor share parame-
ters.17 If ρ is far smaller than σ, the final production features capital–experience
complementarity. As capital is in inelastic supply in the short-run, complemen-
tarity suggests that the intermediate goods produced by the old do not respond
simultaneously to productivity shock, and so does the unemployment rate of the
old.
Firms in the final goods sector maximize profit by choosing the optimal levels
of intermediate goods and capital:
max
Y Yt ,Y
O
t ,Kt
Yt−PYt Y Yt −POt Y Ot − rtKt,
and the FOCs are as follows:
PYt = (Yt)1−σλ1(Y Yt )σ−1 (3.11)
POt = (Yt)1−σ(1−λ1)Ωt(1−λ2)(Y Ot )ρ−1 (3.12)
rt = (Yt)1−σ(1−λ1)Ωtλ2(Kt)ρ−1, (3.13)
where Ωt ≡ [λ2(Kt)ρ+ (1−λ2)(Y Ot )ρ](σ−ρ)/ρ.
To close the model, it is easy to see that the aggregate resource constraint is
Ct+Kt+1 = Yt+ (1− δ)Kt−Cht (3.14)
where Ct = SYt cYt + (1 − SYt )cOt is the aggregate consumption; and Cht ≡
vYt S
Y
t ς
Y +vOt (1−SYt )ςO is the aggregate hiring costs incurred by firms.
3.3.4 Characterization of agents’ asset values
Bellman equations, which characterize the problems of firms and workers, are
similar to those in the standard search and matching model with endogenous
17Notice that final output does not feature a constant marginal product of labor. If labor
enters directly into the final production, the marginal product of labor exhibits diminishing
returns, implying the match surplus depends on the size of employees within a firm. As a
result, firms cannot bargain with each worker independently and the bargaining solution
is more complicated than the Nash bargaining solution. See Elsby and Michaels (2013)
for details. Here, I make a distinction between intermediate and final goods, and assume
that labor is the only input for intermediate goods. In this way, the simplicity of the
bargaining solution is kept.
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separation. The value of a vacancy in terms of final goods is
V it =−ςi+Etβt, t+1
[
qit(1−ρit+1)
∫ ∞
a˜i
t+1
J it+1(At+1, a)
dF (a)
1−F (a˜it+1)
+(1−qit)V it+1
]
,
(3.15)
where ςi is the hiring cost in the current period. In the next period, a vacancy is
filled and production happens with probability qit(1−ρit+1). Free entry ensures
that V it = 0 for both types of vacancies at any time t, which yields
ςi
qit
= Etβt, t+1
[
(1−ρit+1)
∫ ∞
a˜i
t+1
J it+1(At+1, a)
dF (a)
1−F (a˜it+1)
]
, (3.16)
suggesting that the expected cost of a vacancy equals to the expected benefit.
The asset value of a job with productivity (At, at) is
J it (At, at) = P itAtat−ωit(At, at) +Etβt, t+1[
(1−ρit+1)
∫ ∞
a˜i
t+1
J it+1(At+1, a)
dF (a)
1−F (a˜it+1)
]
, (3.17)
where P it and ωit are the relative price of the intermediate good and the wage
rate at time t, respectively. The value of a job is composed of the current profits
P itAtat−ωit and the continuation value. In the next period, jobs survive with
probability 1−ρit+1, and with probability ρit+1 they are destroyed, whereupon
firms get a future value of zero.
For workers, the asset value of being matched is
W it (At, at) = ωit(At, at) +Etβt, t+1
[
(1−ρit+1)
∫ ∞
a˜i
t+1
W it+1(At+1, a)
dF (a)
1−F (a˜it+1)
+ρit+1U it+1
]
. (3.18)
It includes the current inflow ωit and the continuation value. When not separated
from the labor market, employed workers get an expected valueW it+1 in the next
period, otherwise they get U it+1.
The unemployed worker gets a utility of zi in the current period, forms
a match with probability f it (1− ρit+1), and stays unemployed with probability
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1−f it (1−ρit+1):
U it = zi+Etβt, t+1
[
f it (1−ρit+1)
∫ ∞
a˜i
t+1
W it+1(At+1, a)
dF (a)
1−F (a˜it+1)
+
(
1−f it (1−ρit+1)
)
U it+1
]
. (3.19)
With Nash bargaining, wage is chosen to satisfy the optimality condition:
ηJ it (At, at) = (1−η)
(
W it (At, at)−U it
)
, (3.20)
where η ∈ (0,1) reflects the relative bargaining power of workers. Together with
the free-entry conditions, it is straightforward to get the wage equation, after
substituting the equations for the asset values of workers and firms into the
above optimality condition:
ωit(At, at) = η(P itAtat+ ςiθit) + (1−η)zi. (3.21)
Summing up Bellman equations, match surplus, SMit (At, at) ≡ J it (At, at) +
W it (At, at)−V it −U it , can be written as
SMit (At, at) = P itAtat−zi+Etβt, t+1
(1−ρx)(1−f iη)
∫ ∞
a˜i
SMit+1(At+1, a)dF (a). (3.22)
It is easy to see that ∂S
Mi
t (At,at)
∂at
= P itAt > 0, which ensures the existence and
uniqueness of reservation productivity a˜i.
3.3.5 Comparative statics and the youth share
In this section, I first show how price and reservation productivity interact with
the youth share. Based on these results, I present how the responses of mar-
ket tightness and youth unemployment with respect to aggregate productivity
change with the youth share.
Proposition 1. If the employment rate of the old is irresponsive to
the changes in the youth share, then the price of intermediate goods
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produced by young workers decreases with the youth share, that is,
∂PYt
∂SYt
< 0.
Proof: See the Appendix B.3. 
The intuition of Proposition 1 is straightforward: When the youth share
increases, the output by young workers increases accordingly; with the increase
of its supply, the price drops. The assumption is satisfied if the final production
features capital–experience complementarity. As capital is in inelastic supply in
the short-run, the employment rate of the old does not respond to the youth
share.
Notice that the youth share is associated not only with the availability of
young workers but also the reservation productivity of the young, which could
then induce changes in the average productivity and the employment rate of
the young. Suppose the reservation productivity of the young increases with the
youth share, then the average productivity of remaining young workers increases
while the employment rate decreases. Although the decline in employment rate
can partially cancel the effect of the youth share on the output by young workers,
the direct increase in the availability of young workers plays a dominant role.
This results in a higher output by the young and a lower output by the old if
the youth share increases. Since final output has first-degree homogeneity and
capital is in inelastic supply in the short-run, there is an oversupply of goods
produced by the young and its price decreases accordingly. It is important
because the response of price to demographic changes also affects firms’ profits,
which then influences their vacancy-posting behavior.
Corollary 1. If we further assume that the distribution of the
match-specific productivity of young workers is concentrated such that
the expected value, E(a|a> a˜Yt ), barely changes with the youth share,
then the per-match output of young workers in terms of final goods
decreases with the youth share, that is, ∂P
Y
t E(a|a>a˜Yt )
∂SYt
< 0.
In fact, this assumption can be satisfied by most distributions for match-
specific productivity used in the literature. As endogenous separation rate is
about 0.03 per quarter (Krause and Lubik, 2007), the expected value is barely
affected by the young share.
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Proposition 2. If the employment rate of the old is irresponsive to
the changes in the youth share, then the reservation productivity of
the young increases with the youth share, that is, ∂a˜
Y
t
∂SYt
> 0.
Proof: See the Appendix B.4. 
Intuitively, as a greater number of young workers means a decrease in the
price of goods by the young, marginal young workers need to be more productive,
which automatically pushes up the reservation productivity of the young.
If there is no aggregate uncertainty, it can be shown that the elasticity of
market tightness of the young with respect to aggregate productivity is18
∂ lnθY
∂ lnA =
1−β(1− ρ˜Y ) +ηβ(1−ρx)f˜Y
µ[1−β(1− ρ˜Y )] +ηβ(1−ρx)f˜Y
∂ lnPY
∂ lnA + 1
1−zY /[PY AE(a|a> a˜Y )] , (3.23)
where f˜Y ≡ fY [1−F (a˜Y )], ρ˜Y ≡ ρY [1−F (a˜Y )]. The first term of this elasticity
is a function of the overall separation rate, the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to unemployment, workers’ bargaining power, and the overall job-
finding rate. Among which, only the job-finding rate responds to the youth share.
The increase in the number of young workers could lead to overcompetition for
the young and a decrease in the job-finding rate. This implies a higher value of
the first term when the youth share increases. But the limited variation of this
term is well discussed in Shimer (2005).
The second term bears some resemblance to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
in the sense that its value depends on the gap between unity and a function
containing the unemployment benefit of the young19. The difference lies in that
this function is negatively related to the price of goods produced by the young,
as shown in Corollary 1. The increase in the youth share can lower the profits
generated by the match between firm and young worker, since the price of goods
produced by the young decreases. In a boom, there is a large percentage increase
in firms’ profits due to the hiring of young workers, and firms react by posting
more vacancies. In a recession, firms’ profits decline further and they rarely post
any vacancy. Therefore, a greater share of young workers generates a congestion
in their job-finding, and firms’ vacancy posting to young workers becomes more
18Details of the derivations of ∂ lnθ
Y
∂ lnA and
∂ lnuY
∂ lnA can be found in the Appendix B.5.19Notice that one necessary condition for the existence of match between firm and young
worker is PY AE(a|a> a˜Yt )> zY , which ensures the non-negativeness of the denominator
of the second term.
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sensitive to aggregate productivity, so does the labor market tightness of the
young20.
Besides, it can be shown that the elasticity of the youth unemployment rate
with respect to aggregate productivity is
∂ lnuY
∂ lnA =
f˜Y
ρ˜Y + (1− ρ˜Y )f˜Y
[
− (1− ρ˜Y )(1−µ)∂ lnθ
Y
∂ lnA (3.24)
+F ′(a˜Y )a˜Y (1−ρx)(1 + 1
ρ˜Y
)∂ ln a˜
Y
∂ lnA
]
.
It can be considered as a sum of two terms. The first term is a function of
the elasticity of market tightness with respect to aggregate productivity. It
represents the response of the job-finding rate to aggregate productivity. As
mentioned before, the elasticity of market tightness increases as the youth share
increases.
The second term contains the probability density function at reservation
productivity and other functions of reservation productivity. It represents the
response of the job separation rate to aggregate productivity. The density func-
tion at reservation productivity is highly responsive to reservation productivity,
as long as the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity is concentrated and does
not have any fat tail. According to Proposition 2, a higher youth share means a
higher reservation productivity of the young. The level increase in this threshold
could be mild, but it can induce a large increase in the density function, sug-
gesting a dramatic increase in the mass of marginal workers. As more marginal
young workers are prone to aggregate productivity shock, the unemployment
rate of the young becomes more volatile. Therefore, the volatilities of both the
job-finding and separation rates of the young increase with the youth share, and
jointly contribute to the spillover effect.
20Although the second term in this elasticity also depends on the elasticity of the price
of goods produced by young workers to aggregate productivity, this second elasticity is
close to one and has limited variation when the youth share changes if the goods produced
by young workers are substitutable for the composite of other inputs.
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3.4 Calibration
This section describes the parameter specification of the model for the U.S. I
begin by estimating the two parameters governing the elasticities of substitution
in the production of final goods. Thereafter, other parameter values are set to
be consistent with the literature or empirical observations.
3.4.1 The two parameters governing the elasticities of
substitution
As there is no first moment in the data for parameters ρand σ, which describe
the elasticity of substitution among inputs, we need to estimate them. For this,
I take advantage of the FOCs in final goods production in the same way as
Jaimovich, Pruitt, and Siu (2013).
Notice that the FOC with respect to Y Yt can be written in the following form
4ln(PYt Y Yt /Yt) = σ4ln(NYt /Yt) +σ4ln(At), (3.25)
where NYt is the employment size of the young at time t. PYt Y Yt stands for
the total value created by young workers in term of final goods, which can be
measured by the labor income of the young. Note that the ratio of PYt Y Yt to
Yt is just the share of final goods created by the young. Therefore, σ can be
obtained by estimating the response of the share of final goods produced by
the young with respect to the number of young workers needed per final good,
conditional on that the latter is uncorrelated to 4ln(At), a function of current
and past aggregate productivity shocks21.
Similarly, from the FOCs with respect to Y Ot andKt, we get
4ln(POt Y Ot /(rtKt))= ρ4ln(NOt /Kt) +ρ4ln(At). (3.26)
It is easy to see that POt Y Ot is the total value produced by old workers in terms
of final goods and rtKt is the total amount paid for capital. The ratio of these
21From the AR(1) process for aggregate productivity: lnAt = ψlnAt−1 +et, we have
4ln(At) = et− (1−ψ)(et−1 +ψet−2 + ...).
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two is just the ratio of the share of final goods produced by old workers to the
share by capital. Thereafter, ρ can be estimated similarly as σ.
Table 3.3: Estimation results of the elasticities of substitution in final goods
production
σ ρ
Point Estimate 0.701***
(0.056)
0.195***
(0.025)
Hansen’s J-test 1.474 [0.479]
σ = ρ 47.19 [0.000]
Notes: Data from March CPS, 1964–2007. Model used for estimation is GMM
with IVs. HAC standard errors are in parentheses. p-values are in square
brackets. *** stands for a significance level of 1%.
As employment size, final output, and aggregate capital are all correlated
with aggregate productivity shocks, I use lagged birth rates as instruments for
the regressors in both equations. Considering that aggregate productivity shocks
enter the error terms of both, I use GMM for simultaneous estimation using data
from CPS up to 2007.
Table 3.3 reports the estimation results. The point estimate of ρ is 0.195,
indicating that the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods by old
workers and capital (1−ρ)−1 is slightly more than one. The point estimate of
σ is 0.701, suggesting that the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods produced by young and the composite of other two inputs (1−σ)−1 is
much larger than one. The p-value of Hansen’s J-test is 0.479, suggesting no
over-identification. Besides, the null hypothesis σ = ρ is statistically rejected.
Notice that σ > ρ is not imposed as an assumption in the former analysis; it is
a fact supported by data, which supports capital–experience complementarity.
3.4.2 Other parameters
The model is simulated at a quarterly frequency. Table 3.4 summarizes param-
eter values.
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Table 3.4: Parameter values in simulation (quarterly)
Parameter Interpretation Value Rationale
σ (1−σ)−1 0.701 Estimated
ρ (1−ρ)−1 0.195 Estimated
β Discount factor 0.99
δ Depreciation rate 0.025 Jaimovich, Pruitt, and Siu (2013)
τ Inverse of EIS 0.5
ρx Exog. separation rate 0.055 Unemployment rate 7%
φ Matching efficiency 0.86 Job-finding rate 79%
µ Matching elasticity 0.5 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
η Worker’s barg. power 0.5 Hosios condition
ς Vacancy posting cost 0.11 Cajner and Cairo (2013)
zO Unem. benefit- old 0.76 Literature midpoint
zY Unem. benefit- young 0.55 Ratio of the young to the old (0.7)
λ1 Factor share by young 0.335 National income share by young
λ2 Factor share of capital 0.275 National income share of capital
ψ Coef for productivity 0.81 Labour productivity (BLS)
σA SD for productivity 0.011 Labour productivity (BLS)
µLN Mean of log normal 0 Standardization
σLN SD of log normal 0.12 Krause and Lubik (2007)
In the benchmark calibration, the youth share SY is set at 0.20, which is the
average from 1960 to 2007 for the U.S. In a standard manner, discount rate β
is set at 0.99. The depreciation rate δ takes the value of 0.025 and is the same
as that in Jaimovich, Pruitt, and Siu (2013). The intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is chosen to be 2, which is commonly used in the literature. The ex-
ogenous job separation rate ρx is set at 0.055 to target an average unemployment
rate of 7%. The parameter of match efficiency φ is set to be the same for both
labor markets and equals to 0.86 to match the empirical average job-finding rate
of 0.79 in Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2010). Following Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001), the elasticity of market tightness with respect to vacancies µ is set at
0.5. To satisfy the Hosios (1990) condition, I assume that workers’ bargaining
power η is equal to the elasticity of matching function.22 The vacancy posting
22The Hosios condition makes sure the externalities inflicted by searchers and firms offset
each other optimally. Although there is ex ante heterogeneity in the model, workers of
different age and experience search in segmented labor market, thus no further externality
is inflicted and the Hosios condition is guaranteed by equalizing the worker’s bargaining
power to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment.
3.5. SIMULATION RESULTS 57
cost ς is set to be the same for both labor markets and equals to 0.11 based on
the evidence in the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project survey23 of 1982.
It is demonstrated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) that a high value for
non-market activity can generate higher unemployment dynamics, with z= 0.995
for their case. But a high value for non-market activity also implies an unreal-
istically high opportunity cost of employment and an unrealistic sensitivity of
unemployment to changes in unemployment benefits. Here, I set the unemploy-
ment benefit of old workers zO at 0.76, which is close to the value used by Hall
and Milgrom (2008), 0.71. As unemployment benefit is proportional to experi-
ence level, I assume that the unemployment benefit of the young is 70% of that
of the old, which gives the value for the young zY at 0.55. For the specification of
the factor share parameters λ1 and λ2, I follow Krusell et al. (2000) and calibrate
these parameters to match the national income share from the CPS, which shows
that the share created by old workers amounts to 50%, and the share by capital
amounts to 36%. Parameters for the aggregate productivity shock are calibrated
to match the seasonally adjusted real output in the non-farm business sector. I
take log transformation and then use a one-sided HP filter to detrend the series
with smoothing parameter24 of 1600. The standard deviation of productivity
is 0.013 and the quarterly autocorrelation is 0.81, implying that the standard
deviation of error term σA equals to 0.1125. Concerning the parameters of the
lognormal distribution of idiosyncratic productivity at, I follow Krause and Lu-
bik (2007) by normalizing its mean µLN at 1 and setting the standard deviation
σLN at 0.12.
Table 3.5 shows that the simulated first moments are well targeted, close to
their empirical counterparts.
3.5 Simulation results
This section presents the quantitative results of the study. First, I report the
simulation results for the aggregate economy. Second, I check the existence of
23See Cajner and Cairo (2013) for details.
24I follow the standard smoothing parameter used for quarterly data, see e.g. Fujita
and Ramey (2012).
25As aggregate productivity shock follows an AR(1) process in the model: lnAt =
ψlnAt−1 +et, it is easy to see that var(lnAt) = (σ
A)2
1−ψ2 .
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Table 3.5: Summary of the first moments in benchmark calibration (quarterly)
Data Model
Unemployment rate 0.06 0.07
Unemployment rate of the young 0.12 0.09
Unemployment rate of the old 0.05 0.06
Job-finding rate 0.81 0.79
Separation rate 0.06 0.06
Notes: Aggregate and age-specific unemployment rates are from St. Louis Fed,
while transition rates are from CPS. All series are from 1960Q1 to 2007Q4.
the spillover effect in the simulation of each age group, by changing the value for
the youth share and comparing the age-specific unemployment volatility across
demographic states. Finally, I present impulse response functions with respect
to aggregate productivity shock to disentangle the contribution of job-finding
and separation rates in the spillover effect. To solve the model numerically, I
log-linearize the model in Section 3.3 around its steady state. Details can be
found in the Appendix B.6.
3.5.1 Aggregate volatility across demographic states
Table 3.6 reports the standard deviations (SDs) of aggregate labor market vari-
ables in the data26 from 1960 to 2007 in Column 1, as well as the simulation re-
sults when the youth share varies around its empirical average, 20%, in Columns
2-4. As productivity shock is the main but not the only reason for labor mar-
ket fluctuations, to make sure the comparability of the empirical and simulated
moments, I identify the empirical business cycle component as the projection on
the current and lagged detrended output.
The results show that all the simulated moments increase with the youth
share, except that the SD of productivity is targeted at its empirical level. When
the youth share increases from 18 to 20%, the simulated SD of the unemployment
rate increases by 9%, from 0.15 to 0.17; when this share further increases from
20 to 22%, the simulated value for unemployment increases by 24%, from 0.17
to 0.21. Similarly, the simulated SDs of the job-finding rate, the separation rate,
26I use the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate, the quarterly average of monthly
data. Productivity is the real output per person of nonfarm business sector. Both data
series are from St. Louis Fed. Vacancy rate is seasonally adjusted help-wanted advertising
index from the Conference Board.
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and market tightness also increase with the youth share. The model predicts a
positive relationship between aggregate labor market volatilities and the youth
share.
Table 3.6: Aggregate second moments in the data and the model
Data Model
Youth share 20% 18% 20% 22%
(1) (2) (3) 1 (4) 1
Unemployment rate 0.64 0.15 0.17 9% 0.21 24%
Job-finding rate 5.16 2.05 2.12 3% 2.28 7%
Separation rate 0.10 0.02 0.02 16% 0.04 83%
Market tightness 21.67 4.91 5.09 4% 5.50 8%
Productivity 1.30 1.30 1.30 - 1.30 -
Notes: Sample period: 1960Q1–2007Q4. Rates are in percentage points, market
tightness and productivity in percent. All quarterly series are filtered by a
one-sided HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. 1 stands for the
percentage change after a 2% increase in the youth share.
If we calculate the empirical SD of the unemployment rate across 1970-84
and the one across 1985-2007, we see that it drops significantly from 0.89 to 0.43,
with a decrease of 0.46. The simulation results suggest a decrease of 0.11 if the
youth share decreases from 24 to 17% as in the data over these two periods27.
Therefore, the model predicts that demographic changes account for 23% of the
Great Moderation. Considering that the model underpredicts28 labor market
volatilities by comparing Columns 1 and 3, which have the same youth share,
the contribution of demographic changes should be even larger.
3.5.2 Age-specific volatility across demographic states
This section assesses if the model is capable of generating the spillover effect as
observed in the data.
27Which is calculated from (0.21-0.15)*(0.24-0.17)/(0.22-0.18). I also recalculate this
difference by setting the youth share as 0.17 and 0.24, respectively, in the simulation and
get similar result.
28This underprediction is well known in the search and matching literature. For model
with exogenous separation, see Shimer (2005); for model with endogenous separation, see
Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) and Fujita and Ramey (2012).
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Table 3.7: Age-specific second moments in the data and the model
Data Model
Youth share 20% 18% 20% 22%
(1) (2) (3) 1 (4) 1
Unemployment rate
Young 1.03 0.22 0.31 41% 0.49 61%
Old 0.54 0.14 0.14 -4% 0.13 -3%
Job-finding rate
Young 5.26 2.16 2.24 4% 2.26 1%
Old 4.06 2.02 2.02 0% 2.03 0%
Separation rate
Young 0.15 0.01 0.03 391% 0.13 273%
Old 0.08 0.02 0.02 -
14%
0.01 -
13%
Market tightness
Young - 6.63 7.83 18% 8.96 14%
Old - 4.62 4.55 -2% 4.51 -1%
Notes: The age-specific unemployment rate is from St. Louis Fed,
1960Q1–2007Q4, and age-specific transition rates are from the CPS,
1976Q3–2007Q4. The young include workers aged 15–24 years, and the old cover
workers aged 25–64 years. See Table 3.6 for further notes.
Table 3.7 presents the SDs of age-specific labor market variables in the data
in Column 1 and the simulation results when I vary the youth share from 18 to
22% in Columns 2-4. We can see a clear pattern for the spillover effect: The
simulated SD of the unemployment rate of the young increases from 0.22 to
0.31 as the youth share increases from 18 to 20%; it further increases to 0.49 as
the youth share reaches 22%. As unemployment volatility can be attributed to
variations in job-finding and separation rates, I also report the results for these
two. The simulated SDs increase for both rates of the young as the youth share
increases29. This is especially true for the separation rate, because its volatility
becomes about four times larger when the share increases from 18 to 20% and
29Notice that, the SDs of age-specific job-finding rates, in Column 4 of Table 3.7, are
both lower than the SD of aggregate job-finding rate, in Column 4 of Table 3.6, even
for young workers. This seemingly counterintuitive result is due to the fact that the
latter is not a simple weighted average of the former two. In addition to the former two,
the dynamics of aggregate job-finding rate also depend on the dynamics of age-specific
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about three times larger when it increases from 20 to 22%. A similar pattern is
also found for the market tightness of the young, with a relatively less increment.
While for old workers, the volatilities of most labor market variables (the
unemployment rate, the separation rate, and market tightness) decrease as the
youth share increases, since the increase in the youth share naturally means a
decrease in the share of the old. But the volatility of the job-finding rate remains
unchanged, besides, the declines in other variables are mild. The reason lies in
the complementarity between capital and experience, as the data show. It is
also worth noting that the simulated SD of the unemployment rate of the young
is higher than that of the old across all demographic states.
Clearly, the model can generate the spillover phenomenon as observed in the
data. It predicts that there is approximately a 20% increase in the unemployment
volatility of the young when the youth share increases by 1%. With the hump-
shaped youth share across 1960-2007, the model can also generate the hump-
shaped unemployment volatility of the young over time as shown in Figure 3.1.
To see the relative importance of the spillover effect, I further decompose
the overall effect of demographic changes. I shut down the spillover channel
by assuming that the SDs of age-specific unemployment rates remain the same
as those when the youth share lies in 20%. This gives us the counterfactual
values for the SD of the unemployment rate when the youth share changes. This
counterfactual value is 0.165 if the youth share declines from 20 to 18%, and
0.18 if the youth share increases from 20 to 22%. From Table 3.6, we already
know that the SD of the unemployment rate changes from 0.17 to 0.15 if the
youth share declines from 20 to 18%, and changes from 0.17 to 0.21 if the youth
share increases from 20 to 22%. Therefore, based on the simulation results, we
see that the composition effect accounts for only a quarter of the overall effect
of demographic changes, while spillover effect accounts for three-quarters.
3.5.3 Dynamic response of labor market variables of the
young
To highlight the mechanism for the spillover effect, Figure 3.3 plots the impulse
response functions (IRFs) of key labor market variables of the young with respect
unemployment rates, whose weight increases as the youth share increases, due to the
spillover effect.
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to a positive aggregate productivity shock when the youth share varies, from 18
(dotted line) to 20% (solid line), and further to 22% (dotted, circle-hatched line).
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Figure 3.3: IRFs of variables of the young with respect to aggregate productivity
shock across demographic states
The response of the job-finding rate to productivity shock depends mainly
on the response of market tightness. A higher youth share is associated with a
lower price of goods produced by the young, moreover, this price declines more
steeply when there are more young workers (top-left panel). As the decrease
in price lowers profits generated by the match between firm and young worker,
the percentage increase in profits by hiring young workers is larger in case of
a positive productivity shock. Therefore, firms’ vacancy posting becomes more
sensitive to aggregate productivity when the youth share increases, and so do the
labor market tightness and the job-finding rate of the young (top-right panel).
To understand how the response of the separation rate to productivity shock
is affected by demographic changes, we need to look at the corresponding changes
in the size of marginal workers. A higher youth share induces a higher reservation
productivity of the young. Since a higher reservation productivity is associated
with a larger mass of marginal workers as pointed out by Pizzinelli, Theodoridis,
and Zanetti (2018), there are more marginal young workers affected by aggregate
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shock when the youth share increases. Furthermore, the response of the reserva-
tion productivity of the young to productivity shock remains almost unchanged
when the youth share changes30 (bottom-left panel). This means the impact
of productivity shock on each marginal young worker remains equally strong at
different values for the youth share. Thus, the volatility of the separation rate
of the young increases with the youth share (bottom-middle panel).
Hence, the volatilities of both the job-finding and separation rates of the
young increase with the youth share, jointly raising the unemployment volatility
of the young.
3.6 Introducing exogenous separation
In this section, I discuss the robustness of the former results in the case of
exogenous job separation. This exercise is necessary because the dynamics of
the unemployment rate in the U.S. comes mainly from the dynamics of the job-
finding rate, especially for the young. The purpose of this exercise is about the
generality of the spillover effect in different theoretical frameworks rather than
about the selection of a suitable job-matching model.
Table 3.8: Further decomposition of unemployment volatility
15-24 25-54 55-64 15-64
Job-finding rate 80.91 68.80 84.97 73.36
Separation rate 12.42 26.21 15.86 19.38
Notes: Quarterly data from CPS, 1976Q3–2007Q4. All series are detrended by
one-sided HP-filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
In Table 3.8, I decompose unemployment volatility for each age group to
quantify the contribution of the job-finding and separation rates in accounting
for age-specific unemployment volatility31. The results show that the fluctuation
30The reservation productivity of the young depends mainly on its price and aggregate
productivity. Since the response of this price to productivity shock is low in level and only
slightly varies when the youth share changes, the response of the reservation productivity
barely changes with the youth share.
31Following Shimer (2012) in the construction of worker flow rates with CPS data, I
decompose the cyclical unemployment volatility of different age groups into contributions
from the job-finding and separation rates. Due to the effect of labor force participation,
the numbers do not necessarily add up to 100.
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in the job-finding rate accounts for almost all the unemployment volatility for
young workers. Even for other age groups, the role of the job-finding rate is
dominant.
The Bellman equations of the system with exogenous job separation are pro-
vided in the Appendix B.7. If there is no aggregate uncertainty, it can be shown
that the elasticity of market tightness of the young with respect to aggregate
productivity is32
eYθ,A =
∂ lnθY
∂ lnA =
1−β(1−ρx) +ηβ(1−ρx)fY
µ[1−β(1−ρx)] +ηβ(1−ρx)fY
∂ lnPY
∂ lnA + 1
1−zY /(PY A) . (3.27)
The first term has limited variation as discussed before, besides, the nu-
merator in the second term also has limited variation when the youth share
changes, as the estimation results show that the goods produced by young work-
ers are substitutable for the composite of other inputs. Therefore, changes in
this elasticity come mainly from changes in the price of goods produced by
young workers. Since this price decreases when there are more young workers,
as shown in Proposition 1, firms hiring young workers get lower profits and there
are more fluctuations in the labor market tightness of the young with respect to
the aggregate productivity shock33.
Table 3.9 reports the second moments when job is exogenously separated.
Similar to the former case, for the young, the simulated SD of the unemployment
rate is higher when there are more young workers in the labor force; for the
old, it is relatively stable, with a slight decline; at the aggregate level, it also
increases with the youth share. The dynamics of the job-finding rate and market
tightness also exhibit a similar pattern. Notice that the values for unemployment
volatilities (both aggregate and age-specific) are lower than those in the model
with endogenous job separation34, which is consistent with Fujita and Ramey
(2012).
32The proof can be found in Appendix B.8.
33Notice that one necessary condition for the existence of match between firm and young
worker is PY A> zY , which ensures the non-negativeness of 1−zY /(PY A).
34The reason lies in the irresponsiveness of job separation rate to productivity shock
in the model with exogenous job separation. With a positive shock, the value for a new
match increases and firms post more vacancies. This increases worker’s job-finding rate
and reduces unemployment. If separation rate is endogenous determined, firms lower the
threshold of individual productivity and therefore separation rate, which further decreases
unemployment.
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Table 3.9: Second moments in the data and the model (with exogenous separa-
tion)
Data Model
Youth share 20% 18% 20% 22%
(1) (2) (3) 1 (4) 1
Unemployment rate
Young 1.03 0.22 0.29 30% 0.38 33%
Old 0.54 0.13 0.13 -3% 0.12 -3%
Aggregate 0.64 0.15 0.16 8% 0.18 13%
Job-finding rate
Young 5.26 2.30 2.40 4% 2.50 4%
Old 4.06 2.10 2.09 0% 2.09 0%
Market tightness
Young - 6.87 8.30 21% 10.22 23%
Old - 4.70 4.61 -2% 4.52 -2%
Notes: Sources of data are the same as that in Table 3.7. See Table 3.6 for
further notes.
Besides, I plot the IRFs with respect to the aggregate productivity shock
when job is exogenously separated, which can be found in the Appendix B.9.
The results are similar to the case with endogenous job separation. The price
of goods produced by the young decreases more when the youth share increases,
shrinking the level of firms’ profits. Therefore, firms’ vacancy posting becomes
more sensitive to aggregate productivity. The responses of market tightness
and the job-finding rate of the young also become stronger when the youth
share increases. As the dynamics of unemployment are now determined by the
dynamics of the job-finding rate, unemployment volatility of the young also
increases.
To summarize, even without the dynamics of the separation rate, there is
still a positive relationship between the volatility of the job-finding rate of the
young and the youth share, and it leads to the spillover effect.
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3.7 Empirical assessment of the mechanism
This section provides supporting evidence for the aforementioned mechanism.
First, I investigate the causal relationship between the price of goods produced
by the young and the youth share; then, I check the relationship between the
dynamics of transition rates and the youth share.
The first evidence is important since changes in price connect demographic
changes and labor market dynamics. In particular, as I claim in Proposition 1,
there is a decrease in the price of goods produced by the young when the youth
share increases. Since this price level is not directly available in the data, I use
the wage of the young as a proxy, which is
ωYt (At, at) = η(PYt Atat+ ςY θYt ) + (1−η)zY . (3.28)
This shows that the wage of the young is positively related to the price of goods
produced by them. If this price decreases when there is a greater share of young
workers, we should also see a decrease in the wage of the young.
As this wage also depends on aggregate and individual productivities, as well
as the market tightness of the young, I regress the log wage of the young on the
youth share, the lag of the log real GDP per capita, and the job-finding rate of
the young35 using annual data from the U.S. Besides, I also include a trend in
the regression, as wage seems to have a long-term trend in the data.
Table 3.10: The price of goods produced by the young and the share of the young
Youth share Young population
share
Native young population
share
Coefficient -1.71*
(0.86)
-1.28*
(0.71)
-1.35*
(0.77)
Nobs 31 31 31
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98
Notes: Newey–West standard errors are in parentheses. * stands for a
significance level of 10%.
35The wage of the young is per capita wage, which is not affected by the size of the
young. I put the lag of the log real GDP per capita as an independent variable, as Real
GDP per capita is likely to be correlated with the error term. I use the job-finding rate of
the young as a proxy, because data of the age-specific market tightness is not available.
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The results are reported in Table 3.10. The first column shows that the
youth share has a statistically significant, negative effect on the wage of the
young. Besides, to take care of the potential endogeneity problems due to labor
force participation and migration, I use the share of young population and the
share of native young population, respectively, as proxy for the youth share. The
results are similar, a statistically significant, negative impact from demographic
composition on the wage of the young, supporting my claim in Proposition 1.
Given the exogeneity of the youth share and its proxies, the causality of this
relationship is ensured.
Table 3.11: Second moments of the transition rates of the young over time
Period 1976Q3-1986Q2 1986Q3-1996Q2 1996Q3-2006Q2
Youth share 23.3% 18.0% 15.9%
Job-finding rate
(young) 7.59 3.98 3.86
Separation rate (young) 0.22 0.11 0.10
Table 3.11 shows the SDs of the transition rates of the young between 1976Q3
and 2006Q2. This period is characterized by a persistent and sharp decline in
the youth share. It can be divided into three subperiods with a 10-year span for
each. From the first subperiod to the second, the youth share decreases from
23.3 to 18.0%, with a decline of 5.3% in level; from the second subperiod to the
third, it further declines but only by 2.1% in level. Similarly, the SDs of the
job-finding and separation rates of the young also have a decreasing trend over
the whole period, with more decrease from the first subperiod to the second than
from the second subperiod to the third36. These results are consistent with the
prediction of the model, which shows that the variations in the dynamics of the
36Notice that, the variation in the simulated job-finding rate of the young is less obvious
than its empirical counterpart: The empirical results suggest a decrease of 13% in the SD
of job-finding rate with one percent less young workers, while the model only predicts a
corresponding value of 1%. The opposite is true for separation rate: The empirical results
suggest a decrease of 16%, while the model predicts a value of 50%. This inconsistency in
level is left for future research. Still it does not invalidate the mechanism generating the
spillover effect, since both the volatilities of job-finding rate and separation rate in the
model share the same pattern as their empirical counterparts, that is, they increase with
the youth share.
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job-finding and separation rates of the young, when triggered by demographic
changes, jointly contribute to the spillover effect.
3.8 Summary
In this paper, I highlight the role of the demographic structure of the workforce
in shaping aggregate and age-specific cyclical business cycles. I document a
new stylized fact: Unemployment volatility within the group of young workers
increases with their share in the labor force, generating a spillover effect.
More importantly, I provide a theoretical explanation of this new fact. By
incorporating a job-matching model into the RBC model featuring age-specific
differences in labor demand, I show that the dynamics of the transition rates
of the young depend on demographic state. These two are connected through
the general equilibrium price of the intermediate goods produced by the young.
Quantitative results show that the responses of the job-finding and separation
rates of the young to productivity shock become stronger as there are more young
workers in the labor force, jointly contributing to the spillover effect. This result
has important implications for policy-makers. First, it points out the necessity
to pay attention to the current state of demographic structure and its projected
path, either when policy-makers want information about the labor market re-
sponse to potential shocks, especially for young workers, or when they need to
properly evaluate the impacts of age-specific labor market policies. Second, the
positive correlation between business cycle volatility and demographic changes
also suggests that the Great Moderation was more likely driven by structural
factors other than good policies.
Chapter 4
Population Aging, Monetary Policy, and Con-
sumption Inequality
4.1 Introduction
Population aging is one of the biggest challenges most industrialized countries
are currently facing. In the U.S., the average 65-year-old can expect to live
another 24 years in 2060, with an increase of seven years from that in 1990,
while population growth is expected to decline persistently even allowing for
immigration (left panel of Figure 4.1). These two trends will inevitably push up
the dependency ratio—the number of population over 65 years to working age
population1 (right panel of Figure 4.1), and this will be 0.4 in 2060 in the U.S.
Some other countries have already stepped into the society of aging. In Japan,
the dependency ratio is already up to 0.47 in 2017, almost three times as much
as that in 1990. The current ratios for Italy, Germany, and France are all over
0.3.
The demographic trends have far-reaching implications for both monetary
policy and consumption inequality. For the former, there is a long-term down-
ward pressure on real and nominal interest rates as agents facing a longer retire-
ment period tend to save more (see e.g. Krueger and Ludwig, 2007; Carvalho,
Ferrero, and Nechio, 2016), besides, the zero lower bound (ZLB) is more likely to
bind following a shock with the declining trend of the nominal interest rate (see
1The working age population refers to people aged 15-64 years. Although the full
benefit age is 66 years and 2 months in 2017 in the U.S., 65 is still a common full retirement
age in many other countries.
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Figure 4.1: Demographic transition in the U.S. projected until 2060
Note: In the left panel, the dotted line represents the population growth rate and
the solid line shows the life expectancy at 65. In the right panel, the solid line
gives the dependency ratio. All series are from 1990 and projection starts from
2020.
Source: United Nations World Population Prospects (2017 Revision).
e.g. Jones, 2018). For the latter, there is a trend toward increasing consump-
tion inequality between retirees and workers as the pension system comes under
strain with a shrinking percentage of workers. This paper connects these two
and examines the impact of population aging on consumption inequality between
retirees and workers over time through its impact on monetary policy2. While
the previous research (see e.g. Deaton and Paxson, 1994) has focused on the
impact of aging on consumption inequality within a fixed cohort, I restrict my
analysis to the narrower question of between-cohort consumption inequality3.
The connection follows from that population aging can induce higher con-
sumption inequality through the downward adjustment of the real interest rate.
With the increasing life expectancy of retirees, workers increase their labor sup-
ply, reduce consumption, and save more to insure against a longer retirement
2It needs to be pointed out that my analysis does not consider the role of taxation,
particularly progressive taxes, which contributes to a large part of the resurgence of in-
equality after 1980 (see Piketty, 2015). Potentially, this fiscal shift could also be related
to demographic changes as there is an increasing need to finance pension systems with
more retirees. But here I focus on the role of monetary policy in connecting population
aging and consumption inequality.
3In the paper, if unspecified, the term consumption inequality refers exclusively to
consumption inequality between retirees and workers.
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period. At the same time, retirees postpone current consumption and increase
savings to support their future consumption. The accumulation of assets leads
to a decrease in the real interest rate4. Workers’ willingness to carry assets into
retirement is partially discouraged, as assets become less attractive with lower
real returns. With fewer assets carried by workers, retirees further decrease
their consumption. Therefore, consumption inequality has an increasing5 trend
as population ages. On the contrary, the binding of the ZLB can mitigate this
inequality in dynamics. Since retirees rely typically on the returns of assets, they
benefit more when the fall in the nominal interest rate is bounded.
To quantitatively assess the effect of population aging on consumption in-
equality, I consider a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with
sticky prices, investment adjustment costs, and the life-cycle feature of Gertler
(1999); however I deviate in terms of the modeling of labor supply. I endogenize
the labor supply of workers while letting retirees enjoy full leisure. The main pur-
pose of this deviation is to capture the insufficient flexibility of the labor supply
of retirees, which is either a necessary result of declining health or a reflection of
a strong willingness to be outside of the labor market6. Another concern is that
rehiring is not easily available for retirees, since post-pension employees usually
undertake highly complex tasks requiring proficient knowledge and skills, and
constitute only a small part of the retired population. Moreover, as shown by
Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008), a variable labor supply of retirees implies that
the real interest rate can increase with life expectancy, which contradicts the em-
pirical finding of Carvalho, Ferrero, and Nechio (2016), that is the real interest
rate declines monotonically when life expectancy increases.
4This is consistent with the empirical finding in Carvalho, Ferrero, and Nechio (2016)
and Kara and von Thadden (2016).
5The main context here is that workers are wealthier than retirees. This is not an
assumption, but rather a result from simulations under reasonable parameter specifica-
tion. Instead of focusing on the very few asset rich, this paper gives its attention to how
population aging adds to the strain on pension systems and the demand for self-insurance.
6Although there is an upward trend in the labor force participation rate of older people
(65+) in some countries recently, this is more likely to be the result of the extension of
retirement age, e.g., from 65 to 67 between 2012 to 2029 in Germany, and from 66 to
67 in the U.S. The labor force participation rate of retirees is still quite low and rigid.
The supporting evidence can be found in Italy and Spain, who currently have no plan to
extend retirement age. The labor force participation rate of older people (65+) is lower
than 4% for Italy and 2% for Spain, and remains almost unchanged for both over time.
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Consumption inequality is measured by the ratio of consumption per retiree
to consumption per worker (hereafter referred to as the relative consumption
ratio). Compared with an inequality measure of the whole population, it is in-
dependent of the distribution of the population. In my calibrated model, this
ratio for the U.S. is predicted to decline by 40%, from 0.68 to 0.41, between
1990 and 2060, due to population aging. This suggests an increasing consump-
tion inequality over time. Consumption per retiree declines over time, while
consumption per worker increases in the long term. This result is mainly due
to the decline in the real interest rate as population ages, which is predicted to
decrease from 3.7% to -0.3% over this period for the U.S. Retirees, relying only
on the returns on assets, lose more because of the decline in the real interest rate.
Decomposing the effect of population aging into the effect of the prolonging life
expectancy and that of the decreasing population growth, I find that both the
increase in consumption inequality and the decline in the real interest rate are
mainly due to the prolonging life expectancy.
To investigate the distributional effect of the ZLB, I consider two types of
shocks which can push the nominal interest rate against the lower bound: a posi-
tive preference shock, which can be considered as a contractionary demand shock,
and an expansionary monetary policy shock. For the former, the downward ad-
justment of the nominal interest rate is partially hindered with the presence of
the ZLB. This decreases labor demand and the real wage, and induces a cor-
responding fall in consumption per worker relative to consumption per retiree.
For the latter, the expansionary shock induces an instantaneous decrease in the
nominal interest rate. Retirees suffer more due to their full reliance on assets.
With the presence of the ZLB, the change in the nominal interest rate is limited
and so is the loss of retirees. Therefore, consumption inequality between retirees
and workers is mitigated in dynamics after both shocks.
The relationship between population aging and the long-term trend of overall
consumption inequality has been examined by several studies. Deaton and Pax-
son (1994) show that consumption inequality within a fixed cohort increases with
age, using data from the U.S., the U.K., and Taiwan, since idiosyncratic shocks
accumulate throughout the life cycle in an incomplete market. Abe and Yamada
(2009) and Badel and Huggett (2014) provide further evidence of this positive
relationship. One of its implications is that population aging can lead to greater
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overall consumption inequality as the share of older cohorts rises due to a direct
composition effect, as shown by Ohtake and Saito (1998) using Japanese house-
hold data. This paper enriches this literature by investigating the implication of
aging for between-cohort consumption inequality.
The theoretical framework of this paper shares similarity with Fujiwara and
Teranishi (2008), Carvalho, Ferrero, and Nechio (2016), and Kara and von Thad-
den (2016), who follow Gertler’s suggestion for demographic developments as
time-dependent exogenous processes in a New Keynesian model. The first one
studies the asymmetry of the effects of structural shocks, technology and mon-
etary policy shocks, over the life cycle, through the changes in the labor supply
of retirees as population ages. However, it does not systematically address the
impact of population aging on this asymmetry. The other two focus on the im-
pact of demographic changes on the long-term transition of the real interest rate.
The present paper connects the impact of population aging on consumption in-
equality and its implication for the real interest rate. Besides, I deviate from
them7 in labor supply specifications to capture the low and rigid labor supply
of retirees.
This paper is also related to a growing literature studying the distributional
effect of monetary policy shocks8. By tracing overall consumption and income
inequality in the U.S. since 1980, Coibion et al. (2017) find that monetary pol-
icy shocks, particular contractionary monetary policy shocks, account for a non-
trivial part of the cyclical variation in both inequality. In addition, by measuring
the effect of unanticipated changes in the nominal interest rate on income in-
equality for a large sample of advanced and emerging economies, Furceri, Loun-
gani, and Zdzienicka (2018) find that contractionary monetary policy shocks
increase inequality, in both cyclical and long-term variations. The main channel
works through heterogeneity across households in terms of their primary sources
of income. The present paper adds to this literature by investigating the distri-
butional effect of shocks, a preference shock and a monetary policy shock, with
7Labor supply is endogenously determined for both workers and retirees in Fujiwara
and Teranishi (2008) and Kara and von Thadden (2016) while exogenously given for
both in Carvalho, Ferrero, and Nechio (2016). In my modeling setup, it is endogenously
determined for workers while exogenously given for retirees.
8On the theoretical side, based on DSGE models, Auclert (2017) considers the asym-
metric effect of short-term changes in the real interest rate on aggregate consumption and
Doepke, Schneider, and Selezneva (2015) study the heterogeneous effect of changes in the
nominal interest rate generated by a persistent change in the inflation target.
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the binding of the ZLB. I find that redistribution due to the ZLB works through
similar channels as that due to monetary policy shocks.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section lays out the model. Sec-
tion 4.3 gives the calibration strategy. Section 4.4 reports the main results and
explains the mechanism. The final section concludes the paper.
4.2 The model
The model is a canonical New Keynesian DSGE model with Rotemberg (1982)
type price adjustment cost and the life-cycle feature of Gertler (1999). Time is
discrete and households have an infinite time horizon. There are six sectors in
the economy: households, final goods producers, intermediate goods producers,
capital producers, a fiscal authority, and a monetary authority. I restrict the
analysis to a perfect-foresight environment.
4.2.1 Households
Households invest their assets in capital producers to produce capital, which
is then sold to firms producing intermediate goods. Besides, households own
all producers and receive their profits9. Individuals are born as workers. They
choose the optimal levels of consumption, labor supply, and asset holdings to
maximize their utility. With an exogenous probability 1−ωt+1, workers retire
in the next period and enter into retirement10. Retirees choose the optimal levels
of consumption and asset holdings. They survive with an exogenous probability
γt+1 in the next period and live on their asset holdings.
4.2.1.1 Retirees
The value function of retirees, r, who were born at j and become retired at k,
is written as
V rjkt = max
C
rjk
t ,A
rjk
t
[
(Crjkt )ρ+βtγt+1(V
rjk
t+1 )
ρ
]1/ρ
,
9This ownership structure is also used in Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008).
10This setup is similar as the perpetual youth model by Yaari (1965) and Blanchard
(1985).
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subject to their intertemporal budget constraint:
Crjkt +
Arjkt
Pt
+T rjkt =
1
γt
Rt−1Arjkt−1
Pt
+Πrjkt ,
where ρ determines the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution11, βt is a time-
varying subjective discount factor and defined by βt ≡ β exp(ηt), in which β
is the scale factor and ηt stands for an inter-temporal preference shock12 with
ηt = ρηηt−1 +eηt .
Retirees carry Arjkt−1 units of nominal assets into period t, which is the amount
invested in capital producers and which is predetermined in period t−1. They
receive a nominal gross return of Rt−1Arjkt−1 from their investment and real profits
of Πrjkt from their ownership of firms13 and capital producers in period t. Given
investment returns and profits, retirees decide the current level of consumption
and the amount to lend to capital producers in the next period. Tt is a lump-sum
tax which is the same for all households. A perfectly competitive life-insurance
company makes sure the bequests of assets are evenly distributed among all
survived retirees and pays a premium 1/γt over the market return. Besides,
the consistency of asset holdings requires that the retirees’ initial asset holdings
upon retirement correspond to the assets held in the last period as a worker,
namely, Arj(t+1)t = A
wj
t . From the first-order conditions, we can get the Euler
equation for the consumption of retirees:
Rt
pit+1
βt
(Crjkt+1
Crjkt
)ρ−1
= 1,
where pit = PtPt−1 denotes the gross inflation rate.
Let ξrt denote the retirees’ marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of
wealth, then the retirees’ consumption at time t can be written as a linear
function of total wealth at t:
Crjkt = ξrt
( 1
γt
Rt−1Arjkt−1
Pt
+NP rjkt
)
,
11σ = (1−ρ)−1 is the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution.
12The preference shock is intended to generate output contraction and push the nominal
interest rate against the ZLB. It is widely used in the ZLB literature, see e.g. Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and Krause and Moyen (2016).
13Firms include final and intermediate goods producers.
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where NP rjkt is the present discounted value of net profits of retirees. These
net profits are the difference between profits from firms and capital producers,
Πrjkt , and tax payment of retirees, T
rjk
t . The dynamic equation for NP
rjk
t is
NP rjkt ≡ Πrjkt −T rjkt +
∞∑
ν=1
Πrjkt+ν −T rjkt+ν
∞∏
s=0
( Rt+spit+sγt+s )
= Πrjkt −T rjkt +
pit+1γt+1
Rt
NP rjkt+1,
where γt+1 is the survival rate of a retiree and pit+1γt+1Rt represents the real
discount rate for a retiree. It follows that the dynamic equation of ξrt is
ξrt = 1−γt+1βt
1
1−ρ
( Rt
pit+1
) ρ
1−ρ ξrt
ξrt+1
. (4.1)
Retirees’ MPC depends on the real interest rate, the discount factor and its
survival probability. If ρ= 0, we can have ξrt = 1−γt+1βt. If the life expectancy
of retirees increases, retirees tend to consume less of their total wealth and
decrease their MPC, as in Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985). If the discount
factor increases, which represents a positive preference shock, retirees tend to
postpone their consumption, and their MPC declines accordingly.
4.2.1.2 Workers
The value function of workers born at j is written as
V wjt = max
C
wj
t ,L
wj
t ,A
wj
t
{[
(Cwjt )v(1−Lwjt )1−v
]ρ+βt[ωt+1V wjt+1 +(1−ωt+1)V rjt+1]ρ}1/ρ,
subject to their intertemporal budget constraint:
Cwjt +
Awjt
Pt
+Twjt =
Rt−1Awjt−1
Pt
+ Wt
Pt
Lwjt +Π
wj
t ,
where v is a parameter related to the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure.
The form of the instantaneous utility of workers is consistent with that of
retirees. To see this, note that the instantaneous utility of retirees can be written
4.2. THE MODEL 77
as
[(Crjkt )v(1−Lrjkt )1−v]ρ.
Because retirees enjoy full-time leisure, we have Lrjkt = 0, ∀j, k. Besides, the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure goes to infinity,
since labor supply is constant for retirees, thus we have ν = 1 for retirees and
their instantaneous utility becomes (Crjkt )ρ.
In addition to the investment returns from capital producers and the profits
from the ownership of firms and capital producers, workers get one unit of labor
in each period, from which they choose to supply Lwjt , and get wage payment
Wt
Pt
Lwjt . In the next period, workers retire with probability 1− ωt+1. If it
happens, they get a value of V rj(t+1)t+1 , which is the value function of retirees
born at j and retire at t+ 1.
From the first-order conditions, we can get the equation for labor supply:
Lwjt = 1−
1−v
v
Pt
Wt
Cwjt ,
from which, we see that labor supply increases with wage and declines with
consumption. As consumption is proportionate to total wealth at t, there is a
negative wealth effect on labor supply.
As proved in the Appendix C.1, the Euler equation for workers’ consumption
is
ωt+1
(
1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
Cwjt+1 + (1−ωt+1)
(
ξrt+1
ξw
t+1
)−1/ρ
C
rj(t+1)
t+1
=
[
βt
Rt
pit+1
Ωt+1
(
1−v
v
Pt
Wt
)ρ(v−1)] 11−ρ
Cwjt ,
where ξwt is the MPC of workers, Ωt+1
(1−v
v
Pt
Wt
)ρ(v−1) is a weight for the
real interest rate, and Ωt+1 is defined by Ωt+1 ≡ ωt+1
(
1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
+ (1−
ωt+1)ν−1
(
ξrt+1
ξw
t+1
)− 1−ρρ . Workers take into account the probability of retirement
in the next period when they decide the optimal consumption for current period.
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Accordingly, the decision rule for workers’ consumption is
Cwjt = ξwt
(Rt−1Awjt−1
Pt
+Hwjt +NP
wj
t
)
,
where ξwt is the MPC of workers, H
wj
t is human wealth, NP
wj
t is the present
discounted value of net profits of workers. Combining this decision rule with the
Euler equation for workers’ consumption, we get the dynamic equation for the
MPC of workers ξwt :
ξwt = 1−
[
Ωt+1
(1−v
v
Pt
Wt
)ρ(v−1)
βt
( Rt
pit+1
)ρ] 11−ρ(Ω′t+1)−1 ξwtξwt+1 , (4.2)
and the dynamic equations for human wealth Hwjt and the present discounted
value of net profits of workers NPwjt :
Hwjt =
Wt
Pt
Lwjt +
pit+1
Rt
ωt+1
Ω′t+1
(1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
Hwjt+1
NPwjt = Π
wj
t −Twjt +
pit+1
Rt
ωt+1
Ω′t+1
(1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
NPwjt+1
+pit+1
Rt
1−ωt+1
Ω′t+1
(ξrt+1
ξwt+1
)1−1/ρ
NP
rj(t+1)
t+1 ,
where Ω′t+1 ≡ ωt+1
(
1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
+ (1 − ωt+1)
(
ξrt+1
ξw
t+1
)− 1−ρρ
. The term
pit+1
Rt
ωt+1
Ω′
t+1
(
1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
constitutes the real discount rate for a worker, which
captures the positive probability of retiring and losing labor income.
4.2.1.3 Aggregation
Suppose that there are Nwt workers and Nrt retirees at time t, the size of new
born is (1−ωt+1 +nt+1)Nwt and the size of remaining workers is ωt+1Nwt , then
the law of motion for aggregate labor force is
Nwt+1 = (1−ωt+1 +nt+1)Nwt +ωt+1Nwt = (1 +nt+1)Nwt .
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For retirees, the inflow is (1−ωt+1)Nwt and the size of remaining retirees is
γt+1Nrt , thus the law of motion for aggregate retirees is
Nrt+1 = (1−ωt+1)Nwt +γt+1Nrt .
As dependency ratio is the ratio of the size of retirees to the size of workers,
Nrt /N
w
t , we get the dynamic equation for dependency ratio as
(1 +nt+1)dt+1 = 1−ωt+1 +γt+1dt. (4.3)
Since the MPC of retirees, ξrt , is the same for all retirees at each time t,
the aggregate consumption of retirees follows a similar form as Crjkt . The only
difference is that the aggregate asset holdings of retirees do not need to be divided
by γt, because redistribution of requests does not play a role in aggregate. Thus,
the equation for the aggregate consumption of retirees is
Crt = ξrt
(Rt−1Art−1
Pt
+PP rt −PT rt
)
. (4.4)
Similarly, the aggregate consumption of workers and aggregate labor supply are
Cwt = ξwt
(Rt−1Awt−1
Pt
+Hwt +PPwt −PTwt
)
(4.5)
Lt = Nwt −
1−v
v
Pt
Wt
Cwt . (4.6)
The aggregate asset holdings of retirees in period t are composed of the assets
of retirees who survive at t and the assets of workers who retire at t. Thus the
law of motion of the aggregate asset holdings of retirees is
Art
Pt
=
Rt−1Art−1
Pt
+Πrt −
dt
1 +dt
Tt−Crt
+(1−ωt+1)
(Rt−1Awt−1
Pt
+ Wt
Pt
Lt+Πwt −
Tt
1 +dt
−Cwt
)
,
and the aggregate asset holdings of workers depend only on the asset holdings
of the remaining works in the labor force, which gives
Awt
Pt
= ωt+1
(Rt−1Awt−1
Pt
+ Wt
Pt
Lt+Πwt −
Tt
1 +dt
−Cwt
)
.
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Combining the last two equations, we get
Art
Pt
=
Rt−1Art−1
Pt
(1− ξrt ) +Πrt −
dt
1 +dt
Tt− ξrt (PP rt −PT rt )
+1−ωt
ωt
Awt
Pt
. (4.7)
With population growth, the discounting rate for aggregate human wealth
and the present values of net profits needs to be adjusted by 1/(1+nt+1). There-
fore, the dynamic equation of aggregate human wealth is
Hwt =
Wt
Pt
Lwt +
pit+1
(1 +nt+1)Rt
ωt+1
Ω′t+1
(1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
Hwt+1, (4.8)
and the dynamic equations of the present discounted value of net profits are
NP rt = Πrt −
dt
1 +dt
Tt+
pit+1γt+1
(1 +nt+1)Rt
NP rt+1 (4.9)
NPwt = Πwt −
1
1 +dt
Tt+
pit+1
(1 +nt+1)Rt
ωt+1
Ω′t+1
(1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
NPwt+1
+ pit+1(1 +nt+1)Rt
1−ωt+1
Ω′t+1
(ξrt+1
ξwt+1
)1−1/ρ
NP rt+1. (4.10)
4.2.2 Firms
Final goods are produced by perfectly competitive firms with a continuum of
intermediate goods, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], purchased from intermediate goods
producers. The production of intermediate goods follows a Cobb-Douglas func-
tion. It is under monopolistic competition and subject to Rotemberg-type price
adjustment cost.
4.2.2.1 Final goods producers
Taking the price of each input Pt(i) and the price of final goods Pt as given, the
final goods producers choose optimal input Yt(i) for all i ∈ [0, 1] to maximize
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profits. The problem of the final goods producers is
max
Yt(i)
PtYt−
1∫
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di,
subject to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation technology:
Yt =
( 1∫
0
Yt(i)(κ−1)/κdi
)κ/(κ−1)
,
where κ is the constant elasticity of substitution among goods and κ/(κ− 1)
is the gross price markup. From the first-order condition, we get the demand
function for intermediate goods in the form of a downward sloping curve:
Yt(i) =
(Pt(i)
Pt
)−κ
Yt.
4.2.2.2 Intermediate goods producers
Monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers purchase labor Lt(i)
at price Wt/Pt from households and capital Kt−1(i) at price rKt from capital
producers to produce intermediate good i, which is then sold to final goods
producers at price Pt(i). In order to eliminate the distortion from monopolis-
tic competition, government provides a subsidy τ to each intermediate goods
producer with the support of a lump-sum tax.
The problem of a producer producing good i can be written as14
min
Lt(i),Kt−1(i)
Wt
Pt
Lt(i) + rKt Kt−1(i),
subject to
Yt(i) = Lt(i)1−αKt−1(i)α. (4.11)
14In aggregate, we have
∫
i
Kt−1(i) = Kt−1. Although the aggregate capital is deter-
mined at t−1, its distribution is realized at t.
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The first-order conditions with respect to capital and labor supply are
Wt
Pt
= (1−α)ϕtLt(i)−αKt−1(i)α (4.12)
rKt = αϕtLt(i)1−αKt−1(i)α−1 (4.13)
where ϕt = [ Wt(1−α)Pt ]
1−α( r
K
t
α )α is the Lagrangian multiplier of the optimization
problem and denotes real marginal cost. Notice that the real marginal cost is
the same for each intermediate goods producer.
Besides, producers also need to choose the optimal price Pt(i) given the
Rotemberg price adjustment cost and a target of unity for gross inflation rate.
The optimal price is set by the maximization of the sum of current and future
profits,
max
Pt(i)
∞∑
s=0
Φt, t+sΠMt (i),
subject to the demand function for intermediate goods. Of which, Φt, t+1 is a
discount factor given by 1 = Φt, t+1 Rtpit+1 and Π
M
t (i) is the monopoly profit of
producer i at t with
ΠMt (i) =
[
(1 + τ)Pt(i)
Pt
−ϕt
]
Yt(i)− φ2
( Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
−1
)2
Yt. (4.14)
Because of symmetry across intermediate goods producers, each one charges
the same price in equilibrium, Pt(i) = Pt, given that the real marginal cost is
the same for each producer. The first-order condition is
κ(ϕt−1)−φ(pit−1)pit+ pit+1
Rt
φ(pit+1−1)pit+1 = 0. (4.15)
4.2.3 Capital producers
The behavior of capital producers shares similarity with Fujiwara and Teranishi
(2008)15. But instead of introducing financial intermediaries who borrow from
households and invest in capital producers, I assume that the households invest
15It is also similar as the behavior of type II firms in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012).
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directly in capital producers. This simplification of the funding structure offers
very similar result as Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008)16.
Perfectly competitive capital producers receive a nominal payment of
Ptr
K
t Kt from intermediate goods producers and pay a nominal amount of
RtAt−1 to households at the beginning of period t, then they choose the amount
of assets to borrow from households for the next period, At, and the amount of
new investment It for the production of new capital. The capital producers’ real
dividend is given by
ΠKt =
At
Pt
+ rKt Kt−1− It−Rt−1
At−1
Pt
, (4.16)
subject to the law of motion for capital,
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +
[
1−S
( It
It−1
)]
It, (4.17)
where S is the investment adjustment cost and of similar form as Fujiwara and
Teranishi (2008):
S
( It
It−1
)
= (1 +nt)2S”
[ ( It
It−1
)2
2(1 +nt)2
− It
It−1(1 +nt)
+ 12
]
,
in which S” is the parameter of investment adjustment cost17. Accordingly,
the aggregate dividend of households, which is the sum of the dividends from
intermediate goods producers and capital producers, is
Πt =ΠMt +ΠKt .
16I fix some obvious typos in parameter specifications in their Table 4.1: θ in the first
row should be κ, α should be 1− 0.667 instead of 0.667, and δ = 1.1.25− 1 instead of
δ = 1.12.5−1.
17The detrended version of this equation (aggregate investment I divided by (1 +nt))
is:
S( it
it−1
) = [(1+nt)]2S”[(
it
it−1
)2/2− it
it−1
+ 1
2
].
It satisfies the properties specified in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005): S(1) =
S′(1) = 0, and S”(1)> 0.
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The first-order conditions with respect to capital and investment are
Qt =
pit+1
Rt
[Qt+1(1− δ) + rKt+1] (4.18)
1 = Qt[1−S( It
It−1
)−S′( It
It−1
) It
It−1
] + pit+1
Rt
Qt+1S
′(It+1
It
)(It+1
It
)2,(4.19)
where Qt is the Lagrange multiplier on the capital formation, Tobin’s Q. Equa-
tion (4.19) gives the arbitrage condition. In steady state, we get R= 1−δ+rK .
Equation (4.20) gives the dynamic equation for the Lagrange multiplier Qt.
4.2.4 Government’s policy
4.2.4.1 Fiscal policy
The government collects a lump-sum tax and subsidizes intermediate goods pro-
ducers in order to eliminate monopolistic distortion. Therefore, its budget con-
straint is
Tt = τYt. (4.20)
4.2.4.2 Monetary policy
I assume that the gross nominal interest rate follows a truncated Taylor rule:
Rt =max
[
1, Rss+ 1.5(pit−1) + 0.54
( 1
1 +nt
Yt
Yt−1
−1
)
+eMt
]
, (4.21)
where Rss is the short-term nominal interest rate.
4.2.5 Market clearing
The market clearing condition for final goods is given by
Yt = Crt +Cwt + It, (4.22)
and the market clearing condition for asset holdings is
At
Pt
=QtKt, (4.23)
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where At =Art +Awt .
4.2.6 Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of sequences of endogenous variables for all periods, a se-
quence of quantities {Cwt , PPwt , PTwt , Hwt , Awt , Crt , PP rt , PT rt , Art , ΠMt , ΠKt , Tt,
and Kt, Lt, Yt, It, ϕt}, marginal propensities to consume {ξwt , ξrt }, and prices
{Rt, pit, rKt , Qt, Wt}, that satisfy the system of Equations (4.1)-(4.23), taking
the dynamics of the demographic processes as given. As there is population
growth, which could be the source of non-stationarity, I detrend the equation
system to get individual measures for both workers and retirees. To be precise,
Cwt , PP
w
t , PT
w
t , Hwt , Kt, Lt, Yt , and It are detrended by Nwt ; Crt , PP rt , and
PT rt are detrended by Nrt ; ΠMt , ΠKt , and Tt are detrended by Nt; Awt is
detrended by Nwt Pt; Art is detrended by Nrt Pt ; and Wt is detrended by Pt.18
4.3 Calibration
This section describes the parameter specification of the model for the U.S.
from 1990 to 2060 at a quarterly frequency. Individuals are born at age 16 as
workers and enter into retirement at age 65, implying an average quarterly rate
of remaining as workers, ω, as19 1.021−.25. The projected data for population
growth, nt, and dependency ratio, dt, are only available at 5-year intervals. To
get their quarterly measures, I use a similar method20 as Carvalho, Ferrero, and
Nechio (2016) for the generation of these two demographic processes and focus on
the impact of their long-term demographic trends. Their initial values in 1990
are from the United Nations World Population Prospects (the 2017 revision),
18Appendix C.2 lists the detrended counterparts of Equations (4.1)-(4.23).
19The annual rate is 1− 1/(65− 16) = 1.021−1, with its quarterly counterpart as
1.021−.25.
20I assume that nt and dt follow
nt = n1990 exp(n1t −n2t )
dt = d1990 exp(d1t −d2t ),
where nit and dit (for i= {1,2}) are stationary AR(1) processes. n1t and n2t share common
innovation εnt , similarly a common innovation εdt for d1t and d2t . The persistence parame-
ters and innovations of these four processes are chosen such that the generated processes
for nt and dt match their empirical counterparts.
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with the growth rate of population equal to the growth rate of the labor force.
As shown in Figure 4.2, the generated processes for both fit their data well. The
survival probability of retirees, γt , is backed out from Equation (4.3), with its
initial value calibrated with the steady-state counterpart of this equation:
γ = 1 +n− 1−ω
d
.
The demographic structure changes gradually from a relatively young popu-
lation, represented by the population of the U.S. in 1990, to a relatively old
population, represented by that in 2060.
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Figure 4.2: Demographic processes in the model and in the data
Note: In the left panel, the solid line and the dotted line represent the population
growth rate in the model and in the data, respectively. In the right panel, the
solid line and the dotted line are the dependency ratio in the model and in the
data, respectively.
I set the scale factor of the subjective discount factor β = 0.96.25. The cap-
ital share, α, is set to 0.45 given the declining trend of the U.S. labor share21
as shown by Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2013) and Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2013). The elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, σ, is set to 0.25, the same
21The labor share in the U.S. decreases from 0.64 in 1990 to 0.57 in 2012 according
to Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) due to advances in information technology. As
population ages, the accumulation of assets will push down the real interest rate and the
rental price of capital. More firms will shift away from labor to capital. Therefore, for
the period from 1990 to 2060, I use 0.45 for the capital share, which is higher than 0.33,
the value used in Gertler (1999).
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as Gertler (1999). The weight of consumption compared to leisure, υ, is set to
0.64 according to Kara and von Thadden (2016).
Table 4.1: Parameter Values in Simulation
Interpretation Value Rationale
ω Prob. of remaining as worker 1.021−.25
β Scale of subj. discount factor 0.96.25 Gertler (1999)
α Capital share 0.45 Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2013)
σ Ela. of intertemporal subs. 0.25 Gertler (1999)
ν For MRS (cons. & leisure) 0.64 Kara and von Thadden (2016)
δ Capital depreciation rate 1.1.25−1 Gertler (1999)
κ Ela. of subs. among goods 10 Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2000)
φ Price adjustment cost 24 Keen and Wang (2007)
S” Second derivative of inv. adj.
cost
2.48 Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005)
ρη Persistence of pref. shock 0.9 Krause and Moyen (2016)
On the firm side, I set the capital depreciation rate equal to 1.1.25−1, with
an annual depreciation rate of 10%, the same as Gertler (1999). I follow Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) and set the elasticity of substitution among goods
κ = 10, which suggests a 11% markup. I set the price adjustment cost φ = 24,
implying a duration of nine months for firms to re-optimize price in a Calvo-
type model, as shown by Keen and Wang (2007). The parameter governing the
investment adjustment cost is taken from Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005) with S” = 2.48. The persistence of preference shock is taken from Krause
and Moyen (2016), with the value of 0.9. Table 4.1 summarizes the parameter
values.
4.4 Simulation results
This section analyzes the effect of population aging on consumption inequal-
ity measured by the relative consumption ratio, which is the ratio of consumption
per retiree to consumption per worker. I first study the transition path of this
ratio under the projected demographic transition path from 1990 to 2060 for
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the U.S. Meanwhile, I carry out counterfactual experiments to disentangle the
effects of the increasing life expectancy and the decreasing population growth.
I go on to examine the effects of the ZLB on the asymmetry of consumption
with respect to shocks. Finally, I discuss the robustness of the results when the
retirement age is extended.
4.4.1 Transition path
Figure 4.3 shows the transition paths of simulated series from the initial steady
state in 1990 to the terminal steady state in 2060 given the assumed demo-
graphic shocks. To see the overall effects of population aging, I first simulate the
model under scenario (I): Both the survival probability of retirees and popula-
tion growth rate evolve as the generated processes described in Section 4.3 (solid
line in Figure 4.3). In addition, in order to disentangle the effects of the increas-
ing life expectancy and the decreasing population growth, I further simulate the
model under the following scenarios: (II) Only survival probability changes while
population growth rate remains at its initial level in 1990 (dotted, circle-hatched
line), and (III) only population growth rate changes while survival probability
remains at its initial level in 1990 (dotted line).
The top two panels present one of the main results of this paper: Con-
sumption inequality between retirees and workers increases in response to the
projected population aging. With full demographic changes, the relative con-
sumption ratio22 is expected to fall from 0.68 in 1990 to 0.41 in 2060. This
means that a retiree consumes 68% of the consumption level of a worker in 1990,
but only 41% of that in 2060, with a 40 percentage decline. At the same time,
the annual real interest rate is predicted to drop from 3.7% to -0.3% over this
period. Besides, we see that the change of the survival probability of retirees
plays a dominant role in the decline in the relative consumption ratio and the
real interest rate.
22This ratio is smaller than unity over time. This is consistent with Fernández-Villaverde
and Krueger (2007): Consumption per worker is higher than consumption per retiree.
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Figure 4.3: Simulations following different paths of demographic transition
Note: Solid line represents the full demographic transition; dotted, circle-hatched
line represents the case with only the increase in survival probability of retirees;
and dotted line represents the case with only the decrease in the labor force.
Assets per retiree and assets per worker are expressed relative to their
corresponding values in 1990.
The real interest rate declines because of the mismatch between the demand
and supply of assets. Population aging suggests insufficient availability of labor
and a sluggish demand of capital and assets. On the other side, both workers
and retirees tend to increase their asset holdings, as shown in the second bottom
panels. This naturally leads to an oversupply of assets. Assets per worker
increase for two reasons: First, the real wage increases with the deepening of
aging due to the relative scarcity of labor, so do labor supply and human wealth
per worker, which induces workers to increase savings to smooth consumption
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over the life cycle. Second, workers save more in order to insure against a
longer retirement period. For retirees, they also increase savings in order to
support future consumption, as their effective discounting factor increases with
the survival probability.
Notice that the increase in assets per retiree is higher than the increase in
assets per worker almost for the whole period. Due to population aging, it should
be just the opposite, since there are more retirees splitting the assets carried by
workers when the dependency ratio increases. This seemingly counterintuitive
result is due to the decline in the real interest rate.
When the real interest rate falls, assets become less attractive as a value-
preserving technology. This partially discourages workers’ incentive to carry
assets into retirement, which are used instead for workers’ consumption. In fact,
in the long run, the effect of the declining real interest rate dominates the incen-
tive to carry assets into retirement, and results in an increase in consumption
per worker, as shown in the second top panels. Without enough assets carried
by workers, retirees decreases their consumption to self-insure. Thus, from the
two bottom panels, we see that the MPC of retirees falls more than that of
workers, with a 59 percentage decrease for retirees, from 3.4% to 1.4%, and a
47 percentage decrease for the latter, from 1.9% to 1.0%. Therefore, consump-
tion inequality between retirees and workers increases. With the deepening of
population aging, the real interest rate is even likely to be pushed into negative
territory, which will induce even higher consumption inequality between retirees
and workers.
Counterfactual experiments (scenarios II and III) show that the increase in
the survival probability is almost the only demographic reason for the increase
in consumption inequality. It is responsible for almost all changes in the relative
consumption ratio. The reason is that the variation of population growth is
relatively small in size over the whole period, thus quantitatively unimportant
for the increasing dependency ratio23 and the declining real interest rate.
23In Appendix C.3, I carry out another decomposition exercise which illustrates the
relative importance of population growth rate and the survival probability on dependency
ratio. The result shows that the change in the survival probability plays a dominant role.
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4.4.2 The asymmetric dynamic effects
To investigate the distributional effect of the ZLB, I consider two types of unex-
pected shocks: a positive preference shock and an expansionary monetary policy
shock, which can force the nominal interest against the ZLB. I find that in both
cases the asymmetric effects of shocks on workers and retirees are mitigated in
dynamics, as retirees fully rely on the return of assets for consumption, therefore
can benefit from the binding of the ZLB.
4.4.2.1 Preference shock
Figure 4.4 presents the impulse response functions (IRFs) to an unexpected
positive preference shock24, which brings the subjective discount factor β from
an annual rate of 0.96 up to 1.00 in period 6, with an increase of about 4%.
The shock size generates enough contraction of output and inflation, resulting
in three quarters during which the ZLB binds.
The demographic structure is kept the same as that of the U.S. in 1990. Most
of the variables are reported in percentage deviation from steady state, except
for interest rates and inflation, which are in absolute deviation. In the IRFs, I
use the solid lines to represent the case when the central bank follows a Taylor
rule and the dotted lines when it follows a truncated Taylor rule.
For the time being, I ignore the constraint imposed by the ZLB. An increase
in the discount factor makes households become more patient and postpone
their consumption. In the short run, consumption declines immediately, both
for workers and retirees. Output drops instantaneously due to either the slug-
gish response of investment or sticky prices. The asset holdings of both agents
increase to support more future consumption. Firms adjust downward their la-
bor demand because capital is inelastic in the short run. Decline in the prices
of inputs follows, so does inflation. The increase in the discount factor can be
interpreted as a contractionary demand shock since it induces decline in both
24I use the toolkit proposed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), “occbin” , to solve the
DSGE model with a binding constraint. The IRFs, which compare the effects of shocks
(a positive preference shock and an expansionary monetary policy shock) under different
demographic structures, are available in Appendix C.4.1. In addition, I also present this
comparison under the assumption of a variable labor supply of retirees, which is used in
Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008), in Appendix C.4.2.
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output and inflation. The central bank follows a Taylor rule and decreases the
nominal interest rate to mitigate the effects of this contractionary shock.
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Figure 4.4: Impulse responses to a positive preference shock
Note: Solid lines represents the case without a binding ZLB constraint and
dotted lines represents the case with a binding ZLB constraint. The shock is an
unexpected increase in β and occurs in period 6.
When the central bank follows a truncated Taylor rule, the downward ad-
justment of the nominal interest rate is partially hindered as it cannot be pushed
into negative territory. With the presence of sticky prices, the equilibrium al-
locations of real variables depend on monetary policy and the presence of the
ZLB influences real allocations. The real interest rate increases, so does the
rental price of capital via the no arbitrage condition. The demand for capital
and labor decreases in comparison to the case when the ZLB is not binding,
therefore output and consumption fall more in the short run. From the impulse
responses, we see that output recovers with a lower speed, so do labor supply and
the real wage. For workers, human wealth recovers more slowly, which results
in an even lower adjustment of consumption. While for retirees, consumption
actually jumps back faster due to the rigidity of the nominal interest rate.
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Figure 4.5: Impulse responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock
Note: It is an unexpected negative shock in the Taylor rule and occurs in period
6. See Figure 4.4 for further notes.
Therefore, with respect to a positive preference shock, workers experience a
greater loss in consumption than retirees when the ZLB is binding. The reason
lies in the negative impact of the ZLB on labor earnings. Its binding partially
hinders the downward adjustment of the nominal interest rate, therefore gives
rise to further reduction in labor demand and the real wage. Given that workers
consume more than retirees in equilibrium, the presence of the ZLB mitigates
consumption inequality with respect to a positive preference shock.
4.4.2.2 Monetary shock
Figure 4.5 presents the IRFs to an unexpected expansionary monetary policy
shock, which brings the nominal interest rate from an annual rate of 3.7% down
to -4.3% in period 6, with a decline of 8% in level. The shock size ensures that
the IRFs with the ZLB binding are apparently different from those without the
binding constraint. The demographic structure is kept the same as that of the
U.S. in 1990.
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Without the ZLB on the nominal interest rate, an expansionary monetary
policy shock induces an instantaneous, sharp decrease in the nominal interest
rate. Due to the inertia of inflation in the presence of nominal rigidity, inflation
rate changes mildly. Investment, consumption, and output increase instanta-
neously via a lower real interest rate. Real wage and labor supply also increase
in support of the increase in output, so does capital. Accordingly, asset holdings
increase to clear the asset market.
After this monetary shock, the decline in investment is sluggish due to its
adjustment costs, but output falls with a faster speed. This necessitates the
reduction in consumption. From the IRF of consumption per retiree, we see
that the consumption of retirees is lower than its steady state for several quarters
after the monetary shock. While for workers, their consumption moves back to
its steady state much faster, because real wage and labor supply do not fall back
instantaneously after the shock with the sluggish adjustment of capital.
With the presence of the ZLB, the minimum of the nominal interest rate is
zero, thus the effect of an expansionary monetary policy is limited. The real
interest rate declines only mildly, which induces only mild changes in consump-
tion and asset holdings. Therefore, the asymmetric effects of monetary shock are
relatively small in size when the ZLB is binding, so does consumption inequality.
4.4.2.3 The effects of the ZLB under an older demographic structure
To verify the above results under an older demographic structure, I redo the
analyses for an older population with a 15% higher dependency ratio25. The
dependency ratio of the U.S. is 0.19 in 1990. With an increase of 15%, it adds
up to 0.22, corresponding to the dependency ratio in 2015. The increase in
dependency ratio is implemented by the corresponding increase in the survival
probability of retirees. The sizes of preference shock and monetary shock remain
the same.
Figure 4.6 reports the IRFs of the relative consumption ratio with and with-
out the ZLB under two these different demographic structures, with the top
panels for a positive preference shock and the bottom for an expansionary mon-
etary policy shock. The left panels, corresponding to the younger population of
25Instead of considering the whole transition path from 1990 to 2060, for simplicity, I
only compare the results under these two different demographic structures.
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Figure 4.6: The IRFs of the relative consumption ratio to shocks under different
demographic structures
Note: The top panels give the IRFs with respect to a preference shock, and the
bottom panels with respect to a monetary shock. From the left panels to the
right, population becomes older.
the U.S. in 1990, are just restating the main results in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 in
terms of the relative consumption ratio. Comparing with their counterparts in
the right panels, which correspond to that in 2015, we see that the mitigation
effect of the ZLB is unchanged as population ages, that is, the presence of the
ZLB can always mitigate consumption inequality between retirees and workers
in dynamics.
In summary, either with respect to a preference shock or a monetary shock,
the binding of ZLB can always decrease the asymmetric effects of shocks on re-
tirees and workers in dynamics, and reduce the consumption inequality between
them. Moreover, this result is robust to population aging.
4.4.3 Extension of retirement age
In this subsection, I discuss the robustness of the former results when the re-
tirement age is extended, a direct way to mitigate the effects of aging. The
mitigation might be weakened, especially in European countries, by a trend
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toward early retirement26. But research by Hairault, Sopraseuth, and Langot
(2010) and Chéron, Hairault, and Langot (2013) show that the retirement de-
cision of older workers depends on the distance to retirement. Because, with a
short distance to retirement, older job searchers have a low continuation value
of a job, thereby a low search effort. Then the extension of retirement age is
expected to postpone retirement and neutralize the threat of aging.
I consider an extension of the retirement age to 67 in 2020 in the U.S. The
probability of remaining as workers, ω, is changed27 from 1.021−.25 to 1.02−.25.
Dependency ratio becomes the ratio of the population over 67 to the new working
population28. The growth rate of labor force remains the same, and the survival
probability of retirees is backed out from the steady-state equation of dependency
ratio in the same way as the benchmark specification.
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Figure 4.7: Transition paths of the relative consumption ratio and the real in-
terest rate after an extension of retirement age (65→ 67)
26This trend could be due to the insufficient adaptability of older workers required by
technical progresses, but this is a debated issue. The empirical findings are rather mixed.
See Hairault, Sopraseuth, and Langot (2010) for details.
27After the extension, the the annual rate of ω is 1− 1/51, and the quarterly rate is
(1−1/51)0.25.
28The new working age refers to people aged 15-66 years. A direct measure of the new
dependency ratio is not available. I use the projection of age-specific population from the
United Nations World Population Prospects (2017 Revision) to calculate this ratio. As
the projected data are at 5-years intervals, we only have data of the age group of 65-69
years. I treat 40% of the age group of 65-69 years as working age population and the
other 60% as retirees.
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Figure 4.7 presents the comparison of the transition paths of the relative
consumption ratio and the real interest rate under different retirement arrange-
ments. The solid line represents the transition path when workers retire at age
65, and the dotted line at age 67 from 2020. We see that the transition path
for the relative consumption ratio shifts upward after the extension, so does
the transition path of the real interest rate, but the declining trend in both is
still present. Therefore, the extension of retirement age can mitigate the effects
of population aging, but does not change the increasing trend in consumption
inequality29.
Besides, I also recheck the distributional effect of the ZLB in dynamics when
retirement age is extended to 67. I find that the extension of retirement age
does not change the conclusion either: With respect to both types of shocks,
the binding of ZLB can always decrease asymmetric effects and consumption
inequality in dynamics.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between population aging and consumption
inequality between retirees and workers. The channels connecting these two
are the two implications of population aging—a downward pressure on the real
interest rate and the more frequent binding of the ZLB. The former makes assets
less attractive as a value-preserving technology and partially discourages workers’
incentive to carry assets into retirement, leading to an increasing transition path
of consumption inequality. In my calibrated model, the relative consumption
ratio, which is the ratio of consumption per retiree to consumption per worker, is
predicted to fall from 0.68 in 1990 to 0.41 in 2060, with a 40% decline for the U.S.
The latter decreases the asymmetric effects of shocks (preference and monetary
shocks) on retirees and workers, and reduces the consumption inequality between
them. Because the real return on assets decreases less with the presence of the
ZLB, which particularly benefits retirees.
My conclusions about the predicted transition path depend heavily on the
argument for the adjustment of asset holdings per worker to changes in the real
29Theoretically, a series of continuous and further extensions of retirement age is likely
to fully cancel out the declining trend of the real interest rate, thereby counteracting the
increasing consumption inequality in transition.
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interest rate. Therefore, one urgent future endeavor would be to find empirical
evidence on this asset adjustment due to population aging or changes in labor
market policies. A further task is the empirical identification of the relationship
between the relative consumption ratio and population aging30.
30The data of consumption per worker and consumption per retiree over time are not
easily available. The difficulty in identifying the empirical relationship makes this theo-
retical research more valuable.
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A.1 Specification of Equation (2.1)
With log-transformation of the level equation, Equation (2.1) becomes
log ut = ρlog ut−1 +eσtvt, (A.1)
together with Equation (2.2), we have
ut = (ut−1)ρexp{exp[(1−ρσ)σ¯+ρσσt−1]exp(ηεt)vt}. (A.2)
From Proposition 1 in Andreasen (2010), we have
E(exp[exp(ηεt)vt])→∞,
as its corresponding probability density function
g(εt,vt)≡ 12pi exp[e
ηεtvt−0.5(εt)2−0.5(vt)2], (A.3)
is an increasing function of εt for certain range of εt , η and vt1. Therefore,
the moment E(exp[exp(ηεt)vt]) does not exist. This means that the expected
unemployment rate goes to infinity. Clearly this is impossible to justify.
Similarly if we assume log (1−uit) follows an AR(1) in the level equation,
log (1−ut) = ρlog (1−ut−1) +eσtvt, (A.4)
1For example, if all three are bigger than unity.
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from which we can get the time-varying percentage standard deviation of em-
ployment rate, we will encounter the same problem.
A.2 Data sources
The age-specific unemployment rate data are from OECD Labour Force Statis-
tics database at an annual frequency. These are available from the age of 15
years with a 5-years interval. The main explanatory variable, the share of each
age group in the labor force, is also from this database. Besides, I also use the
share of population and the share of native population for each age group to deal
with potential endogeneity problems. For the former, I use the population size
of each age group from the OECD Demography and Population database2; for
the latter, I use the data of birth rate for each countries from Mitchell (2008).
Data for union density are from the OECD database trade union section since
1960. Data for union centralization of wage bargaining are from the ICTWSS
database (Visser (2016), 2016) since 1960 for 20 OECD countries. Data for the
strictness of employment protection legislation are available from 1960 to 1995
in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and from 1985 to 2013 in OECD Employment
Protection Legislation, but with different scales. I take the one from Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000) as the benchmark measure and extrapolate them using the
second series, such that the annual percentage change from 1996 in the extrapo-
lated data is the same as that in the other. Data for tax wedge are from Nickell
(2006) CEP-OECD institutions database since 1960 for 20 OECD countries, but
particularly unbalanced. I extrapolate these data until 2007 using the tax wedge
data from Bassanini and Duval (2006) and OECD Tax Statistics. Data for gross
replacement rate are from the benefits and wages section of the OECD database
since 1960.
2Under the link: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=POP_PROJ#
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A.3 Summary statistics of key variables
Table A.1: Unemployment volatility and demographic statistics
Young Prime-age Old
15-24 25-54 55-64
Unemployment
volatility
1.71 0.71 0.76
Share of labor force 0.18 0.71 0.12
Share of population 0.23 0.61 0.16
Share of native
population
0.17 0.60 0.23
Notes: Sample period: 1960-2007.
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A.4 Time-varying unemployment volatility by age group
for other sixteen countries
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Figure A.1: Time-varying unemployment volatility by age group (1/2)
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Figure A.2: Time-varying unemployment volatility by age group (2/2)
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Notes: Solid line is for young workers (15-24); dotted, triangle-hatched line is
for prime-age workers (25-54); and solid, square-hatched line is for old workers
(55-64).
A.5 Calculation of test statistics
Panel MW test refers to the panel Maddala and Wu (MW) unit root test. The
test statistic is defined as −2∑Ni=1 ln(pi), where pi is the p-value of ADF test
for country i. For the country-specific ADF test, it has a constant term and its
lag length is selected by the Akaike information criterion.
Average correlation refers to the average cross-sectional correlation coeffi-
cient. It is defined as 2/(N(N − 1))∑N−1i=1 ∑Nj=i+1 ρˆij , where ρˆij is the cross-
sectional correlation coefficient between country i and country j. For unbalanced
panel, according to Pesaran (2004), the calculation of ρˆij should also take care
of the fact that the residuals for subsets of t are not necessarily mean zero.
CD test is the Pesaran (2004) cross-sectional dependence (CD) test, which
is defined as
√
2/(N(N −1))∑N−1i=1 ∑Nj=i+1√Tij ρˆij , where Tij is the number
of common time-series observations between country i and j.
MW test refers to the panel Maddala and Wu (MW) cointegration test. The
test statistic is defined in a similar way as that of a panel unit root test. Now
the p-values are from the ADF unit root tests on the residuals of the model.
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A.6 The role of labor market institutions in the unem-
ployment volatility of young workers
Table A.2: Unemployment volatility and the share of labor force: young workers
- with the coefficients of LMIs
Model CCEP
Youth share 8.97***
(3.43)
Union density 0.14***
(0.02)
Union centralization -0.61
(0.90)
Employment protection legislation -1.05***
(0.24)
Tax wedge 0.04***
(0.01)
Gross replacement rate -0.01
(0.01)
Demand shock 0.42**
(0.19)
Nobs 644
R2 0.77
CD test 0.60
[0.55]
Notes: Sample period: 1960-2007, unbalanced panel of 20 OECD countries. The
dependent variable is the unemployment volatility of young workers.
See Tables 3 and 4 for further details.
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A.7 CCEMG estimators for prime-age and old workers
Table A.3: Unemployment volatility and the share of labor force: prime-age and
old workers
Age-specific share native population share
(prime-age)
native population share
(old)
Coef. of share 4.22
(6.46)
-2.04
(4.51)
Observations 627 627
CD test -0.49
[0.62]
-1.16
[0.24]
Notes: Sample period: 1970-2007, unbalanced panel of 20 OECD countries.
Model used in this table is the common correlated effects mean group (CCEMG)
estimator.
A.8 Redefinition of age group: the young (15-29)
Table A.4: Unemployment volatility and the share of labor force: young workers
(15-29)
Model CCEP
Age-specific
share
labor force share population
share
native population
share
(young) (young) (young)
Coef. of share 5.45***
(1.62)
4.73***
(1.42)
4.87**
(1.39)
LMIs & shock Yes Yes Yes
FETE Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 658 658 627
CD test [0.58] [0.57] [0.43]
Notes: Sample period: 1970-2007, unbalanced panel of 20 OECD countries. The
dependent variable is aggregate unemployment volatility.
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B.1 Participation’s share in unemployment volatility
(with different age groups categorization)
Table B.1: Decomposition of unemployment volatility: participation’s share
Female Male Both
15-24 15-64 15-24 15-64 15-24 15-64
Cov. excl. 1.87 0.39 0.40 0.05 0.81 0.10
Cov. incl. 4.72 1.68 2.38 1.30 2.82 1.19
Notes: Robustness check for Table 1. See Table 1 for further notes.
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B.2 Unemployment volatilities of other age groups and
demographic changes
Table B.2: Unemployment volatility and demographic changes: prime-age and
old workers
Labor force
share
Population
share
Labor force
share
Population
share
Prime-age Old
Coefficient -3.54
(2.25)
-1.30
(2.17)
3.26
(3.73)
3.57
(3.04)
Nobs 658 658 658 658
R2 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.79
Notes: Unbalanced panel of 20 OECD countries, sample period: 1960-2007. The
dependent variable for Columns 1-2 is the unemployment volatility of prime-age
workers (25-59 years old), and for Columns 3-4, it is the unemployment volatility
of old workers (60-64).
See Table 2 for further notes.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 1.
Taking partial derivative of PYt = (Yt)1−σλ1(Y Yt )σ−1 with respect to SYt gives
∂PYt
∂SYt
= (1−σ)[(Yt)−σλ1(Y Yt )σ−1 ∂Yt
∂SYt
− (Yt)1−σλ1(Y Yt )σ−2
∂Y Yt
∂SYt
]
= (1−σ)PYt (
1
Yt
∂Yt
∂SYt
− 1
Y Yt
∂Y Yt
∂SYt
),
from which we see that the effect of demographic changes on the price of output
produced by young workers is negatively related to its effect on output produced
by young workers and positively related to its effect on final goods.
As the output produced by young workers can be written as
Y Yt =AtnYt SYt E(a|a> a˜Yt ),
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we have
∂Y Yt
∂SYt
= At
(
nYt E(a|a> a˜Yt ) +SYt E(a|a> a˜Yt )
∂nYt
∂SYt
+nYt SYt
∂E(a|a> a˜Yt )
∂SYt
)
.
Besides, we have
∂nYt
∂SYt
=−n
Y
t F
′(a˜Yt )
1−F (a˜Yt )
∂a˜Yt
∂SYt
and1
∂E(a|a> a˜Yt )
∂SYt
=
[
E(a|a> a˜Yt )− a˜Yt
] F ′(a˜Yt )
1−F (a˜Yt )
∂a˜Yt
∂SYt
,
thus ∂Y
Y
t
∂SYt
can be written as
∂Y Yt
∂SYt
= At
[
nYt E(a|a> a˜Yt ) + a˜Yt SYt
∂nYt
∂SYt
]
.
Similarly, we can get the corresponding expression for ∂Y
O
t
∂SYt
:
∂Y Ot
∂SYt
= At
[
−nOt E(a|a> a˜Ot ) + a˜Ot (1−SYt )
∂nOt
∂SYt
]
.
For ∂Yt
∂SYt
, as capital is also in inelastic supply in the short-run, we have
∂Yt
∂SYt
= (Yt)1−σ
[
λ1(Y Yt )σ−1
∂Y Yt
∂SYt
+ (1−λ1)Ωt(1−λ2)(Y Ot )ρ−1
∂Y Yt
∂SYt
]
= PYt
∂Y Yt
∂SYt
+POt
∂Y Yt
∂SYt
.
1For the derivative of the conditional expectation, I used the fact that
∫ ∞
a˜Y
a
dF (a)
1−F (˜aY ) = a˜
Y +
∫ ∞
a˜Y
[1−F (˜aY )]da
1−F (˜aY )
is true for any function F such that F (∞) = 1 and the Leibniz integral rule.
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Plugging the equations for ∂Y
Y
t
∂SYt
, ∂Y
O
t
∂SYt
, and ∂Yt
∂SYt
back into the equation for
∂PYt
∂SYt
, one gets2
∂PYt
∂SYt
= (1−σ)PYt At
[(
E(a|a> a˜Yt )nYt + a˜Yt SYt
∂nYt
∂SYt
)( 1
Yt
PYt −
1
Y Yt
)
− 1
Yt
POt n
O
t E(a|a> a˜Ot )
]
.
From the optimization of final firm’s problem, it is easy to see that Yt >PYt Y Yt ,
which leads to 1YtP
Y
t Atn
Y
t − 1Y Yt Atn
Y
t = AtnYt ( 1YtP
Y
t − 1Y Yt ) < 0. Besides, it is
easy to see that nYt > SYt
∂nYt
∂SYt
, which means that the change in the employment
rate due to demographic changes cannot be greater than itself. Therefore, we
have ∂P
Y
t
∂SYt
< 0, since σ ∈ (0,1). 
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2.
In the following, I try to identify the sign of ∂a˜
Y
∂SYt
. With free entry condition and
wage equation, the asset value of a job for the young can be written as
JYt (At, at) = (1−η)(PYt Atat−z)−ηςY θYt +
ςY
qYt
.
Besides, from JYt (At, a˜t
Y ) = 0, we can get the reservation productivity for the
young explicitly as
a˜t
Y = 1
PYt At
[z+ 11−η (ης
Y θYt −
ςY
qYt
)].
Taking derivative with respect to SYt yields
∂a˜Yt
∂SYt
=− a˜
Y
t
PYt
∂PYt
∂SYt
+ ς
Y
PYt At
1
1−η (η−
µ
fYt
) ∂θ
Y
t
∂SYt
.
2Here I use the assumption that the employment rate of the old is irresponsive to the
changes in the youth share.
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which suggests the effect of the youth share on the reservation productivity of the
young depends on not only its effect on the price of intermediate goods produced
by young workers, but also its effect on the market tightness of young labor
market. It is necessary to express the second effect with known expressions. After
abstracting from aggregate productivity shock, the asset equation for young can
be written as
SMY (A, a) = PY Aa−z+β (1−ρx)(1−fY η)
∫ ∞
a˜Y
SMY (A, a)dF (a),
and free entry condition as
ςY
qY
= β (1−ρx)(1−η)
∫ ∞
a˜Y
SMY (A, a)dF (a).
As SMY (A, a˜Y ) = 0, subtracting SMY (A, a˜Y ) from SMY (A, a), we get
SMY (A, a) = PY A(a− a˜Y ),
then free entry condition becomes
ςY
qY
= β (1−ρx)(1−η)APY
∫ ∞
a˜Y
(a− a˜Y )dF (a).
Taking derivative with respect to SYt yields
∂θY
∂SYt
= f
Y β(1−ρx)(1−η)A
ςY µ
[(E(a|a> a˜Y )−(1−F (a˜Y ))a˜Y )∂P
Y
∂SYt
−(1−F (a˜Y ))PY ∂a˜
Y
∂SYt
].
Combining the above two equations with partial derivatives gives
∂a˜Y
∂SYt
=
β(1−ρx)
[
E(a|a > a˜Y )−(1−F (a˜Y ))a˜Y ]+ a˜Y /(1−fY )
PYM
∂PY
∂SY
,
where M =−1/(1−fY ) +β(1−ρx)(1−F (a˜Y )).
As the probability of a young worker being matched is lower than 1, we can
get that 1/(1− fY ) > 1 and the second part of M is smaller than 1, thus it is
easy to see that M < 0. Besides, the conditional expectation of idiosyncratic
productivity is higher than the reservation productivity, thus, E(a|a > a˜Y )−
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(1−F (a˜Y ))a˜Y > 0. Together with the result from Proposition 1, which suggests
that higher supply of young labor will drive down the price of intermediate
goods produced by young, ∂P
Y
∂SY
< 0, we can conclude that the youth share has
a positive effect on the reservation productivity of the young.
B.5 Derivation of the equations for ∂ lnθY∂ lnA and
∂ lnuY
∂ lnA in
case of endogenous job separation
Part 1: ∂ lnθY∂ lnA
In steady state, the free entry condition becomes3
ςi
qi
=β (1−ρx)(1−η)
∫ ∞
a˜i
SMi(A, a)dF (a) =β (1−ρx)(1−η)P iA
∫ ∞
a˜i
[1−F (a)]da.
(B.1)
Evaluating the equation for match surplus at a˜i gives the condition for reserva-
tion productivity
P iA(a˜i+β (1−ρx)
∫ ∞
a˜i
[1−F (a)]da) = zi+ ηθ
iςi
1−η . (B.2)
Equations (B.1) and (B.2) uniquely determine the steady values of market tight-
ness, θi, and reservation productivity, a˜i. With these two equations, I can derive
the comparative statics for the responsiveness of market tightness with respect
to aggregate productivity.
From Equation (B.1), we have
ςY
qY
= β (1−ρx)(1−η)PY A
∫ ∞
a˜Y
[1−F (a)]da. (B.3)
Taking log form and totally differentiating with respect to lnA gives
∂ lnθY
∂ lnA µ= 1 +
∂ lnPY
∂ lnA −
[1−F (a˜Y )]a˜Y∫ ∞
a˜Y
[1−F (a)]da
∂ ln a˜Y
∂ lnA . (B.4)
3The second equality follows from integration by parts for any function such that
F (∞) = 0 and the condition ∂S
i
t(At,at)
∂at
= P itAt.
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From Equation (B.2), we have
PY A{a˜Y +β (1−ρx)
∫ ∞
a˜Y
[1−F (a)]da}= z+ ηθ
Y ςY
1−η . (B.5)
Taking log form and totally differentiating with respect to lnA gives
(1 + ∂ lnP
Y
∂ lnA ){a˜Y +β (1−ρx)
∫ ∞
a˜Y
[1−F (a)]da}+
∂ ln a˜Y
∂ lnA a˜
Y {1−β(1−ρx)[1−F (a˜Y )]}= ∂ lnθY∂ lnA ηθ
Y ςY
PY A(1−η) .
(B.6)
Combining Equations (B.3) and (B.4) to substitute out
∫ ∞
a˜Y
[1−F (a)]da,
and the same for Equations (B.5) and (B.6), then solving for ∂ lnθ
Y
∂ lnA and get
∂ lnθY
∂ lnA = (
∂ lnPY
∂ lnA + 1)
z(1−η)β(1−ρx)f˜Y
ςY θY
+ 1−β(1− ρ˜Y ) +ηβ(1−ρx)f˜Y
µ[1−β(1− ρ˜Y )] +ηβ(1−ρx)f˜Y
.
Denote z˜Y ≡ z/(PY A
∫ ∞
a˜Y
a dF (a)
1−F (˜aY ) ) and f˜
Y ≡ fY [1−F (a˜Y )], and use the fact
that4
∫ ∞
a˜Y
a dF (a)
1−F (˜aY ) = a˜
Y +
∫ ∞
a˜Y
[1−F (a)]da
1−F (˜aY ) , then z˜
Y becomes
z˜Y = z
a˜Y +
F (a˜Y )
∫ ∞
a˜Y
[1−F (a)]da
1−F (˜aY ) +
∫ ∞
a˜Y
[1−F (a)]da
.
Using Equation (B.3) to substitute out the first integral in the denominator and
Equation (B.5) to substitute out the second integral, then get
z˜Y = zβ(1−ρ
x)f˜Y (1−η)
PY Aa˜Y f˜Y (1−η)[β(1−ρx)−1] +θY ςY − (f˜Y η− [1−F (a˜Y )])θY ςY +zf˜Y (1−η)
.
4Which can be obtained from the integral of
∫ ∞
a˜Y
[1−F (a)]da by parts. In fact, there
is a limit for the upper bound, as a follows a lognormal distribution.
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Combining Equations (B.3) and (B.5) to get
(f˜Y η− [1−F (a˜Y )])θY ςY = (PY Aa˜Y −z)(1−η)f˜Y .
Substituting this term into the expression of z˜Y to get
z(1−η)β(1−ρx)f˜Y
ςY θY
= z˜
Y β(1−ρx)(f˜Y η− [1−F (a˜Y )]) + z˜Y
1− z˜Y .
After the substitution of this term into the expression of ∂ lnθ
Y
∂ lnA , it can be
simplified as
∂ lnθY
∂ lnA =
1−β(1− ρ˜Y ) +ηβ(1−ρx)f˜Y
µ[1−β(1− ρ˜Y )] +ηβ(1−ρx)f˜Y
∂ lnPY
∂ lnA + 1
1− z˜Y .
Part 2: ∂ lnuY∂ lnA
Notice that the elasticity of the overall job-finding rate with respect to aggregate
productivity can be written as
∂ ln f˜Y
∂ lnA =
∂ ln([1−F (a˜Y )]fY )
∂ lnA
= (1−µ)∂ lnθ
Y
∂ lnA −
f(a˜Y )a˜Y
1−F (a˜Y )
∂ ln a˜Y
∂ lnA ,
and the elasticity of the overall separation rate with respect to aggregate pro-
ductivity can be written as
∂ ln ρ˜Y
∂ lnA =
∂ ln [ρx+ (1−ρx)F (a˜Y )]
∂ lnA
= (1−ρ
x)f(a˜Y )a˜Y
ρx+ (1−ρx)F (a˜Y )
∂ ln a˜Y
∂ lnA .
With endogenous separation, employment rate at each segmented labor mar-
ket evolves according to
nYt = (1− ρ˜Y )(nYt−1 + f˜Yt−1uYt−1).
B.6. (LINEARIZED) EQUATION SYSTEM 115
Therefore the steady state value for unemployment rate is
uY = ρ˜
Y
ρ˜Y + (1− ρ˜Y )f˜Y .
Thus the elasticity of unemployment with respect to aggregate productivity
is
∂ lnuY
∂ lnA =
f˜Y
ρ˜Y + (1− ρ˜Y )f˜Y
∂ ln ρ˜Y
∂ lnA −
(1− ρ˜Y )f˜Y
ρ˜Y + (1− ρ˜Y )f˜Y
∂ ln f˜Y
∂ lnA
= f˜
Y
ρ˜Y + (1− ρ˜Y )f˜Y {f(a˜
Y )a˜Y [(1−ρx)(1 + 1
ρ˜Y
)]∂ ln a˜
Y
∂ lnA
−(1− ρ˜Y )(1−µ)∂ lnθ
Y
∂ lnA }.
B.6 (Linearized) equation system for model with en-
dogenous separation
1. Euler equation:
c−τt = βEt[c
−τ
t+1(rt+1 + 1− δ)]
0 = Et[τ(cˆt− cˆt+1) + r
r+ 1− δ rˆt+1]
2. Output of intermediate goods:
Y Yt = AtnYt SY
∫ ∞
a˜Yt
a
dF (a)
1−F (a˜Yt )
Y Ot = AtnOt (1−SY )
∫ ∞
a˜Ot
a
dF (a)
1−F (a˜Ot )
Yˆ it = Aˆt+ nˆit+
H ′(a˜i)a˜i
H(a˜i)
ˆ˜a
i
t
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where H(a˜i) ≡
∫ ∞
a˜i
a dF (a)
1−F (˜ai) and H
′(a˜i) = dH (˜a
i)
da˜i
= f (˜a
i)[H (˜ai)−a˜i]
1−F (˜ai)
5
3. Output of final good:
Yt = [λ1(Y Yt )σ + (1−λ1)(λ2(Kt)ρ+ (1−λ2)(Y Ot )ρ)σ/ρ]1/σ
Yˆt =λ1(
Y Y
Y
)σYˆ Yt +
1−λ1(Y Y /Y )σ
λ2(K)ρ+ (1−λ2)(Y O)ρ (λ2K
ρKˆt+(1−λ2)(Y O)ρYˆ Ot )
4. Price of intermediate goods produced by young:
PYt = (Yt)1−σλ1(Y Yt )σ−1
PˆYt = (1−σ)Yˆt+ (σ−1)Yˆ Yt
5. Price of intermediate goods produced by old:
POt = (Yt)1−σ(1−λ1)Ωt(1−λ2)(Y Ot )ρ−1
PˆOt = (1−σ)Yˆt+Ωˆt+ (ρ−1)Yˆ Ot
where Ωˆt = σ−ρλ2(K)ρ+(1−λ2)(Y O)ρ (λ2K
ρKˆt+ (1−λ2)(Y O)ρYˆ Ot ).
6. Price of capital:
rt = (Yt)1−σ(1−λ1)Ωtλ2(Kt)ρ−1
5As H (˜ai) ≡
∫ ∞
a˜i
a
dF (a)
1−F (˜ai)
, H′ (˜ai) =
d
∫ ∞
a˜i
adF (a)/da˜i
1−F (˜ai)
−
∫ ∞
a˜i
adF (a)
(1−F (˜ai))2
(−f (˜ai)). With
Leibniz integral rule, it is easy to see that:
d
∫ ∞
a˜i
adF (a)/da˜i =−f (˜ai )˜ai
therefore,
H′ (˜ai) = −f (˜a
i )˜ai
1−F (˜ai) +
f (˜ai)H (˜ai)
1−F (˜ai)
= f (˜a
i)[H (˜ai)− a˜i]
1−F (˜ai)
.
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rt = (1−σ)Yˆt+Ωˆt+ (ρ−1)Kˆt
7. Aggregate resource constraint:
ct+Kt+1 = Yt+ (1− δ)Kt−vYt SY ςY −vOt (1−SY )ςO
ccˆt+KKˆt+1 = Y Yˆt+ (1− δ)KKˆt−SY ςY vY vˆYt − (1−SY )ςOvO vˆOt
8. Evolution of employment rate:
nit = (1−ρit)(nit−1 +φi(vit−1)1−µ(uit−1)µ)
nˆit+
ρi
1−ρi ρˆ
i
t = (1−ρi)nˆit−1 +ρi(1−µ)vˆit−1 +ρiµuˆit−1)
9. Evolution of unemployment rate:
uit = 1−nit
uiuˆit =−ninˆit
10. Labor market tightness:
θit = vit/uit
θˆit = vˆit− uˆit
11. Overall separation rate:
ρit = ρx+ (1−ρx)F (a˜it)
ρˆit =
(1−ρx)a˜if(a˜i)
ρi
ˆ˜a
i
t
12. Overall job-finding rate:
frit = (1−ρx)[1−F (a˜it+1)]φiθit1−µ
fˆ r
i
t =−
a˜if(a˜i)
1−F (a˜i)
ˆ˜a
i
t+1 + (1−µ)θˆit
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13. Reservation productivity:
a˜t
i = 1
P itAt
[z+ ς
i
1−η (ηθ
i
t− (θit)µ/φi)]
ˆ˜a
i
t =−Pˆ it − Aˆt+
ςi
1−η (ηθi−µ(θit)µ/φi)
z+ ςi1−η (ηθi− (θi)µ/φi)
θˆit
14. Free entry condition in differential equation:
ςi(θit)µ
φi
= βEt{
c−τt+1
c−τt
(1−ρit+1)[(1−η)P it+1At+1H(a˜it+1)
−ςiηθit+1− (1−η)z+
ςi(θit+1)µ
φi
]}
µθˆit− τ cˆt = −τEtcˆt+1−
ρi
1−ρiEtρˆ
i
t+1 +
ςi(µ(θi)µ/φi−ηθi)Etθˆit+1
B
+
(1−η)P iA[H(a˜i)(EtPˆ it+1 +EtAˆt+1) +H ′(a˜i)a˜iEtˆ˜a
i
t+1]
B
where B = (1−η)P iAH(a˜i)− ςiηθi− (1−η)z+ ςi(θi)µ/φi.
15. Aggregate productivity shock:
lnAt = ψAlnAt−1 +eAt
Aˆt = ψAAˆt−1 +eAt
16. Aggregate unemployment rate:
ut = uOt (1−SY ) +uYt SY
uuˆt = uO(1−SY )uˆOt +uYt SY uˆYt
17. Aggregate vacancies:
vt = vOt (1−SY ) +vYt SY
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vvˆt = vO(1−SY )vˆOt +vYt SY vˆYt
18. Aggregate market tightness:
θt = vt/ut
θˆt = vˆt− uˆt
19. Aggregate job-finding rate:
frt = [uOt (1−SY )frOt +uYt SY frYt ]/ut
fˆ rt =
uOt (1−SY )frOt (fˆ r
O
t + uˆOt ) +uYt SY frYt (fˆ r
Y
t + uˆYt )
uOt (1−SY )frOt +uYt SY frYt
− uˆt
20. Aggregate separation rate6:
ρt = 1− (1−ut)/[(1−SY )(nOt−1 +fOt−1uOt−1) +SY (nYt−1 +fYt−1uYt−1)]
− ρ˜1− ρ˜ ρˆ
i
t = −
u
1−uuˆt−
(1−SY )[nOnˆOt−1 + f˜OuO((1−µ)θˆOt−1 + uˆOt−1)]
(1−SY )(nO +fOuO) +SY (nY +fY uY )
−S
Y [nY nˆYt−1 +fY uY ((1−µ)θˆYt−1 + uˆYt−1)]
(1−SY )(nO +fOuO) +SY (nY +fY uY )
B.7 Bellman equations for model with exogenous job
separation
The Bellman equation for the asset value of a job in term of final good is
J it = P itAt−ωit+ (1−ρx)Etβt, t+1J it+1.
The value of a vacancy is
V it =−ςi+Etβt, t+1[qit(1−ρx)J it+1 + (1− qit)V it+1].
6It comes from the evolution of age-specific employment rate, which gives 1− ρ˜t =
nt
nt−1+ft−1ut−1
.
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For workers, the asset value of being matched is
W it = ωit+Etβt, t+1[(1−ρx)W it+1 +ρU it+1].
The expected value of being unemployed is
U it = z+Etβt, t+1[f it (1−ρx)W it+1 + (1−f it (1−ρx))U it+1].
B.8 Derivation of the equation for ∂ lnθY∂ lnA in case of ex-
ogenous job separation
In case of no aggregate uncertainty (At =A), we can solve for the asset value of
a job,
J i = (1−η)(P
iA−zi)−ηςiθi
1−β(1−ρx) .
Plugging this into the free entry condition, we can get a implicit function for
market tightness θi
ςi
β(1−ρx)qi =
(1−η)(P iA−zi)−ηςiθi
1−β(1−ρx) .
Denote aggregate productivity α≡ [1−β(1−ρx)]/[β(1−ρx)] and rearrange the
equation,
α
ςi
qi
+ηςiθi = (1−η)(P iA−zi).
Totally differentiate the above equation,
−αςi [q
i(θi)]′
[qi(θi)]2 dθ
i+ηςidθi = (1−η)d(P iA),
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then, we can get
eYθ,A =
∂θY
∂A
A
θY
= ∂θ
Y
∂(PY A−zY )
PY A−zY
θY
∂(PY A−zY )
∂A
A
PY A−zY
= 1−η
ηςY −αςY [qY (θY )]
′
[qY (θY )]2
α ς
Y
qY θY
+ηςY
1−η
∂ ln(PY A−zY )
∂ lnA
= α+ηf
Y (θY )
αµ+ηfY (θY )
∂ ln(PY A−zY )
∂ lnA .
For the second term, we can get that ∂ ln(P
Y A−zY )
∂ lnA =
∂(PY A−zY )
∂A
A
PY A−zY =
(A∂P
Y
∂A +PY )
A
PY A−zY . Then, we have
eYθ,A =
∂ lnθY
∂ lnA =
1−β(1−ρx) +ηβ(1−ρx)fY
µ[1−β(1−ρx)] +ηβ(1−ρx)fY
∂ lnPY
∂ lnA + 1
1−zY /(PY A) .
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B.9 IRFs with respect to an aggregate productivity
shock (with exogenous job separation)
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Figure B.1: IRFs of variables of the young with respect to an aggregate produc-
tivity shock across demographic states (with exogenous separation)
Appendix C
Appendices to Chapter 4
C.1 Derivations of Euler equations for households and
FOCs for final goods producers
C.1.1 Retirees’ problem
C.1.1.1 Derivation of the dynamic equations
Substituting in the objective function with Crjkt using in the constraint, we get
the first-order condition with respect to Arjkt as
βtγt+1(V rjkt+1 )
ρ−1 ∂V
rjk
t+1
∂Arjkt
= (C
rjk
t )ρ−1
Pt
.
The Envelope condition is
∂V rjkt+1
∂Arjkt
=
(V rjkt+1 )1−ρ(C
rjk
t+1)ρ−1
γt+1
Rt
Pt+1
. (C.1)
Combining the FOC with Equation (C.1) yields the Euler equation:
Rt
pit+1
βt
(Crjkt+1
Crjkt
)ρ−1
= 1.
123
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Substitution of the guess function for Crjkt into the budget constraint yields
the dynamic equation for asset holdings:
Arjkt
Pt
= 1− ξ
r
t
γt
Rt−1Arjkt−1
Pt
+Πrjkt −Tt− ξrt (PP rjkt −PT rjkt ).
Combining the guess function for Crjkt with the Euler equation yields the
dynamic equation for the marginal propensity to consume of retirees, ξrt :
ξrt+1
[ 1
γt+1
(RtArjkt
Pt+1
)
+PP rjkt+1−PT rjkt+1
]
= ξrt
(
βt
Rt
pit+1
) 1
1−ρ( 1
γt
Rt−1Arjkt−1
Pt
+PP rjkt −PT rjkt
)
.
With the dynamic equations for the present discounted value of profits and
tax payment,
PP rjkt = Π
rjk
t +
pit+1γt+1
Rt
PP rjkt+1
PT rjkt = T
rjk
t +
pit+1γt+1
Rt
PT rjkt+1,
and the dynamic equation for asset holdings, the dynamic equation for the
marginal propensity to consume can be simplified to
ξrt = 1−γt+1βt
1
1−ρ
( Rt
pit+1
) ρ
1−ρ ξrt
ξrt+1
.
C.1.1.2 Verification of the conjecture of the value function of retirees
Suppose that V rjkt+1 = (ξrt+1)
− 1ρCrjkt+1 is true. We need to check whether V
rjk
t =
(ξrt )
− 1ρCrjkt is also true. From the Bellman equation of the value function of
retirees, we can have
(V rjkt )ρ = (C
rjk
t )ρ+βtγt+1(V
rjk
t+1 )
ρ
= (Crjkt )ρ+βtγt+1(ξrt+1)−1(C
rjk
t+1)
ρ
= (Crjkt )ρ+βt
1
1−ρ γt+1(ξrt+1)−1
( Rt
pit+1
) ρ
1−ρ (Crjkt )ρ.
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In the last step, I use the Euler equation for retirees. Then, it is easy to see
that the dynamic equation for ξrt in Equation (4.1) is sufficient to justify that
V rjkt = (ξrt )
− 1ρCrjkt is true.
C.1.2 Workers’ problem
C.1.2.1 Derivation of the dynamic equations
The first-order conditions with respect to labor supply and assets, respectively,
are
Lwjt = 1−
1−v
v
Pt
Wt
Cwjt
v(Cwjt )ρv−1(1−Lwjt )ρ(1−v)
Pt
= βt[ωt+1V wjt+1 + (1−ωt+1)V rj(t+1)t+1 ]ρ−1[
ωt+1
∂V wjt+1
∂Awjt
+ (1−ωt+1)
∂V
rj(t+1)
t+1
∂Awjt
]
.
The Envelope condition is
∂V wjt+1
∂Awjt
= v(Cwjt+1)
ρv−1(1−Lwjt )ρ(1−v)(V wjt+1)1−ρ
Rt
Pt+1
. (C.2)
As the initial asset holdings of a retiree equal to the asset holdings of a worker
before she becomes a retiree, which is Awjt =A
rj(t+1)
t . It is easy to see that
∂V
rj(t+1)
t+1
∂Awjt
=
∂V
rj(t+1)
t+1
∂A
rj(t+1)
t
= (V rj(t+1)t+1 )
1−ρ(Crj(t+1)t+1 )
ρ−1 Rt
Pt+1
. (C.3)
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Combining the second FOC with Equations (C.2) and (C.3) yields the Euler
equation for consumption1:
(Cwjt )ρv−1(1−Lwjt )ρ(1−v) = βt
(
ωt+1V
wj
t+1 + (1−ωt+1)V rj(t+1)t+1
)ρ−1
Rt
pit+1
[
ωt+1(V wjt+1)
1−ρ(Cwjt+1)
ρv−1(1−Lwjt+1)ρ(1−v)
+(1−ωt+1)ν−1(V rj(t+1)t+1 )1−ρ(Crj(t+1)t+1 )ρ−1
]
.
Conjecture that the value function of workers takes the form
V wjt = (ξwt )−1/ρC
wj
t
(1−v
v
Pt
Wt
)1−v
,
where ξwt is the marginal propensity to consume of workers. Then, the Euler
equation for consumption can be written as
ωt+1
(
1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
Cwjt+1 + (1−ωt+1)
(
ξrt+1
ξw
t+1
)−1/ρ
C
rj(t+1)
t+1
=
(
βt
Rt
pit+1
Ωt+1
) 1
1−ρ(1−v
v
Pt
Wt
) ρ(v−1)
1−ρ
Cwjt ,
where Ωt+1 ≡ ωt+1
(
1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
+ (1−ωt+1)ν−1
(
ξrt+1
ξw
t+1
)− 1−ρρ .
Guess that consumption of workers is a fraction ξwt of the total wealth:
Cwjt = ξwt
(Rt−1Awjt−1
Pt
+Hwjt +PP
wj
t −PTwjt
)
,
where Hwjt is the present discounted value of human wealth for a worker, and
PPwjt , PT
wj
t are, respectively, the present discounted values of profits from firms
and tax payment for a worker.
1If a worker becomes a retiree at time t+ 1, the survival probability is 1 for current
period, namely:
∂V
rj(t+1)
t+1
∂A
rj(t)
t
= λt+1
Rt
Pt+1
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Substitution of guess functions for Crj(t+1)t+1 and C
wj
t into the Euler equation
for the consumption of workers yields2
[
1− ξwt −β
1
1−ρ
t
(
Rt
pit+1
) ρ
1−ρ(Ωt+1) 11−ρ(Ω′t+1)−1(1−vv PtWt) ρ(v−1)1−ρ ξwtξwt+1 ]
Rt−1Awjt−1
Pt
=
[
−1 + ξwt +β
1
1−ρ
t
(
Rt
pit+1
) ρ
1−ρ(Ωt+1) 11−ρ(Ω′t+1)−1(1−vv PtWt) ρ(v−1)1−ρ ξwtξwt+1 ]
(Hwjt +PP
wj
t −PTwjt )
+Hwjt +PP
wj
t −PTwjt −
(
Wt
Pt
Lwjt +Π
wj
t −Tt
)
− pit+1Rt
ωt+1
Ω′
t+1
(
1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
(Hwjt+1 +PP
wj
t+1−PTwjt+1)− pit+1Rt
1−ωt+1
Ω′
t+1
(
ξrt+1
ξw
t+1
)1−1/ρ
(PP rj(t+1)t+1 −PT rj(t+1)t+1 ),
where Ω′t+1 ≡ ωt+1
(
1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
+ (1−ωt+1)
(
ξrt+1
ξw
t+1
)− 1−ρρ .
This equation holds if
ξwt = 1−
[
Ωt+1
(1−v
v
Pt
Wt
)ρ(v−1)
βt
( Rt
pit+1
)ρ] 11−ρ(Ω′t+1)−1 ξwtξwt+1
Hwjt =
Wt
Pt
Lwjt +
pit+1
Rt
ωt+1
Ω′t+1
(1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
Hwjt+1
PPwjt = Π
wj
t +
pit+1
Rt
ωt+1
Ω′t+1
(1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
PPwjt+1
+pit+1
Rt
1−ωt+1
Ω′t+1
(ξrt+1
ξwt+1
)1−1/ρ
PP
rj(t+1)
t+1
PTwjt = Tt+
pit+1
Rt
ωt+1
Ω′t+1
(1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
PTwjt+1
+pit+1
Rt
1−ωt+1
Ω′t+1
(ξrt+1
ξwt+1
)1−1/ρ
PT
rj(t+1)
t+1 .
2Note that: Crj(t)t = ξrt (
RtA
wj
t
Pt
+PP rj(t)t −PT rj(t)t ), as the initial asset holdings for
a retiree is the same as that of a worker.
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C.1.2.2 Verification of the conjecture of the value function of workers
Suppose that V rjkt+1 = (ξrt+1)
− 1ρCrjkt+1 and V
wj
t+1 = (ξwt+1)−1/ρC
wj
t+1
(
1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
are true. We need to check whether V wjt = (ξwt )−1/ρC
wj
t
(
1−v
v
Pt
Wt
)1−v
is also
true. From the Bellman equation of the value function of workers, we can have:
(V wjt )ρ =
[
(Cwjt )v(1−Lwjt )1−v
]ρ+βt[ωt+1V wjt+1 + (1−ωt+1)V rj(t+1)t+1 ]ρ
=
[
(Cwjt )v
(1−v
v
Pt
Wt
Cwjt
)1−v]ρ
+βt
[
ωt+1(ξwt+1)−1/ρC
wj
t+1
(1−v
v
Pt+1
Wt+1
)1−v
+(1−ωt+1)(ξrt+1)−1/ρCrj(t+1)t+1
]ρ
=
(1−v
v
Pt
Wt
)(1−v)ρ
(Cwjt )ρ
+βt
[
(ξwt+1)−1/ρ
(
β
Rt
pit+1
Ωt+1
) 1
1−ρ(1−v
v
Pt
Wt
) ρ(v−1)
1−ρ
Cwjt
]ρ
.
In the last step, I use the Euler equation for workers. Then, it is easy to see
that, the dynamic equation for ξwt in Equation (4.2) is sufficient to justify V
wj
t =
(ξwt )−1/ρC
wj
t
(
1−v
v
Pt
Wt
)1−v
is true.
C.1.3 Final goods producer’s Problem
max
Yt(i)
Pt
( 1∫
0
Yt(i)(κ−1)/κdi
)κ/(κ−1)
−
1∫
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di
The first-order conditions with respect to input Yt(i):
κ
κ−1Pt
( 1∫
0
Yt(i)(κ−1)/κdi
)κ/(κ−1)−1 κ−1
κ
Yt(i)−1/κ = Pt(i),
which can be written as:
Yt(i) =
(Pt(i)
Pt
)−κ
Yt.
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C.2 Detrended system of equations
1. Marginal propensity to consume of retirees:
ξrt = 1−γt+1(β exp(ηt))
1
1−ρ ( Rt
pit+1
)
ρ
1−ρ ξ
r
t
ξrt+1
2. Marginal propensity to consume of workers:3
ξwt = 1−
[
Ω˜t+1
(1−v
vwt
)ρ(v−1)
β exp(ηt)
( Rt
pit+1
)ρ] 11−ρ(Ω˜′t+1)−1 ξwtξwt+1
3. Dependency ratio:
(1 +nt)dt = 1−ωt+γtdt−1
4. Consumption of retirees:4
crt = ξrt (
Rt−1art−1
(1 +nt)pit
+pprt −ptrt )
5. Consumption of workers:
cwt = ξwt [
Rt−1awt−1
(1 +nt)pit
+hwt +ppwt −ptwt ]
6. Labor supply:
lt = 1− 1−v
v
cwt
wt
7. Law of motion for asset holdings of retirees:
art =
Rt−1art−1(1− ξrt )
(1 +nt)pit
+ Π˜Mt + Π˜Kt − tt− ξrt (pprt −ptrt )
+1−ωt+1
ωt+1dt
awt
3Where the detrended Ωt+1 is Ω˜t+1 = ωt+1( 1−vvwt+1 )
1−v +(1−ωt+1)ν−1( ξ
r
t+1
ξw
t+1
)−
1−ρ
ρ ,
and the detrended Ω′t+1 is Ω˜
′
t+1 = ωt+1(
1−v
vwt+1
)1−v + (1−ωt+1)( ξ
r
t+1
ξw
t+1
)−
1−ρ
ρ .
4Detrended variables are denoted by lower-case letters. For the profits from firms, I
use Π˜t to distinguish from inflation rate pit. Similarly, the detrended Ωt is denoted as Ω˜t,
to distinguish from the probability of remaining as worker ωt.
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8. Human wealth:
hwt = wtlt+
pit+1
Rt
ωt+1
Ω˜′t+1
(1−v
vwt
)1−vhwt+1
9. Present discounted value of profits of retirees:
pprt = Π˜Mt + Π˜Kt +
pit+1γt+1
Rt
pprt+1
Present discounted value of lump-sum tax of retirees:
ptrt = tt+
pit+1γt+1
Rt
ptrt+1
10. Present discounted value of profits of workers:
ppwt = Π˜Mt + Π˜Kt +
pit+1
Rt
ωt+1
Ω˜′t+1
(1−v
vwt
)1−vppwt+1
+dt+1pit+1
Rt
1−ωt+1
Ω˜′t+1
(
ξrt+1
ξwt+1
)
ρ−1
ρ pprt+1
Present discounted value of lump-sum tax of workers:
ptwt = tt+
pit+1
Rt
ωt+1
Ω˜′t+1
(1−v
vwt
)1−vptwt+1
+dt+1pit+1
Rt
1−ωt+1
Ω˜′t+1
(
ξrt+1
ξwt+1
)
ρ−1
ρ ptrt+1
11. Output:
yt = lt1−α(
kt−1
1 +nt
)α
12. Real wage:
wt = (1−α)ϕtytl−1t
13. Cost of capital:
rKt = αϕtyt(
kt−1
1 +nt
)−1
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14. Profits from intermediate goods producers:
(1 +dt)Π˜Mt = [1 + τ −ϕt−
φ
2 (pit−1)
2]yt
15. New Keynesian Phillips curve:
κ(ϕt−1)−φ(pit−1)pit+ pit+1
Rt
φ(pit+1−1)pit+1 = 0
16. Profits of capital producers:
(1 +dt)Π˜Kt = awt +artdt+
rKt kt−1
(1 +nt)
− it−
Rt−1(awt−1 +art−1dt−1)
pit(1 +nt)
17. Law of motion for capital:
kt = (1− δ) kt−11 +nt +{1− (1 +nt)
2S”[( it
it−1
)2/2− it
it−1
+ 12]}it
18. Rental cost of capital:
Qt =
pit+1
Rt
[Qt+1(1− δ) + rKt+1]
19. Lagrange multiplier on the capital formation:
1 = Qt{1− (1 +nt)2S”[( it
it−1
)2/2− it
it−1
+ 12]− (1 +nt)
2S”( it
it−1
−1) it
it−1
}
+pit+1Qt+1
Rt
(1 +nt+1)3S”(
it+1
it
)2( it+1
it
−1)
20. Government budget constraint:
(1 +dt)tt = τyt
21. Truncated monetary policy:
Rt =max [1, Rss+ 1.5(pit−1) + 0.54 (
yt
yt−1
−1) +eMt ]
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22. Market clearing for final goods:
yt = crtdt+ cwt + it
23. Market clearing for assets:
artdt+awt =Qtkt
C.3 Decomposition of dependency ratio
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Figure C.1: Decomposition of dependency ratio
Note: The solid line is the actual transition path of dependency ratio, with the
joint effects of population growth and life expectancy. The dotted,
square-hatched line is a counterfactual transition path of dependency ratio, which
assumes that only the survival probability of retirees changes while the
population growth rate remains at its initial level in 1990. The dotted line
represents another counterfactual transition path, which assumes that only the
population growth rate changes while the other remains at its initial level in 1990.
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C.4 Effects of population aging
C.4.1 When retirees enjoy full leisure
Response to a positive preference shock as population gets older5:
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Figure C.2: Response to a preference shock when retirees enjoy full leisure
Response to an expansionary monetary policy shock as population gets older:
5For easy comparison, different demographic structures are defined in the same way as
Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008): Younger population refers to their baseline scenario, with
the average life expectancy equal to 75, and older population refers to the scenario with
this value equal to 85.
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Figure C.3: Response to a monetary shock when retirees enjoy full leisure
C.4.2 When retirees endogenously decide their labor
supply
Stationary results corresponding to Table 2 in Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008):
Table C.1: Values under stationary population
c/y k/y R ar/k ξw ξr lw lr
(i) 0.70 10.3 0.01 0.16 0.016 0.03 0.41 0.05
(ii) 0.70 10.3 0.01 0.22 0.013 0.02 0.41 0.12
Notes: All variables are detrended in the same way as Fujiwara and Teranishi
(2008), divided by the size of labor force, thus low-case letters do not necessarily
mean the per capita counterparts. The values of marginal propensity to consume
of workers, ξw, are slightly lower than those in Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008). In
their case, these two are 0.017 and 0.014, respectively.
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IRFs corresponding to Figure 4 in Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008):
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Figure C.4: Response to a technology shock with flexible labor supply from
retirees
IRFs corresponding to Figure 8 in Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008):
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Figure C.5: Response to a monetary shock with flexible labor supply from re-
tirees
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